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1 
PREFACE 
 
Professor Brian Fitzgerald 
 
 
This book arises from a conference that I convened along with Benedict Atkinson at 
Old Parliament House in Canberra. 
The conference was held near to the day of the 40th anniversary of the 
commencement of the Australian Copyright Act of 1968.1 
Ben Atkinson’s work -The True History of Copyright – had encouraged me to 
assemble key figures in Australian copyright history at Old Parliament House to 
discuss the past, present and future of copyright law.  
I am thankful to the presenters for their generosity and insights and to the enthusiastic 
participants for making the conference a lively forum of discussion.  
I am also thankful to the Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence for 
Creative Industries and Innovation (CCi) and QUT (my home institutions) for 
supporting the conference and the many people who helped make the conference a 
success including Ben Atkinson, Tanya Butkovsky, Anne Fitzgerald, Steven Gething, 
Rami Olwan, Elliott Bledsoe, Kylie Pappalardo, Xiao-Xiang Shi and Nic Suzor.  
A special thank you to Ruth Bell of the Ngunnawal people for her Welcome to 
Country. 
While I had high hopes that this would be an interesting event I had not anticipated 
the excitement that the conference would generate.  
The essays we have collected in this volume are only a selection of what was on offer.  
We trust that you will enjoy them.  
 
Professor Brian Fitzgerald 
Brisbane 
October 2010 
                                                             
1 The Act commenced on 1 May 1969. 
2 
FOREWORD 
 
The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG1 
 
COPYRIGHT WILL CONTINUE 
Towards the end of this book, in his second contribution on national, regional and 
international perspectives of copyright, Professor Adrian Sterling shares with the 
reader an anecdote from his long career in the world of copyright law.2 
He describes the conclusion of the conference of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) in 1996, at which the WIPO treaties on copyright and related 
rights were approved. According to his recollection, the Director of WIPO at the time, 
Dr Arpad Bogsch, greeted him in what was to be their last meeting. Dr Bogsch 
declared: “Sterling, these treaties are only a step in the history of copyright. You and I 
will disappear, but copyright will continue”. Affirming that “Dr Bogsch was always 
right”, Adrian Sterling draws comfort and encouragement from this prediction.  
Partly in consequence of the exponential growth of technology in recent years (and 
especially the development of the internet), the challenges to copyright law, as it has 
evolved, are daunting. Traditionalists, even of the most devoted kind, must sometimes 
wonder how the fabric that they have built, and loved, can remain intact under the 
multiple assaults launched against it. Criticisms have been conceived in ideology, 
nurtured in politics and self-interest and delivered by a never-ending stream of 
technological changes. So it has been in the past thirty years. So it will probably be in 
the decades ahead. 
Just to show that miracles can still happen to retired judges, when I departed Barwick’s 
High Court building, I had no computer on my desk. Not far from the building could 
be seen the art deco elegance of Old Parliament House, Canberra. That was where the 
conference was held whose papers are collected in this book. Not long before I 
attended the conference, I could not open a computer, still less send an email or 
conduct a Google search. Well, necessity is not only the essential ingredient for an 
                                                             
1 Justice of the High Court of Australia (1996–2009). One time chairman of the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (1975–84); Judge of the Federal Court of Australia (1983–4); Laureate of the 
UNESCO Prize for Human Rights Education (1998). 
2 A. Sterling, “Current Issues: National, Regional and International Perspectives, this volume, p215. 
3 
implication that a statutory licence will be implied as a matter of law under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s183 into a contract between a creator and its clients in 
favour of a State3, it is also the mother of a retiree’s inventiveness. So now, like more 
than a billion others of my species, I lock my mind every day into the internet. It trawls 
and searches through cyberspace, opening up original works of countless others, 
available for the most part free online.  
THE DYNAMIC OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
My newfound capacity with the internet has brought me into acquaintance with all the 
fashionable outlets, even YouTube. A video doing the rounds on this network reveals, 
amongst other things4: 
If you were one in a million in China, there would be 1300 people just like 
you.  
China will soon be the number one English-speaking nation on earth. 
The top ten in-demand jobs in 2010 did not even exist in 2004. 
One in eight couples in the United States who married in 2010 met on line. 
Every month in 2010, 31 billion searches were conducted using Google. In 
2006, the figure was 2.7 billion. 
The number of years that it took to reach a market of 50 million was: in the 
case of radio, 38 years; of television, 13 years; of the internet, 4 years; the 
iPod, 3 years; Facebook, 2 years.  
200 million users of Myspace, if they were a nation, would be fifth largest in 
the world, ranked between Indonesia and Brazil.  
The number of internet devices in 1984 was 1000. In 1992, a million. In 
2008, 1000 million. 
The amount of new technological information is doubling every two years. 
For students taking a four year technical degree, this means that half of what 
they have learned in their first year of study will be outdated by their third 
year of study.  
By 2013, a super computer will be built that exceeds the computational 
capacities of the human brain. Predictions are that by 2049, a $1,000 
                                                             
3 Copyright Agency Limited v State of New South Wales [2008] HCA 35; (2008) 233 CLR 279 at 305–6 
[92]-[93], citing Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; 
(2006) 229 CLR 577 at 584 [13]-[14] per Gummow ACJ; and at 606 [96], per Kirby and Crennan JJ. 
4 www.youtube.com/watch?v=cL9Wu2kWwSY. 
4 
computer will exceed the computational capacity of the entire human 
species.  
During the course of this presentation, 67 babies were born in the US; 274 in 
China; 395 in India and 694,000 songs were downloaded illegally. 
From the point of view of experts in the law of copyright, the sting in the tail of this 
YouTube presentation (which lasted all of four minutes) was to be found in the 
concluding statistic. All of those worthy individuals and citizens, many of them 
children (some maybe even judges), are knowingly, ignorantly or indifferently finding 
themselves in breach of international and national copyright law. And they intend to 
keep on doing exactly as before.  
THE LEGAL AND THE ILLEGAL 
The fact that this is so and is of such little concern to so many, profoundly interests 
Professor Laurence Lessig, whose keynote address is featured in this book.5 Young 
people, especially, view remixes, for example, as a type of conversation. Just as in 
earlier days, young people sang the songs of the day, or old songs together. As 
Professor Lessig describes it: 
Instead of gathering in the corner, or on the back lawn, people from around 
the world are using this digital platform to engage in a form of read-write 
technology. 
Some activities of the new generations are unregulated by law. But some are definitely 
contrary to law. Just as in earlier generations, buying tea at Boston Harbour, upon 
which royal tax had not been paid, was contrary to law. Or just as adult private 
homosexual activity was (as it still is in many places) contrary to law. Or providing 
sterile injecting equipment to minimise the spread of HIV/AIDS was (and often still 
is) contrary to law. Law is not everything. But lawyers tend to consider that it is rather 
important that it should be obeyed and respected. Otherwise, if it is ignored or defied, 
that fact might bring down the whole edifice of the rule of law. 
In the same chapter, Adrian Sterling quotes the recent report Digital Britain as making 
this point:6 
In the new digital world, the ability to share content legally becomes ever 
more important and necessary … There is a clear and unambiguous 
distinction between the legal and illegal sharing of content which we must 
                                                             
5 L. Lessig, “Culture Wars: Getting to Peace, this volume, p129. 
6 Sterling, n2 above at p240 citing BERR, Interim Report, Digital Britain, (January 2009, The 
Stationery Office), par.[3.2]. 
5 
urgently address. But we need to do so in a way that recognises that, when 
there is very widespread behaviour and social acceptability of such 
behaviour that is at odds with the rules, then the rules, the business models 
that the rules have underpinned and the behaviour itself, may all need to 
change … Our aim, in the rapidly changing digital world is a framework 
that is effective and enforceable, both nationally and across borders. But it 
must be one which also allows for innovation in platforms, devices and 
applications … 
How can international and national copyright law be changed to conform not just 
with the technology that is with us now, but with the amazing pace of technological 
expansion that is happening so fast that we cannot even imagine where we will be in a 
couple of decades? The slow-moving pace of legislative change, bureaucratic decisions 
and judicial opinion-writing makes it difficult, if not impossible, to cope with the 
current pace of technological innovation in informatics. And if this is true of 
municipal law, how much more true in the case of international law, where the 
economic, social, cultural and other diversities are such that consensus (with all its 
subtle nuances) can only be achieved through intensely time-consuming negotiations, 
trade-offs against competing interests and overcoming hurdles presented by countless 
obstacles? 
THE WARM EMBRACE OF SOFT LAW 
In my early days as chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, I was 
introduced to the challenges of the impact of technology on the law in several of the 
projects of the Commission. They included the reports on human tissue 
transplantation7 and privacy.8 Thus, scientific developments suddenly helped to 
overcome the previous human immune rejection of transplants. And just as the 
Commission was about to deliver its report on transplantation law, a baby, Louise 
Brown, was born as a result of in vitro fertilisation. The use of foetal tissue already then 
loomed as a new challenge for gaining a local consensus over the shape that Australian 
law should take. Prudently, perhaps, the Commission elected to leave these issues 
aside, for separate attention. Safer by far to limit our recommendations to the 
transplantation of corneas and kidneys. A foetus seemed to raise different and more 
controversial questions. 
                                                             
7 Australian Law Reform Commission, Human Tissue Transplants, (ALRC 7, 1977). 
8 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy (ALRC 22, 1983), 206. 
6 
In the privacy report, the Commission recommended (and the Australian Parliament 
accepted9) certain ‘information privacy principles’ to guide decisions on the protection 
of privacy in the then new world of computer processing. These principles were, in 
turn, derived from a report of the Expert Group on Privacy of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) which I had chaired in Paris 
1978–80.10  
There was wisdom at that time in proceeding along the path earlier charted by “soft 
law”, in the form of the OECD Guidelines. This is a point that has been made in the 
context of copyright law by Professors Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji, when 
conceiving a future international instrument on limitations and exceptions to 
copyright.11 Still, the dangers of soft law, when translated into the hard law of national 
statutory texts, was quickly demonstrated to the Australian Law Reform Commission 
by supervening advances in information technology. Suitable to the technology as it 
stood when the OECD report was completed (and endorsed by the Council of that 
organisation in 1980) was the ‘use limitation principle’. For protection of individual 
privacy, this principle limited the later use of [private] personal information to a use 
for which the information had earlier been [lawfully] collected or any other use to 
which the data subject had given consent or specific approval was granted by law. But 
with the advent of search engines, such as Google, that principle, at least in the terms 
originally expressed, became unsuitable, if not unworkable and probably unthinkable. 
So enormous were the utilities of the search engines that no-one could hope to turn 
back the clock.  
Although this meant the active use of information with personal identifiers for 
purposes other than those first given (necessarily some of it out-of-date and gathered 
for quite different and even alien purposes) the marginal utility of the facility of the 
search engine was far greater than the marginal cost in the loss of privacy or in any 
(futile) attempt to restore the old legal regime so as to apply to the new informatics. 
In this sense, therefore, the problem now faced by intellectual property lawyers in 
general (and copyright lawyers in particular), because of the advance of technology 
and the huge public engagement with it, is nothing new. What is new, as the report 
Digital Britain explains, is the “very widespread behaviour and social acceptability” 
                                                             
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD, Paris, 1981.  
10 See M.D. Kirby, “The History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD Guidelines on Privacy” 
(2010) 20 Journal of Law, Information and Science 1. 
11 P.B. Hugenholtz and R.L. Okediji, Conceiving an International Instrument on Limitations and 
Exceptions to Copyright (Final Report), March 06, 2008, Uni of Amsterdam and Uni of Minnesota, 5. 
7 
that comes in the train of the new technology and effectively demands the acceptance 
of a new legal paradigm.  
COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
What should that paradigm be? This is a question that recurs throughout the 
contributions collected in this book. Professors Hugenholtz and Okediji have pointed 
out that, certainly in our legal tradition of the common law”12 
It is a well-established principle of copyright doctrine that the qualified 
grant of proprietary rights over the fruits of creative enterprise is directed 
first and foremost at the promotion of the public interest. Most countries 
around the world explicitly recognise this vital goal as a foundational 
element of their copyright systems.13 Indeed, from the very first formal 
copyright law, the British Statute of Anne (1710), the encouragement of 
learning and dissemination and knowledge as a means to enhance the 
general welfare has been the chief objective behind the grant of exclusive 
rights to authors14. For over 100 years, this public-centred rationale of 
copyright protection has been recognised and clearly articulated in all major 
instruments for the global regulation of copyright15. The currently pre-
eminent Global Intellectual Property (IP) Treaty, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights16 (TRIPS) Agreement, concluded under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, recently 
reflected and re-affirmed this basic precept by describing the overarching 
objective of intellectual property protection under the Agreement as “the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge … 
conducive to social and economic welfare”17 
Yet, it is one thing to express, in general language, a commitment to “public interest”, 
“learning and dissemination of knowledge” and “mutual advantage”. It is often quite 
                                                             
12 Ibid, 6. 
13 See e.g. US Constitution, Art.1, sec8, cl8. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation Of Certain Aspects Of Copyright And Related 
Rights In The Information Society, OJ No.L167 at 10 (2001), pmbl 3. 
14 See Statute of Anne, 8Anne c19 (1710), pmbl and art.[2] 1. 
15 See Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886 as last 
revised, July 24, 1976; 828 UNTS 221; Universal Copyright Convention (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, 
December 20, 1996. 
16 TRIPS Agreement, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, Annex.1C; 33 ILM 81 (1994). 
17 TRIPS Agreement, n15, art.7. See also id. Art 8.1. 
8 
another to translate these aspirational phrases into activities that are accepted by the 
several competing interests that are at stake. The competition of interests will include 
such practical concerns as respective economic advantages. They will offer perceptions 
of what is right, derived from legal history and doctrine that can differ quite markedly 
between nations. They will sometimes include a particular element offered by 
competing assertions of the requirements of international human rights law. Because 
this is an area of law with which I have had some involvement over three decades, I 
must refer to it in this context. 
THE NEW PARADIGM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The language of international human rights is not antagonistic to intellectual property 
protection. Providing legal protections for intellectual property (including patents of 
invention, trademarks and copyright) is by no means alien to the objectives of 
universal human rights. To the contrary, from the very start of the attempts in the 
post-Second World War era, to express and uphold universal human rights, a place 
has always existed for the defence of those interests that are conventionally safe-
guarded by intellectual property law.  
Thus, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights18 (UDHR), prepared in 1947–8 by 
a committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States of America (and 
brought into operation in the General Assembly of the United Nations by a vote over 
which an Australian, Dr. H.V. Evatt, presided), the following article was included: 
Article 27 
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
The potential juxtaposition of, and tension between, the foregoing paragraphs was 
immediately noted. When the UDHR was transformed into a treaty, relevantly the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)19, the states 
parties to the treaty committed themselves to “achieving progressively the full 
                                                             
18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, GA Resolution 217A(iii), 1948. 
19 993 UNTS 1453 (1976). 
9 
realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.20 
Amongst the rights recorded in the ICESCR were: 
Article 15 
1. The States Parties to the present covenant recognise the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present covenant to 
achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary for the 
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present covenant undertake to respect the 
freedom indispensible for scientific research and creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present covenant recognise the benefits to be 
derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts 
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields. 
Again, within the very same article, principles are stated that appear to pull in 
differing, and even opposite, directions, so far as the award of exclusive rights to 
creative authors is concerned. However, it is not always appreciated that international 
human rights law includes provisions expressly recognising and accepting the 
fundamental, universal and morally justifiable character of the nominated intellectual 
property rights.  
Of course, in the attainment of those rights, it is necessary to secure a reconciliation of 
each such right with the other rights provided elsewhere by international human rights 
law, according to their terms. Thus, the rights of some persons must be reconciled 
with those of others. The rights afforded by some articles of the human rights treaties 
must be reconciled with the rights of others under other treaties. Notably, in apparent 
competition with a provision such as that in Article 15 of the ICESCR are the 
following rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)21:  
Article 19 
                                                             
20 ICESCR, Art2.1 
21 999 UNTS 171 (1976), 16 December 1966 (emphasis added). 
10 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject 
to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary:  
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals.” 
Many of the contemporary debates about the shape and direction of international and 
national copyright law involve an endeavour to reconcile the foregoing rights. I am 
sure that some intellectual property lawyers, particularly those of a parochial kind who 
have never ventured outside their intellectual specialty, will have little sympathy for 
my mention of this backdrop of international human rights law. However, it is 
reassuring to see the attention given to the subject in this book by, amongst others, 
Adrian Sterling.22 Correctly, he invokes international human rights law to rebuff the 
more extreme assertions of IP-phobic commentators, calling for the abolition of IP 
protection altogether, or, at least, modification in relation to material freely available 
on the internet.23 
Just as reminders of the aspirational core value of “public interest” in copyright law 
can sometimes give little practical guidance to municipal lawyers or lawmakers, so 
appeals to the broad language of the UDHR or the ICESCR may sometimes send 
different signals to different minds, according to their susceptibility, backgrounds and 
interests.  
An important point has been made in this connection by Professors Graeme Austin 
and Amy Zavidow24 in an article on “Copyright Law Reform Through a Human Rights 
Lens”.25 Whilst accepting that international human rights law will not necessarily 
resolve the tensions between proponents and critics of copyright law, the authors 
suggest, for the purpose of reform (in my view correctly), that international law 
                                                             
22 Cf. Sterling, n2 above p240.  
23 Ibid, p227. 
24 Both of the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. 
25 “Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, 2008, Arizona Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No.0734. 
11 
affords unexplored territory, potentially useful for defenders of global copyright 
regimes. Moreover, Austin and Zadidow assert that:  
Debates about the domestic law reform agenda in the copyright field could 
be richer and more salient if they were accompanied by deeper engagement 
with public international law – both the public international law of 
intellectual property and international human rights law.  
This is an appeal that I would endorse. Unfortunately, it sometimes needs 
endorsement in countries, such as Australia and the United States, which tend to be 
rather parochial and even a tad self-satisfied about their law in general, and their 
intellectual property law in particular.  
DESTABILISING PREVIOUS BALANCES 
A special difficulty that is peculiar to the need, which international human rights law 
recognises, to reconcile competing human rights norms, is the fact that, in many 
countries, particularly in the developing world, there are inadequate provisions either 
in constitutional law or the domestic legal tradition and practice, to speak up for the 
right of access to information when it comes into conflict with intellectual property 
rights asserted by powerful commercial interests. This is a point which has been made 
by Professor Michael Birnhack in his article “Global Copyright, Local Speech”26. 
Birnhack argues that, whatever its original history, copyright law today is less a means 
of promoting progress in science (as the words of the United States Constitution 
proclaim) so much as protecting established national interests in the matter of trade. 
The TRIPS Agreement of the WTO has effectively produced a global copyright regime 
which, Birnhack concludes, has “de-stabilised previous balances”. He argues that the 
shift to a global trade environment requires an urgent re-evaluation of the previous 
balances, particularly because, in the face of expanding trade-related copyright, the 
competing norms of international human rights law (access to information, research 
and free speech) tend to be “left unattended”.  
Professor Birnhack argues that this result is especially true in developing countries, 
mostly with neither express nor effective constitutional provisions to uphold free 
speech and usually with inadequate political will to do so. In short, Birnhack’s special 
concern is about the effective imposition of copyright obligations, through TRIPS and 
bilateral free trade agreements, whereby, as he puts it, as “the trade benefits to The 
North have a cost in limiting access to information, use thereof and formation of new 
speech, or more generally, it has a cost in freedom, in The South”.  
                                                             
26 24 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 491 (2006). 
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Not all writers in this field are as pessimistic as Professor Birnhack. Professors L.R. 
Helfer and G.W. Austin, in an excellent review: “Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property: Mapping the Global Interface”,27 conclude that the intersection of human 
rights and intellectual property law is now “unavoidable”.28 They classify the responses 
of lawyers in the field into four groups:  
 The first are those human rights lawyers who declare that, basically, IP law 
does not fit into the new world of human rights. By reference to the history 
and the texts of the UDHR and ICESCR, it is suggested that such opponents 
“understand the discourse of one complex legal and political system but not 
the other”.29  
 Secondly, they identify the IP protagonists who are deeply fearful of, and 
therefore hostile towards, international human rights law; proclaiming that it 
will “promote government intervention in private innovation markets and … 
radically scale back or even abolish IP protection”.30 They point out that this 
is simply not likely to happen in the real world.  
 The third category includes those lawyers from both camps who worry that 
the international legal system is being overly fragmented, so that it is difficult 
to acknowledge the competing values of human rights and IP. The authors 
accept that there is a specific problem of whether the current decision-makers 
within WTO, for example, “are adequately equipped” to mediate the 
conflicting values of international IP treaties and of human rights law31.  
 Finally, they themselves suggest a fourth approach, which they urge should be 
“empirically grounded”.32 That is, it should recognise that both human rights 
and IP legal regimes are continually evolving in response to changing 
conceptions of fundamental legal entitlements and technological progress. 
They point out that no empirical approach to that reconciliation of 
international law which will best protect the legitimate interests of all players 
will occur, without improvement in the process, transparency and 
predictability of the current techniques.33  
                                                             
27 Arizona Legal Studies, DP No.10–18 (University of Arizona, May 2010). 
28 Ibid, 10. 
29 Ibid, 11. 
30 Ibid, 11. 
31 Ibid, 12. 
32 Ibid, 16. 
33 For an example of a practical way in which the broad principles of fundamental rights may be used 
in choosing the preferable construction of municipal copyright legislation and thus securing a 
reconciliation see e.g. Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd  75 545 US 913 (2005) per 
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TOWARDS A NEW RECONCILIATION 
In this connection, Professors Helfer and Austin make what seems to me to be a 
powerful point: 
A salient recent example is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), a proposed multi-lateral treaty that would establish new and more 
robust obligations for states to suppress unauthorised uses of intellectual 
property. For two years, ACTA negotiations occurred in secret and 
governments refused to disclose an official draft text of the treaty. Only after 
a French civil rights NGO leaked the document revealing “contradictions 
between the text and public comments by [government] negotiators” did 
governments release an official text. This lack of transparency involving 
potentially far-reaching changes to domestic and international intellectual 
property laws and enforcement mechanisms is disturbing, as is the inability 
of interested constituencies to, in the words of the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, “take part in … any significant decision-making 
processes that have an impact on their rights and legitimate interests.34 
Whilst secrecy on the part of powerful national interests (doubtless egged on by the 
sometimes even more powerful interests of transnational corporations) may be 
understandable, it is intolerable as a matter of global policy and principle. It may itself 
be a breach of international human rights norms. Little wonder that many observers of 
international copyright law, and of its current directions and indecisions, are 
suspicious and antagonistic. Nevertheless, Professors Helfer and Austin, make very 
useful suggestions. It is essential to know exactly how in practice the current 
international regimes operate. There is no doubt that intellectual property protections 
are still useful and justifiable in principle. Moreover, in the international context, they 
have the support of express provisions in international human rights law itself.  
At the end of their analysis, Professors Helfer and Austin conclude in words that I 
would endorse:35 
[T]here may be no incompatibility if individuals retain the right to be 
acknowledged as creators and to receive remuneration for at least some 
uses. The more fundamental point, however, is that although creators and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Breyer J (with whom Stevens and O’Connor JJ joined) and Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Corp 
[2005] HCA 58; (2005) 224 CLR 193 at 255–258 [213]-[221] per Kirby J. 
34 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.17, 
The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, 
Literary or Artistic Product of which he is the Author, Art.15(1)(c). UN Doc.E/C/12/2005, par.[34] 
(November 21, 2005). 
35 Helfer and Austin, above n26, 24. 
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innovators do indeed possess a narrow class of inalienable economic and 
personality rights, they can choose how best to exercise those rights so as to 
construct a zone of personal autonomy that is both self-empowering and 
conducive to the broader public values that the human rights framework for 
IP seeks to achieve. 
Those broader frameworks will include creative commons, incentives designed to 
reduce poverty, disease, misgovernment and other afflictions as well as limitations and 
exceptions to copyright protection, yet to be worked out. 
The working out is, of course, a major enterprise. It will not happen overnight. Indeed, 
it will not happen any time soon. But a step in the right direction is to collect the 
informed experts. To encourage amongst them a constructive clash of opinions. To lift 
the thinking of all so as to take them outside their comfort zones, shaped by current 
international and municipal law and perceptions of past practice and present national 
interests. And to stimulate bold and inventive thinking.  
THE URGENCY OF LAW REFORM  
This was the objective of the conference convened at Old Parliament House, Canberra 
on the 40th anniversary of Australia’s Copyright Act of 1968. It is what makes this 
book, collecting those proceedings, so interesting, topical and valuable. It is all here. 
Anecdotes. Analysis. History. Optimism. Pessimism. Ways forward. Scepticism. 
Hostility. Infatuation. Fierce reformism. And passionate defence of the status quo. The 
editors and organisers deserve praise. But, the greatest reward for the contributors will 
be if this book helps to stimulate consideration of law reform, both at an international 
and national level. 
     
Michael Kirby 
February 2011 
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CONFERENCE OPENING SPEECH 
 
The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia,  
The Hon Robert McClelland, MP 
 
 
First, may I acknowledge the traditional owners of the land we meet on – and pay my 
respects to their elders, both past and present.  
Professor Brian Fitzgerald, Queensland University of Technology  
The Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG  
The Honourable Greg James QC  
Professors Lessig, Cohen and Sterling  
Distinguished guests 
Ladies and gentlemen  
Good morning and thank you for your welcome to this important conference.  
It is now 40 years since the commencement of the 1968 Copyright Act.  
When former Attorney-General, Nigel Bowen, introduced the Bill into Parliament in 
1967, which completely revised Australia’s copyright law, he acknowledged that:  
the law of copyright is assuming a greater practical and economic 
importance both within Australia and internationally. 
His statement is just as relevant today.  
Studies prove that point, including recent research by Price Waterhouse. Their 2008 
report1 found that Australia’s copyright industries have grown considerably over the 
past twelve years.  
It may not be widely known that in 2006–07 alone, Australian copyright industries 
employed more than 830,000 people – 8 per cent of the Australian workforce.  
They generated $ 97.7 billion – 10.3 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product. And 
earned more than $6.8 billion in exports – that is, 4.1 per cent of the Australian total.  
                                                             
1 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Making the Intangible Tangible: the Economic Contribution of 
Australia’s Copyright Industries, November 2008.  
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I know that successive Attorneys-General have worked to develop reforms to 
copyright law in response to the impacts of new technologies or changing 
circumstances in society.  
That need for copyright reform continues – particularly in response to the 
development of new technologies now largely driven by the internet and digital 
devices.  
We have international obligations to meet, incentives to establish for creators, and 
consideration of the broader public interest of access to copyright materials.  
These factors create a challenging mix as we work to find a “balanced” copyright 
regime. 
Overall, I think Australia is acknowledged internationally as having a strong, 
comprehensive and balanced copyright law. 
Despite this, we must also be open to the need to re-examine the present balance as 
circumstances change.  
ACHIEVING BALANCE 
One of my challenging tasks as Attorney-General lies in creating a fair and workable 
copyright system that ensures the right balance between the often conflicting interests 
of copyright owners and the needs of copyright users.  
Traditionally, copyright owners have tended to argue that the law should protect their 
copyright, in response to innovations that facilitate greater copying or sharing of 
copyright material.  
On the other hand, copyright users generally oppose any tightening or increased 
control of access to copyright protected materials.  
Some have argued that copyright not only comprises the copyright owner’s private 
property rights, but also certain “public rights”.  
This is not a novel debate.  
Just as Nigel Bowen’s comments about the importance of copyright are relevant today, 
so too is the observation of Victor Hugo in the 1870s:  
Before the publication, the author has an undeniable and unlimited right … 
but as soon as the work is published, the author is not any more the master. 
It is then that other persons seize it …2 
As Minister responsible for copyright almost 150 years later, I do not profess to have 
the ultimate resolution to this issue.  
                                                             
2 Victor Hugo, when chair of l’Association Littéraire Internationale. 
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But it is my view the balance is best achieved by adopting a principled approach to 
policy development. 
In effect, this means not being captive to one interest group or point of view.  
The Government needs to reach a reasonable middle ground when interests have 
worked together to find a solution but genuinely cannot agree, and when the public 
interest is at risk.  
The key here is about working genuinely to come to agreement.  
Copyright interests are often diametrically opposed. But that is no excuse for not 
seeking compromise and fair outcomes.  
In this respect, I see copyright as essentially about players acting in good faith.  
This is not to say that Government does not have a role in guiding policy and finding 
legislative solutions. But Governments can never purely be arbiters between two 
competing interests; there are broader considerations to take into account.  
Governments also have an obligation to consider individual rights as well as the social 
benefits and implications of copyright when developing policy.  
Government must also act according to international obligations arising from 
multilateral and bilateral copyright agreements.  
The guiding statement for today’s conference mentions that:  
Copyright should underpin freedom by promoting the optimal flow and 
dissemination of knowledge.  
I will be interested to learn more from your discussions about how copyright can be 
“free”, yet part of a balanced system that recognises owners’ rights and Australia’s 
international obligations.  
ENGAGEMENT WITH STAKEHOLDERS  
The task of assessing what aspects of copyright law should be examined is a difficult 
one. 
There is clearly a wide range of stakeholders.  
Only last week I held a roundtable forum with about 30 of the key representative 
groups to hear their perspective on copyright reform and what their key issues were.  
Their views are important and I found it a very efficient way to gauge stakeholder 
views. I was also struck by the broad range of issues aired.  
There was some commonality of issues.  
This will lead me to think further about key themes.  
For example:  
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 whether the Government would benefit from an independent source of 
advice in addition to my Department, especially for technology and 
competition issues  
 access to justice considerations for individual creators and also the 
effectiveness of the Copyright Tribunal  
 addressing piracy in the online environment 
 the roles and responsibilities of declared collecting societies 
 whether there should be new rights for visual artists, indigenous creators 
and audio-visual performers  
 the relationship between copyright and contract law, and 
 whether there should be new exceptions to allow greater access to 
copyright materials.  
These are some of the themes that came through at the meeting and many will be 
further considered by the Government.  
COPYRIGHT AGENDA  
In addition to these ideas there are a range of copyright issues facing Government.  
These include the issues of resale royalty legislation for visual artists and the review of 
restrictions on the parallel importation of books.  
I am also evaluating proposals on the use of internet material by educational 
institutions, the role of Internet Service Providers in relation to online infringements, 
and appropriate enforcement of intellectual property crimes.  
There is also the push for Governments to consider how to enhance access to and re-
use Government information.  
These are just a few of the important copyright issues to address – and in doing so, 
being mindful that copyright policies influence our wider agenda for innovation, 
education, the arts, trade and the digital economy.  
CONCLUSION  
These are interesting times for copyright policy.  
We face challenges as new platforms of communication, presentation and distribution 
sprout almost overnight.  
The context for all we do is subject to constant change. The agenda for this conference 
demonstrates that point.  
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I commend Professor Brian Fitzgerald for bringing you together and welcome your 
perspectives on copyright policy to help us achieve an effective and fair balance.  
I wish you success in your deliberations.  
It is my great pleasure to declare the Conference officially open.  
Thank you. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
Professor Brian Fitzgerald 1 
 
 
Thank you Attorney General McClelland for opening this conference. Your remarks 
provide a good starting point for us as we move on over the next day and a half to 
consider the past, present and future of copyright law and policy. 
At the outset let me say a few words about why this Conference, why now and why 
here?  
The conference would not have happened if it was not for the excellent work that 
Benedict Atkinson produced as part of his LLM thesis at Sydney University and which 
he subsequently published as a book – The true history of copyright 1905–2005: the 
Australian experience (Sydney University Press). The book in my mind is one of the 
most important contributions to Australian copyright scholarship. It opened our eyes 
to the nuances of copyright in this country and did so in a concise and learned way 
with an interesting narrative.  
Ben’s hours of researching uncovered some interesting facts and threw light on the 
roles of a good number of people. When I read Ben’s work I saw the name Leslie Zines. 
                                                             
1 Professor Brian Fitzgerald BA (Griff) LLB (Hons) (QUT) BCL (Oxon.) LLM (Harv.) PhD (Griff) 
Honorary Professor – City University of London, Professor – Law Faculty, QUT Brisbane Australia, 
Barrister of the High Court of Australia, bf.fitzgerald@qut.edu.au Website at: 
www.law.qut.edu.au/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp. Brian Fitzgerald studied law at the Queensland 
University of Technology graduating as University Medallist in Law and holds postgraduate 
degrees in law from Oxford University and Harvard University. He is well known in the areas of 
Intellectual Property and Internet Law and has worked closely with Australian governments on 
facilitating access to public sector information. Brian is also a project lead of Creative Commons 
Australia, and Peer to Patent Australia www.peertopatent.org.au From 1998–2002 he was Head 
of the School of Law and Justice at Southern Cross University in New South Wales, Australia and 
from January 2002 – January 2007 was appointed as Head of the School of Law at QUT in 
Brisbane, Australia. Brian is currently a specialist Research Professor in Intellectual Property and 
Innovation at QUT, Honorary Professor at City University of London and Chief Investigator 
in the ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation. In 2009 Brian 
was appointed to the Australia Government’s “Government 2.0 Taskforce” by Ministers Tanner 
and Ludwig and to the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) by Minister Carr. 
Brian's most recent publication is B Fitzgerald (editor and contributor) Access to Public Sector 
Information: Law Technology and Policy (2010) Sydney University Press.  
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I also saw the name Adrian Sterling and the name John Gilchrist, and said to myself, “I 
know those people; I didn’t realise that they had such an intimate connection with 
Australian Copyright Law”.  
I knew John Gilchrist as an academic at the University of Canberra who had come to 
do a PhD with me at QUT and Adrian Sterling I had met at the Fordham conference 
in New York over the years and knew of his connection with Australia. And Leslie 
Zines I knew as our esteemed professor of constitutional law at the Australian 
National University. But I did not realise that these people had had such interesting 
roles to play in Australian copyright history. I said to Ben, “I would like to be able to 
take your work, and those figures, those personalities, and put them together right 
back where a lot of this happened, in Canberra, and particularly at Old Parliament 
House (OPH).”  
Ben was just as enthusiastic and with his help we have managed to organise this 
conference.  
We did miss a couple of milestones along the way. We had hoped to run the 
conference in 2005 on the 100 year anniversary of the Copyright Act 1905 (our first 
federal copyright Act) and having failed to get organised by that date we set our sights 
on the 40 year anniversary of the enactment of the Copyright Act 1968. Again, we did 
not get it organised in time. We then set our sights on running this event as we are 
now doing on the 40 year anniversary of the commencement of the 1968 Act, which 
was May 1969. We got there in the end.  
The research that Ben undertook, and the venue here at OPH, bring us together in 
unique circumstances and give us an exciting platform upon which to consider 
copyright law and policy.  
COPYRIGHT FREEDOM 
What about the title of the conference – Copyright Future: Copyright Freedom – what 
does it mean? On seeing the flyer for the conference some people said to me, 
“copyright freedom, that is a little provocative”. There is no doubt that copyright and 
freedom have been viewed as enemies in recent history, and I am not convinced that is 
the way it should be. I am not convinced that is what copyright law demands. To my 
mind, copyright ought to be about liberating us from ignorance, enriching our culture 
and therefore the idea of copyright and freedom existing side by side as partners is a 
natural fit not an aberration. The debates we have had over the last 10 years have 
certainly pitched copyright and freedom as the opposing ends of a fiercely contested 
spectrum. The time is right – right now – to put these two words together, copyright 
and freedom, and see how we can move forward. 
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As a focal point for our discussion I suggest we might consider the following as a 
fundamental principle or underlying purpose of copyright law: “Copyright should 
underpin freedom by promoting the optimal flow and dissemination of knowledge.” 
And then ask how copyright law might facilitate this goal in the future? This is without 
doubt a significant challenge. In recent times we have seen some interesting 
developments which I would like to highlight. They show how people and institutions 
are giving definition to the notion of “copyright freedom” in the digital era.  
IceTV 
Let me start with the High Court of Australia and the recent case of IceTV2 in which 
the High Court held that it was not an infringement for IceTV to copy the time and 
title aspects of a television program produced by Channel 9 and to use that in their 
electronic program guide (EPG). As lawyers will say it is a complex case and there are 
complex facts in issue but amidst the many judgements and arguments made in the 
case we get the message. The High Court says, in effect, that where there is a “merger”, 
a term of art used in US copyright law, of content and expression, so that you can 
really only express something – such as the time and title of the television program – 
in one way, it’s very difficult to say to someone downstream, “you should not be able 
to re-use the information.” And that meets with common sense. Think of people in 
everyday life creating their own guides – whether it is in a retirement village or a 
mining canteen or wherever – for their community from an assortment of TV 
programs; creating their own programs and then being told, “Oh well, look sorry, 
that’s an infringement”.  
Now, people would say to me “that’s technically an infringement but it is tolerated 
use” and the whole concept of tolerated use is an interesting one. Some American 
academics, particularly Professor Tim Wu, say there is a lot of copying that goes on 
out there that owners are not worried about, or they tolerate because it is in their best 
interests.3 There is no indication in IceTV that the High Court was saying that copying 
time and title information was tolerated use. To the contrary the Court is saying that 
this is unremunerated use, a use that you are able to freely make of this particular 
information. While the High Court has not expressly endorsed the merger doctrine 
recognised in the United States it goes very close when one considers the essence of 
what the High Court is saying in the two judgments in the IceTV case: “if you can only 
say something in one way, there is a real question about infringement and proving 
infringement”. 
                                                             
2 IceTV Pty Limited v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14.  
3 Tim Wu, “Tolerated Use” (2008) Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No 333 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132247 
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IceTV is an articulation of what I might call copyright freedom. At the level of doctrine 
the High Court is providing the contours of an Australian version of the “merger 
doctrine”. The idea that certain parts of “intellectual infrastructure”4 must be able to be 
reused without fear of infringing otherwise the dissemination (and innovation) 
rationale of copyright is stifled. At a deeper level the High Court hints at but does not 
expound on its theory of copyright. Ben Atkinson has reminded me of the seminal 
work of Lyman Ray Patterson in this area5 and Sam Ricketson has written on this topic 
many years ago6 – the idea that copyright is designed to protect against unfair 
competition (which I would extrapolate to mean) not remuneration for every 
conceivable use. The scope of remunerable use is a key consideration in evaluating the 
level of copyright freedom. 
GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT 
The other development that I find fascinating is the Google Book Settlement.7 Love it 
or hate it this event is revolutionising copyright law as we know it and will give us 
insights as to how things might work in the future. My colleague Larry Lessig has 
already expressed his concerns with the operation of the proposed Google Books 
Settlement (GBS). I agree that the GBS needs more work but let us not overlook some 
of the key aspects of it.  
Lessig has been famous for the mantra that copyright is a permission based concept, 
that is, you cannot do anything without the copyright owner’s permission. Google, a 
very big, powerful company that has entered the copyright politics arena in the last few 
years, is, starting to change the way we think about copyright and that idea of a 
permissions culture. In undertaking the Google Library Project8, the company took 
                                                             
4 Brett M Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Economic and Commons Management 89 Minn LR 
917 (2005); Peter Lee, ‘The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure’, Washington Law Review, Vol 
83, 2008. 
5 L Ray Patterson, “Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use”, Vanderbilt Law Review, Jan 1987, Vol 
40 No 1 
6 S Ricketson, "Reaping without Sowing: Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in 
Anglo-Australian Law" [1984] UNSW Law Journal 1  
7 In 2005, the Authors’ Guild and American Association of Publishers launched an action against 
Google for breach of copyright. The action followed commencement of Google’s Library Project 
to scan books in the collections of five of the world’s great libraries. In 2008, the parties agreed a 
preliminary settlement creating a compensation fund of $125million for authors and publishers 
and creating a books rights registry. However, the settlement fairness hearing has involved a large 
number of interested parties speaking for and against the settlement, and the dispute continues. 
8 The project began in 2004. Initially, Google agreed with the libraries of Oxford, Harvard, 
Michigan and Stanford universities, and the New York Public Library, to digitise the books in 
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that approach that “we do not need to seek permission; we see something that’s 
innovative, we see something that we can make money out of, we see a new 
opportunity, we’re going to go and do it”. Then the copyright owners say, “No, we are 
going to sue you, you do not have our permission”. Google all along has maintained 
that it is engaging in “fair use” and does not need permission to undertake this activity. 
Litigation ensues and we now have a proposed settlement.  
If we stand back and look at this case study we start to see that we have gone beyond a 
permission based notion of copyright to a benefit-share model of copyright where 
Google have said, “we are going to do this, we started out to do this, and we will still 
continue to do this, but what we are happy to enter a commercial deal with you to 
share the benefits”. People can debate how good or bad that commercial deal is, but it 
seems to me that the Google Book Settlement represents a fundamental shift in the 
way we are going to start thinking about copyright in the future. More and more, as I 
would advocate, and people will no doubt disagree with me, we will move towards an 
access-based model, rather than a control-based model.  
To make the point more succinctly let me say this. Google as a key player in copyright 
politics has moved the goal posts somewhat. This is where the notion of copyright 
freedom finds further articulation. Google in this case are in a battle and leading the 
charge on who controls the redistribution of copyright material. Tradition tells us 
control is held by the copyright owner – the control model. The digital networks of the 
21st century suggest access is the key to dissemination, innovation and wealth in the 
21st century. As business evolves to meet this new dynamic one anticipates the need 
for copyright to be able to accommodate widespread dissemination practices. This is 
another aspect of copyright freedom.  
THE RIGHT TO NETWORK VS THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 
The last thing that I would like to mention in terms of this idea of copyright freedom is 
the idea of the network and innovation in the network. The network, as we call it in 
the broad sense of the word, is crucial, and if we are not careful in the way we 
strategise about litigation, and the way we position our business models, if the network 
is made slower and less effective, we are going to harm the potential for innovation, 
and the potential for creativity. There is a real question mark over the impact we are 
going to have on networks and innovation.  
                                                                                                                                                    
their collections, in order to facilitate public electronic access to the five collections. Fifteen other 
university, or university-affiliated, libraries have joined the project. 
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Many people have made this argument over the last ten years; that when we think 
about copyright, and when we think about regulation in general around the network, 
we have to appreciate that there is a fundamental interest not only in private property, 
but also in the right to network, if you like, the right to be able to use the one of the 
most incredible networks that we have ever possessed, to be able to innovate, to be able 
to create, and to be able to do new things.  
It is very difficult to work out how we put copyright together with instantaneous 
worldwide communication and viral distribution and all of the affordances of Web 2.0, 
but that is one of the great challenges that lie ahead. One of the exciting things about 
bringing copyright and freedom together (again) is to show us, and focus our attention 
on what might be able to be done.  
THE CULTURE OF THE LAWYERS 
Copyright freedom has a broader dimension and an interesting dynamic to navigate. 
In my mind copyright and freedom are metaphors for the established and the new 
wave of copyright lawyers (respectively) and we could go even further and say for 
business or more broadly social interaction. 
Let me stick to the lawyers to make my point. 
We have a proud tradition worldwide but especially in Australia of scholars and 
industry leaders who have spent over 40 years building a tremendous edifice that we 
know today as copyright. These people spent years and years building a legal 
framework that can support creative people and creative industries, and they are very 
proud of it.  
I have seen this most recently as part of a copyright reform group – Copyright 
Principles Project – that has been convened by Professor Pam Samuelson of the 
University of California, Berkeley. Over a three year period twenty people have come 
together from “all sides of the fence” to make proposals about the future of copyright 
law. Lawyers from software companies, practice, film studios, and libraries joined with 
academics from the leading law schools.. When we meet I see an interesting dynamic. 
We have the people who built the structure, the people who really see this as their 
craft, and are very proud of it, and to some extent, they represent a copyright tradition. 
But on the other hand, we have a brash new generation of people who come forward 
and say, “you built a great structure, but guess what it’s wrong, it’s got these problems 
with it”, and the other side bristles, but acknowledges, “you know, I think we can do it 
better”. If metaphors help one side represents “copyright” as we it know it today and 
the other side represents the call for “freedom” in the network era. Now how can we – 
like Pam has done – get those two groups together more often and more productively 
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because that is the future of the copyright. I hope we have done that with this 
conference to some extent. 
Take time to listen to and appreciate what is being said over the next two days. We 
have an interesting line up of speakers and a tremendous group of participants. The 
venue is remarkable. 
Thank you to all who have made this event possible.  
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1 
AUSTRALIA’S COPYRIGHT HISTORY 
 
Benedict Atkinson 1 
 
PSYCHOLOGY AND NATIONS 
Psychology, understood as speculation, not science, helps the historian to make sense 
of what sometimes seems mysterious in national politics. Within limits of reason and 
commonsense, we may be justified in considering how the behaviour of nations invites 
analogy with that of individuals, and extrapolate from human psychology principles to 
explain political conduct. In the case of Australian legislative history, one 
psychological theory, in particular, commends itself as a partial explanation for the 
sometimes sabotaging conduct of Australian politicians. This is the concept of the 
“locus of control”, proposed in the 1950s by the psychologist Julian Rotter.2  
It helps to explain plausibly the elements of passivity and subservience in Australian 
lawmaking whenever it has involved the interests of two powers, Great Britain and the 
United States. Those elements are so perceptible in the pattern of Australian copyright 
legislation that Rotter’s theory seems directly to explain why politicians passed 
copyright laws more accommodating to foreign interests than Australian. 
LOCUS OF CONTROL 
Although an academic, Rotter observed patients in therapy and noticed that their 
psychological health to some extent correlated to their perception of control. He 
                                                             
1 Benedict Atkinson is a Fellow of the CCI ARC Centre for Excellence for Creative Industries and 
Innovation and author of The True History of Copyright 1905–2005: The Australian Experience, 
Sydney University Press, 2007.  
2 Born United States 1916. Spent the majority of his career at the University of Connecticut. In 
the 1950s helped to develop social learning theory (positive or negative expectations derived from 
experience influence behavioural choices in ways that may not be rational) – see Social Learning 
and Clinical Psychology 1954.  
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coined the term “locus of control” to explain why an individual’s sense of autonomy is 
stronger or weaker.  
People who observe that certain behaviour is rewarded, and are permitted to engage in 
that behaviour, come to believe that their behaviour controls reward. If they 
experience sufficient positive reinforcement, they may believe that reward is the 
invariable consequence of action. Their locus of control is internalised: they, so they 
believe, control their environment. 
Those who perceive that action does not result in reward, or that if reward occurs, it 
does so irrespective of individual initiative, tend to become apathetic or avoidant. 
They are certain that their actions do not, in any way, determine the outcome of 
events. They externalise the locus of control. External forces, they believe, shape what 
happens to them.3  
The idea of a locus of control is helpful in explaining why nations, like humans, may 
act boldly or timidly, rashly or with foresight, and pursue strategies that may result in 
prosperity and stability, or poverty and anomie.4 In Australia’s case, the body politic, 
in the widest sense, has tended to externalise the locus of control. Externalising is not 
invariable. Australia wears the mask of Janus, at once backward-gazing and self-
doubting and forward-looking and optimistic.5 
AUSTRALIA’S LOCUS 
Why externalise? One emotion, scattering or binding the particles of resolution, seems 
especially to have shaped the European response to the antipodes, and whites, feeling 
its omnipresence, avoided mention of its name: fear. First settlement in 1788, the 
primordial act in Australia’s political history, seems to have transmitted to politics 
                                                             
3 The locus of control is fixed in childhood, though adults may learn ways to a stronger sense of 
autonomy. The child who is brought up in a secure predictable way will generally develop a 
strong sense of autonomy. Its locus of control becomes internal. But a child who experiences fear 
or rejection, who is treated capriciously or cruelly, may react differently. It may learn to see the 
external environment as frightening and punitive, inflicting hurt unpredictably. Such a child is 
likely to externalise the locus of control. 
4 Rotter’s schema is conceptually sweeping and critics have noted that a person’s perception of 
control may vary according to environment. For example, some people may believe that external 
events govern their professional wellbeing, yet confidently expect to control the outcome of events 
occurring in their private lives.  
5 The theme of Australian identity, explored in national literature over more than 150 years, 
needs little elaboration. Contrasting themes of optimism and tragedy, youth and decay, 
extroversion and repression, honesty and concealment, heroism and cowardice, progress and 
ignorance, acceptance and denial, failure and rebirth, run through the continuing discourse on 
Australian character and nationhood. 
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something of the emotions of the convicts, and their overseers and masters, who 
confronted the mysterious hinterland, human threat, and the everyday possibility of 
violence, failure and starvation.  
Colonial policy in the later part of the 19th century absorbed the traces of their 
reaction and anticipated, in new hinterlands, and the horizon of the ocean, threat and 
danger. The imperial power remained far away and not very helpful. But the support 
of that power was indispensable. Australians, who lived “in the brave sunshine” and 
for whom life seemed “[r]ich, rude, strong-giving”,6 could not escape their hidden 
anxiety about a world that could deliver ruin with little warning.  
At the end of the 19th century, filled with recorded deeds and unrecorded terrors, 
colonial politicians faced the necessity for political unity. Though The Bulletin and the 
bush poets sounded the call for the republic, the colonies chose federation and 
imperial co-option. But long before the creation of the federal commonwealth, 
politicians responded to their fear of external forces by dependency – a dependency as 
much psychological as material.7 Thus, over two centuries, Australia adopted as its 
protectors Great Britain (19th century until World War II) and the United States 
(from World War II).8 In matters of defence, foreign policy and economics, the 
prescriptions of these two powers powerfully influenced Australian policy.  
The requisites of dependency applied with particular force to copyright policy 
formation. 
                                                             
6 Victor J Daley (1858–1905), In a Wine Cellar. 
7 The tension caused by the sense of external threat expressed itself most strongly in reactions to the 
surrounding environment, powerfully expressed by some of the bush poets in the later part of the 
19th century. Authority is dangerous, the moneyed class exploits ruthlessly, life is fragile, nature is 
overwhelming:  
 Strangled by thirst and fierce privation- 
 That’s how the dead men die! 
 Out on Moneygrub’s farthest station – 
 That’s how the dead men die! 
 Barcroft Boake (1866–1892), Where the Dead Men Lie. 
8 When in 1942 General Douglas Macarthur established the Allied Forces’ South West Pacific 
Area headquarters first in Melbourne then in Brisbane, Australia’s dependency on the military 
protection of the United States, protection that the United Kingdom could not offer, became 
obvious. However, though the control locus passed to the US, and US policy began increasingly 
to influence Australian, Australia, culturally, and to a significant degree, economically, remained 
tethered to Britain. 
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 INTERNALISING THE LOCUS OF CONTROL 
Australia, in the field of copyright, has been a follower, though twice a leader. On the 
occasions of autonomous policymaking, Australia internalised the locus of control, 
once in 1905, when the new federal parliament passed the first federal copyright 
legislation, and a second time in 1928, when Australia and New Zealand leadership 
encouraged the Berne Union to permit members to legislate limitations on the 
author’s broadcasting right. 
Why, on these two occasions, were policymakers able to internalise the locus of 
control? Probably because, for distinct reasons, they felt free from the undertow of fear 
that creates dependency and mental enclosure. A certain poetry, or perhaps romantic 
self-confidence, can be discerned in the actions of legislators in 1905. In 1928, policy is 
shaped by national necessity and the federal government determines that on the 
question of broadcasting, Australia will, if necessary, stand its ground against the 
world.  
FEDERATION 
Federation in 1901 created the independent Commonwealth of Australia. The radicals 
of the 1890s, the great decade of political gestation, who anticipated in Australia a 
sweeping away of the traces of the old order, heard no birdsong in the new creation. 
The constitutional device, they said, merely consolidated the self-serving stranglehold 
exerted over the life of Australia by its seedy politicians, moneygrubs, imperial 
lickspittles and complacent middle class. 
Yet federation produced something remarkable and unimagined: a strain of poetic 
licence in the behaviour of legislators charged with giving life to the commonwealth. 
Parliamentarians expressed, in a flood of legislation, the poetry of new nationhood. 
Death attended new life –the nation continued, until 1902, to grieve at the deaths of 
Australian soldiers in the Boer War9 – but joy outweighed sorrow. After federation, 
the blood, travail and striving of colonial Australia could be forgotten, and for a golden 
moment in its history, one measured in a handful of years, Australia, the nation, 
enjoyed gilded youth. 
In this moment, politicians grew unafraid. They located control within themselves, 
and chose boldly to step out of the 19th century’s shade, and the penumbra of imperial 
restriction, to express a nation’s freedom to be its own arbiter. The poetry of these 
post-federation years lies in expression of political emancipation. Political chaos 
supplied one of the clearest signs of psychic emancipation. Many federal politicians 
                                                             
9 About 1,000 Australian volunteers died in the conflict between the British colonies in South Africa 
and the adjoining Dutch republics, the Anglo-Boer war of 1899–1902.  
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refused to be corralled by party discipline, and they forced frequent government 
dissolutions.10  
Then, inevitably, accommodations, failures, and tragedies, small and large, swept in 
like the tide, and youth vanished. Before the vanishing, in the golden moment, a time 
when everything seemed possible, federal parliament passed the 1905 Copyright Act. It 
expressed, in full measure, the spirit of the times. Short, coherent, cogent, wasting no 
words, and written in style attractive to modern readers – and admirably distant in 
style from obfuscating19th century statutes – it is, so far as any law can be, a poetic 
achievement. 
THE INTERNALISED LOCUS OF CONTROL 1 – THE 1905 
COPYRIGHT ACT 
In 1905, Australia did not need copyright legislation.11 Parliamentarians could have 
waited for the imperial parliament to pass legislation that could be imitated or 
adopted, and in the meantime left the States to carry on administering copyrights 
according to their own laws. This was the path of least resistance, or least difficulty. 
The men of 1905 eschewed this path. The achievements of Australian authors,12 and 
the penury of some,13 urged them to action – a number of senators dilated on the 
publishers’ abuse of monopoly, and their exploitation of writers – though they knew 
that publishers, predominantly British, would not welcome their initiative.14  
                                                             
10 Between 1901 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, five different federal parties formed 
eight governments (a ninth taking office a month after the outbreak of war). Five governments 
(including three in 1904–1905) lasted for less than a year. 
11 The Australian colonies had enacted copyright laws, principally concerned with registration of 
local publications, in the later part of the 19th century. The British imperial Copyright Act of 
1842, and a miscellany of related imperial statutes, governed the subsistence of British copyright 
material and its distribution throughout the empire, and also regulated, in lieu of conforming 
local statutes, copyright in books etc in British possessions.  
12 Beginning with the anonymous folk songs and ballads that record life in early Sydney, and 
continuing with colonial poetry and the bush ballads, publication of Marcus Clarke’s great realist 
novel, For The Term of His Natural Life, and the effusion of diverse, distinctively Australian 
poetry and prose from 1890 onwards, the literature of nineteenth century Australia is remarkable 
for its originality and deep poetic feeling.  
13 Christopher Brennan, probably the finest Australian poet of the 1890s, and Henry Lawson, 
were two great figures of Australian literature whose lives were by 1905 disintegrating in 
alcoholism and poverty. 
14 The British publishers’ grip on the Australian market did not constrain the supply of 
Australian literature, although publishers, controlling supply of British books to the Australian 
market, practised ruthless price discrimination. Contrary to contemporary assertions by 
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The Act said NO to the claims of external powers. It said no to provision for import 
controls, which, for the avoidance of doubt, British publishers would have wanted 
carried over from the imperial Copyright Act of 1842. It said no to provision for the 
new categories of copyright works, and the 50 year posthumous term, advocated by 
the Berne Convention. And it said no to a conception of copyright as more than the 
19th century idea of literary property, thus turning away from expanding the scope of 
copyright to permit copyright holders to control the production of records. 
Viewed in this light, the 1905 enactment can be depicted as an expression of 
recalcitrance. The unwillingness to adopt the all-encompassing categories of “works” 
promulgated in the Berne Convention, the insistence on retaining as the principal 
category of protected subject matter, “books”, and the shunning of the idea that 
copyright extended to so-called “mechanical” reproduction, condemned the legislation 
to swift obsolescence. 
A more accurate way to characterise the legislation is as an act of defiance. The 
generation of 1905 rejoiced in its volition. The Hansard record shows that in the few 
years that elapsed between the passing of the 1905 Act and its successor in 1912, party 
discipline and the interdictions of imperial policy sapped politicians of vitality, 
independence and forthrightness. Politicians remaining from 1905 were mostly 
cyphers in the debates of 1912. Senator John Keating, probably the most learned 
student of copyright law in Australian political history, the sponsor, and possibly 
author, of the 1905 bill, made a noble and patriotic speech against adoption of import 
controls. The Government ignored him. The other great figure of 1905, Senator Sir 
Josiah Symon, kept his silence.  
In 1905, however, the Senate engaged in a searching examination of copyright policy 
that far exceeded in its penetration, and diversity of opinion, any debate, in either 
chamber, of any Australian parliament, since. Feeling unconstrained by external 
considerations, politicians concentrated on a principal object: to vest in Australian 
authors proprietary rights that would, they hoped, allow authors to bargain more 
effectively with publishers. 
They could be called artless for scorning much consideration of the Berne Convention, 
or the controversy caused by unauthorised recording of musical performances by 
pianolas or phonographs. On the other hand, their debates showed a sincere concern 
with ascertaining the rationale of copyright and ensuring that the law created for authors 
the means to secure economic justice. Subsequent parliamentary debates on these and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Australian publishers, British control did not preclude Australian publishing (Angus and 
Robertson, est 1886, and publisher of Henry Lawson, is an example of a highly successful early 
Australian publisher). Import controls, however, enabled British publishers to regulate the supply 
of foreign books – to public detriment. 
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other subjects of the law were usually characterised by shallow reasoning and glib 
certitude. 
The 1905 Copyright Act lasted on the statute books for a mere seven years. It deserves 
to be remembered as the outcome of the one great act of legislative independence in 
Australian copyright history. 
THE INTERNALISED LOCUS OF CONTROL 2 – THE 1928 ROME 
REVISION CONFERENCE 
By 1928, the poetry of the immediate post-federation years had long vanished. In 1912, 
Australia reverted to the policy of imperial dependence, adopting in the Australian 
Copyright Act of that year the British Copyright Act of 1911. In so doing, it accepted 
the provisos of the Berne Convention ignored by the legislators of 1905, including the 
50 year posthumous term. After 1912, Australia deviated only once, in 1928, from its 
policy of following the normative examples of the United Kingdom, the Berne 
Convention (which Britain studiously implemented) and the United States. 
The Australian federal parliament of 1928 differed in spirit from its counterpart of 
1905. Now the grim factionalism of two party politics (Nationalist and Labor) made 
impossible the creative anarchy of post-federation, when Protectionist, Labour,15 Free 
Trade, and, later, Commonwealth Liberal parties vied for office. Australia’s role as a 
dominion cooperating in the machinery of the British Empire, and its tenderness to 
the welfare and concerns of the United Kingdom, betrayed the attitude of the obedient 
child to its distant mother. The locus of control, internalised for a few short years, 
reposed once again in the bosom of that mother.  
For a fleeting period in 1928, Australia snatched back power to make copyright policy 
for its own sake. This brief reprisal of the 1905 spirit proved too much for the 
Government, and the control locus soon returned to the imperial power. In the 
meantime, Australian diplomacy achieved a great deal. The reason for the departure 
from policy conformism is that the Berne Union’s broadcasting policy threatened to 
wreck the Australian Government’s strategy for ensuring the spread of radio 
broadcasting across the nation. The Government considered the danger to Australia’s 
national interest to be grave and definite. So Australia shrugged off docility. Like the 
child suddenly aware that self-extinction is the price of automatic obedience, it acted, 
with decision and acumen, to secure its own interest. 
The Berne Union’s 1928 Rome revision conference considered, among other things, 
amending the Convention to vest in authors control over the broadcasting of original 
works. This proposed extension of authors’ rights threatened the policy of countries 
                                                             
15 The Australian Labor Party changed the spelling of its name from ‘Labour’ to ‘Labor’ in 1912. 
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like Australia, which regarded the spread of radio dissemination as a critical element 
in unifying disparate, often isolated, populations, stretched around and across a vast 
continent.  
If the authors’ proposed broadcasting right were adopted in the Convention text 
without limitation, authors could, thought some, hold broadcasters to ransom. 
Australian radio stations, embroiled in argument with the Australasian Performing 
Right Association over fees for playing music, lobbied furiously. If no means existed 
for restraining APRA, they said, they could be held to ransom, and go to the wall. If 
APRA, on behalf of copyright owners, demanded inordinate fees for the broadcasting 
of music, the development in Australia of radio broadcasting could be severely 
retarded.  
The federal Attorney General, John Latham, entertained no doubt, and he instructed 
the Australian delegate to the Rome conference, Sir Harrison Moore, to resist the 
conference resolution to adopt an unfettered broadcasting right. Great Britain, while 
not unsympathetic to the Australian position, offered no particular assistance, and 
might have voted for the proposition supported by civil law countries. Moore, and his 
New Zealand colleague, Samuel Raymond (as they pointed out proudly in their 
conference reports) refused to accept the consensus in favour of an unrestricted 
broadcasting right.  
Eventually, the Union, which depended on unanimity for the passage of resolutions, 
relented. Article 11 bis (2) of the Convention permitted Union members to “determine 
the conditions under which the … [broadcasting right] may be exercised …” The 
Australian legislature could thus enact copyright laws imposing certain limitations on 
the way APRA exercised the performing right. Ultimately, this concession resulted in 
the provisions of the 1968 Copyright Act establishing the Copyright Tribunal.  
As Moore stated in his report, “the interests of the public – that great body of 
purchasers of copyright wares – were vigorously voiced by the Dominions for the first 
time in the history of the International Copyright Conferences.”  
THE EXTERNALISED LOCUS OF CONTROL 
After parliament passed the 1905 Act, Australian governments continued, until 1910, 
to determine copyright policy from the sole perspective of the Australian interest. 
Then Westminster turned the screws. In 1909, the British Board of Trade appointed a 
copyright review committee to consider whether to accept in British law the Berne 
Convention, amended in Berlin in 1908. The Gorell Committee replied in the 
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affirmative,16 and the Board of Trade oversaw drafting of a copyright bill 
implementing the Berne provisos. Committed to legislating, the British government 
turned its attention to securing uniform legislation throughout the empire. 
Government policymakers had no wish for dominions like Australia and Canada to 
pursue independent policy. A patchwork of copyright regulations, they reasoned, 
could only prove inimical to the policy of imperial cooperation, and the preferential 
trade system on which it was based.  
In 1910, at the imperial copyright conference in London, Sydney Buxton, the President 
of the Board of Trade, made Britain’s wishes plain to the assembled dominions. For 
reasons of “efficiency” and “the imperial connection”, the imperial government 
considered it “highly important to attain as great a degree of uniformity as is 
reasonably practicable among the principal nations of the world with regard to 
international copyright.” The coda of Buxton’s words was clear: commit to legislating 
in conformity with the imperial copyright bill circulated to conference delegates.  
Even so, Australia at first showed no inclination to accept a central precept of the 
Berne consensus, the 50 year posthumous term, which British publishers embraced 
enthusiastically. The federal Attorney General, Billy Hughes, instructed Australia’s 
representative at the imperial conference to resist pressure to accept the 50 year term, 
adding that a long posthumous term benefitted British publishers but conferred “nil” 
benefit on Australia.  
The Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, also cabled instructions to reject the 50 year 
posthumous term. Deakin promptly lost office (a month before the conference took 
place) and his replacement, Andrew Fisher, cabled that his government must examine 
the British copyright bill before any commitments could be made. Remarkably, 
Australia’s representative at the conference, Lord Tennyson,17 an Englishman, and a 
seeming partisan for the British interest, disregarded government communications. 
A former governor-general of Australia, he treated federal government 
communications with condescension and pursued the policy he declared best suited to 
Australia’s interest: that of accepting the resolutions of the conference, including 
British ratification of the Convention, and the preparation of imperial legislation that 
could be adopted by all British possessions. The insistence of Australia’s first law 
officer, and its prime minister, that Australia retain the limited copyright term set out 
in the 1905 Act came to nought, and no Australian politician criticised Tennyson for 
his wilfulness.  
                                                             
16 Although it rejected enactment of a compulsory licence, a measure countenanced by the 
revised Convention. 
17 Hallam Tennyson, son of the great Victorian poet Alfred, Lord Tennyson. Governor of South 
Australia 1899–1902, Governor-General Australia 1903–1904. 
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The outcome of the imperial copyright conference, which substantially committed 
Australia to legislate in conformity with new imperial legislation, indicated 
psychological shift in Australian policy. The unwillingness to discipline Tennyson, 
indeed the peculiar choice of Tennyson as Australia’s representative,18 the ready 
acquiescence to copyright policy that, in the words of Billy Hughes, “is of greater 
relative importance in Great Britain than it is in Australia”,19 betokened return to the 
tractability that subsumed national interest in that of the perceived external protector. 
The change is not surprising. In Australian copyright history, the internalised control 
locus is anomalous. Externalisation is normal. Once federation’s golden moment 
vanished, and the machinery of politics began to grind predictably, as politicians 
defined national development and imperial cooperation as inseparable objects, 
reversion to psychic traits of the 19th century occurred.  
The excitement and creative possibility of federation’s early years absorbed politicians 
in nation-building, and they forgot old fears. Australia’s dark ontology could be 
forgotten, but only for a while. Politicians discovered that, in some ways, they forged 
independence contingently. Seemingly every aspect of Australian life, from railways to 
sheep stations, relied, in some portion, on British investment. Prosperity depended, to 
a large extent, on imperial markets, chiefly those of the mother country, and safe 
passage of cargo guaranteed by the arms and diplomacy of Great Britain. 
The recurrence of fear need not have prevented politicians from recognising that while 
Australian policy must take account of external factors – and external powers – 
national interest could yet be separated from, and preferred to, foreign. Acceptance of 
Westminster’s primacy in imperial governance need not have entirely stymied the 
rush of free-wheeling enthusiasm launched by federation. Politicians, presented with 
the fait accompli of imperial copyright conference resolutions, could yet have fought 
for, and won, important legislative concessions that benefitted the Australian public. 
But after 1910, they retreated.  
The old fear of annihilation, by nature or humankind, sublimated yet fixed, steered 
politicians away from the awe-inspiring prospect of genuine self-determination. A 
person may outwardly display the signs of vitality and resolution and still exist as the 
mental bondservant of another, crippled by belief that survival without the other is 
impossible. So it was with Australia, young and free, in the words of the national 
                                                             
18 The former prime minister George Reid became high commissioner in London in 1910. He 
took some part in debate over the 1905 copyright bill in the House of Representatives and would 
probably have suited the role of representative better than Tennyson. Keating or Symon could 
perhaps have attended the conference as Australia’s representative. They were still sitting 
members of parliament but neither was a member of the governing party. 
19 Hughes spoke of the 50 year posthumous term. 
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anthem written in 1878, yet stepping off the path of adventure and choosing instead to 
follow that of conformity, certitude, safety – and enclosure.  
THE 1912 COPYRIGHT ACT 
Great Britain enacted new copyright legislation at the close of 1911 and issued a polite 
warning to Australia. Any Australian legislation, said a British cable on 1 December, 
must adopt the provisions of the imperial act (which implemented the amended Berne 
Convention) or otherwise Australian copyright would no longer be recognised in 
Britain or the empire. A flickering manifestation of independent spirit prompted the 
British statement. The Labour Government, perhaps smarting from Tennyson’s 
disobedience in the previous year, drafted a copyright bill in 1911 to give effect to the 
imperial conference resolutions, but its haste probably indicated a desire for 
expedition rather than mischief making. At any rate, in 1912, the Government issued a 
new copyright bill adopting the imperial act of 1911.  The bill attracted little critical 
comment from either house. Legislators concerned themselves mostly with matters of 
machinery and passed over the substantive portions of the legislation. 
The Australian Copyright Act of 1912 adopted the whole of the British Copyright Act 
of 1911, the latter placed in a schedule to the Australian legislation, offending a 
number of politicians who expressed dislike of inferior British parliamentary drafting. 
John Keating called the British legislation “unintelligible to the ordinary person.” 
Together, the statutes swept away the brief legacy of 1905. Keating objected to one part 
only of the disavowal of legislation with which his name is associated.  
He understood, and supported, he said, the passing of new legislation that brought 
Australia into the community of Berne nations, and brought to authors the benefit of 
international uniformity in copyright rules. However, he disagreed vehemently with 
the provision creating import controls, a proviso absent from the 1905 Act.  
Import control allowed the copyright holder to control the distribution of copyright 
material in Australia. Their provenance lay in the 18th century battle against French 
and Irish book pirates, and principally they benefitted British book and music 
publishers. They relied on copyright legislation to prevent Australian retailers (or 
wholesalers) from buying overseas remaindered legitimate copies of British books (or 
sheet music), and importing them into Australia for sale at prices that undercut the 
publishers.  
The British Copyright Act permitted dominions like Australia to adopt the legislation 
subject to modifications relating to “procedures and remedies” or “necessary to adapt 
this Act to the circumstances of the dominion.”20 The notoriously poor drafting of the 
                                                             
20 Copyright Act 1911, section 25(1). 
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1911 Act here created doubt about exactly in what circumstances Australia could 
modify the terms of the imperial legislation, and the Australian parliament allayed 
uncertainty by accepting the legislation unchanged.  
Keating, though, could not be mollified. Joined by Senator Joseph Vardon, he insisted, 
that import controls must be resisted, as they had been ignored in 1905. In words that 
resound in the present day, he demanded that the public interest be satisfied. “We 
have to realise that copyright legislation affects not merely publishers, printers, and 
authors, but readers … the whole community.” Keating called section 10 of the 1911 
Act, which established controls, “a big blackmailing clause”, and he added that, “in 
adopting this legislation, we are adopting British legislation, and … Great Britain is a 
totally different country from Australia.”21 
Keating returned to the theme of blackmail, anticipating modern arguments against 
parallel importation restrictions. Controls, he reiterated, “open the door to blackmail.” 
They “give a monopoly to a man who chooses to buy the copyright of a song, as far as 
Australia is concerned.” 
In the lower house, William Archibald, a Labor MP, and the man responsible for the 
creation of free libraries in towns, said that section 10 would do “an injustice … to 
people in Australia.” David Gordon, a member of the ruling Commonwealth Liberal 
party, submitted that, “we should legislate according to Australian requirements”. 
Section 10, he said, “is all very well from the British aspect, but from the Australian 
standpoint, it seems to me that we ought to consider the position in this part of the 
world, and modify the law to suit our own purposes, rather than to suit those of 
persons who are copyrighting in Great Britain.”22  
These voices of dissent, arguing for the Australian interest, were ignored. A new 
Australian Copyright Act, superseding the legislation of 1905, and accepting in 
Australian law, the British Copyright Act of 1911, passed in 1912. The new Act 
introduced a 50 year posthumous term, the class of “works” recognised in the Berne 
Convention, the compulsory licence for recording music, and classes of fair dealing. 
Copyright applied to the production or reproduction of works in any material form, 
including recording or cinematograph film. Import controls placed in the hands of 
copyright holders control over the supply of all legitimate product. 
                                                             
21 He continued that, “we are adopting a provision made in the United Kingdom to meet 
conditions with respect to importation of pirated copies, which are totally dissimilar from those 
that apply in Australia.” 
22 Archibald added that legislators, “should not make away with our rights for the sake of 
securing uniformity.” 
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THE INTERWAR YEARS 
Allowing for the unusual circumstance that Britain ratified the Berne Convention on 
Australia’s behalf,23 and thus technically only imperial legislation formally 
implemented the convention, Australia’s adoption of the 1911 Act emphasised the 
nation’s rediscovered psychological subsidiarity. That for 56 years, a self-directed 
British legal instrument constituted the substance of Australian copyright legislation, 
reflects the external locus of control. 
The British Copyright Act of 1911 made Australia safe for British business in three 
ways: 
 import controls enabled British publishers and record companies to control 
the supply of all licit copyright material to the Australian market  
 control, by the Australasian Performing Right Association, of the public 
performance right, resulted in repatriation to Britain of the bulk of music 
performance fees collected by APRA  
 copyright in records enabled British gramophone companies, which by the 
early 1930s monopolised Australian record manufacture, to regulate 
production and supply. 
Except in the case of import controls, designed to facilitate the practice of ruthless 
price discrimination by British publishers, British commercial control in Australia did 
not result from legislative plotting to subordinate Australian markets to British 
copyright interests. In 1911, no-one foresaw the rise of radio broadcasting and its 
extraordinary effect on the increase in the commercial value of the public performance 
right. However, imperial copyright legislation vested in the publishing and recording 
industries, by species of copyright control, great economic power. These industries 
were made up of British companies, and as soon as peace descended on Europe, they 
exerted control over Australian markets for copyright material.  
The history of Australian copyright politicking in the interwar period is complex, and 
it is sufficient, for present purposes, to record that by accepting imperial legislation, 
and the obligation to honour the unfolding program of authors’ rights in the Berne 
Convention (and the evolving system of neighbouring rights), Australia’s copyright 
perspective, already governed by the imperial perspective, became fixed.  
Considerations of international law and imperial comity now made impossible 
significant retreat from the legal position determined, at root, by psychic dependency. 
Even though Australia the nation, seen independently from external considerations, 
benefitted little from the lengthy copyright term, or a number of other stipulations of 
                                                             
23 Australia became an independent member of the Berne Union in 1928. Until then British 
accessions or ratifications were done in its own right and on behalf of its imperial possessions. 
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copyright law, and not at all from import controls, politicians could not contemplate 
the frightful possibility of separation. The desire for attachment perhaps explains the 
otherwise mysterious absence of critical thought in Australian policymaking from this 
time forward. 
Though policymakers had plenty to object to, from now on, by and large, they 
confined themselves to discussing the mechanics of international law and its reception 
into Australian. They were not disturbed that the structure of the law primarily 
benefitted a foreign economic interest. They reacted to copyright disputes that broke 
out frequently between 1920 and 1940, as if the underlying law, which buttressed the 
arguments of British copyright owners against obstacles to revenue-making, reflected 
deeper natural necessity. 
Between the wars, two copyright-related phenomena disturbed the economic peace. 
The first, starting in the mid-1920s involved APRA’s collection of fees for the public 
performance of music. Radio broadcasters, instruments of unprecedented mass 
communication, beneficiaries of advertising revenues and government subsidy, 
quickly became APRA’s favourite collecting source. The second concerned the bitter 
dispute between commercial radio broadcasters,24 orchestrated from EMI 
headquarters in London, which, in the early 1930s, resulted in Australian record 
companies banning radio stations from playing their records. 
Government reacted by conciliation. The Royal Commission on Performing Rights, 
which reported in 1933, examined the first dispute, and became embroiled in the 
second. The Royal Commissioner, Sir William Owen, recommended compulsory 
arbitration as the suitable procedure for resolving performing right disputes,25 and 
equivocated on the record companies’ claim for a record performing right (on which 
basis they asserted the right to ban the playing of their records). Owen saw that such a 
right, if accepted, would lead to necessity to pay two public performance fees but he 
said the legislature must determine the question. 
Reform, however, proved too much. Government ignored the royal commission 
report and life went on as before. APRA, described as a “dragon devastating the 
                                                             
24 Australia, unusually, established in the early 1920s a broadcasting system split between public 
broadcasters supported by licence fees, and private broadcasters supported by advertising 
revenue. By the mid 1930s public broadcasters were consolidated under the control of the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Public and private broadcasters devoted a large proportion 
of airtime to the playing of music.  
25 He also recommended, among other things, that APRA publicly disclose non-collection 
income, public performance fees, distributions, its music repertoire. Government allowed the 
report to lapse. Over 30 years later, the Coalition Government adopted the first recommendation, 
for the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, establishing in the Copyright Act 1968 the 
Copyright Tribunal.  
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countryside”26 continued to court unpopularity by demanding progressively larger 
public performance fees from the ABC and commercial radio stations. Legally, the 
broadcasters could do nothing to stop the devastation. The record companies, whose 
counsel at the royal commission called commercial radio, “a noisome weed”, 
continued – with diminishing interest – their war against radio.  
The “gramophone lion”, so-called by an interested member of the federal attorney-
general’s department, blamed the precipitate fall in record sales during the great 
depression on radio broadcasting of music. In the United States and United Kingdom, 
the recording industry reacted by instituting bans on the playing of their records. In 
the UK, EMI asserted that the 1911 Copyright Act conferred on record producers the 
right to control the public performance of their records, and to general amazement, 
the English High Court upheld this argument in 1933.27  
In Australia, Gramophone Company, Parlophone Company, and Columbia 
Gramophone Company, sustained heavy losses from record sales from the mid 1920s. 
After their UK parent companies merged in 1931, they constituted the monopoly 
supplier of records in Australia. Their ban on broadcasting of records thus posed a 
grave threat to radio stations but over time the record industry saw, in its activities and 
those of broadcasters, confluence of interest. As EMI eventually realised, broadcasting 
stimulated, rather than undermined, sales. 
By 1940, government, because of difficulty, distraction, and simple ineptitude, had 
failed in its task of conciliation. Copyright factions were antagonistic but they lived 
with their differences. The Australian interest in the wide dissemination, via radio and 
other means, of copyright material could not be said to be a foremost consideration of 
government policy. Reform would have to wait. 
THE EXTERNAL LOCUS STRENGTHENED AND BROADENED 
Reform came, slowly, and once again, Australia followed the British lead. Spurred by 
continued commercial dispute over performing rights, and importuning for 
recognition of a sports performing right,28 the British Government commissioned a 
committee to review the copyright law. The Gregory committee reported in 1952, 
                                                             
26 By Purcell, barrister for the Cinematograph Exhibitors’ Association at the royal commission. 
27 Gramophone Company Ltd v Stephen Cawardine & Co [1934] 1 Ch 450. 
28 The Association for the Protection of Copyright in Sports (renamed the Sports Promoters’ 
Association) lobbied government hard in the late 1940s and early 1950s, for recognition of 
copyright in sporting spectacles. Though the sports promoters often did not precisely articulate 
the species of right sought, they wanted the legal right to control the broadcasting of sporting 
fixtures. In 1952 they organised a ban on television broadcasting of major events. In the same 
year, the Gregory Committee rejected the proposal for a sporting performing right.  
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recommending implementation of the latest amendment to the Berne convention,29 
and reordering of the copyright legislation to recognise analogous copyrights of the 
recording and radio and television broadcasting industries. 
Australia followed by assembling the Spicer committee in 1958 to review the findings 
of the Gregory committee and the implementing legislation.30 The committee largely 
adopted the conclusions of its British counterpart, and recommended new legislation, 
which, when it finally came in 1968, adopted the structure, categories and terminology 
of the British legislation. 
The Australian Copyright Act of 1968 thus began its life as an analogue of the British 
Act of 1956. In its present incarnation, multiplied in length about sevenfold, it sets out 
complex procedures for collecting fees for use of copyright material, as well as 
expressing imperatives of international law and a bilateral trade agreement with the 
United States. 
Most informed Australians would regard the 1968 Copyright Act as an instrument 
nicely calculated to enable Australia to benefit from the principle of international 
mutuality, while supposedly “balancing”31 the interest of copyright owners in profit, 
and the public in dissemination. The Act is thus viewed as a beneficial compact, the 
product of something more than mortal wisdom, uncovered by the exegesis of 
enlightened foreign lawmakers, and so obviously giving effect to the universal moral 
law, that reception in Australian law must occur automatically. 
Another view, drawn from consideration of Australian copyright history, suggests 
itself. If the locus of control is hard to shift, if embedded psychologies live in nations 
through centuries, we have no reason to expect, in the future, more freedom of 
information than that allowed us, in the century past, by the proprietary interest 
collectives of larger powers. Two young Canadian scholars, Sara Bannerman 
(sarabannerman.blogspot.com) and Blayne Haggart (blaynehaggart.blogspot.com), 
neither lawyers, are drawing attention to a way in which Australia, among other 
nations, might free itself from psychological subsidiarity, and emancipate its policy for 
practical benefit. They suggest that even within the constraints of international law 
and free trade agreements, so-called “middle powers” like Australia and Canada, and 
less developed countries, can create something like copyright freedom, or more 
freedom than before, by identifying common interests and interpreting rules to 
encourage, rather than restrict, information freedom. Theirs is a pragmatic conception 
of freedom, but it offers more encouragement than the principle of “balance of 
                                                             
29 At a conference in Brussels. 
30 The British Copyright Act 1956. 
31 The first reference to a “balance of interests” – now repeated ad nauseum to be the function of 
copyright law – that I noticed in official literature is in the 1959 report of the Spicer Committee. 
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interests”, which, if the last century is a guide, may encourage more obedience to 
external restrictions that inhibit rather than emancipate the supply of information.  
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THE SPICER COMMITTEE (1958) 
 
Professor Leslie Zines 1 
 
INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR BRIAN FITZGERALD 
Most people here know Professor Leslie Zines as probably Australia’s most famous 
constitutional law professor, having been at ANU for over 30 years. A real genius in 
the constitutional law area. Many people don’t know that he also played an interesting 
role as a new recruit to the Attorney General’s Department in the mid 50s with the 
Spicer Committee. What we asked him to do, although he was a little apprehensive 
about this, was to come to the conference and talk a little bit about that time and about 
his reflections about copyright. So over to you. 
PROFESSOR ZINES 
As was just said, when I was first asked to attend the conference, I refused on the 
ground that although I had been heavily involved in the reform of copyright law 50 
years ago, I have had nothing to do with it for several decades. As a result of a change 
in my career, my work and my interests led me into other fields.  
I explained that when it came to issues at the cutting edge of copyright, such as the 
internet and information technology and digital copyright, I am an ignoramus. But it 
was made clear to me that my presence was not desired because it was thought I could 
contribute anything intellectually to your discussions, but rather as an historical relic 
who, moreover, should be invited soon, while he was still around. I must say, having 
regard to the way I feel at the moment, it wasn’t a moment too soon.  
The writer, LP Hartley, famously said, “The past is a foreign country, they do things 
differently there” and that was certainly true of Australia in the late 1950s.  
                                                             
1 Emeritus Professor Leslie Zines is a Visiting Fellow in the Law Program of the Research School 
of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Australia’s most distinguished constitutional 
scholar, and the author of seminal scholarly works on constitutional law and history. 
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It seems to me that the most striking feature of the establishment and work of the 
Copyright Law Review Committee under Sir John Spicer was the pervasive force of 
what I would call the British Connection, which has been touched upon in relation to 
earlier periods by the previous speaker. It was, in fact, I believe, an important element 
still, despite General MacArthur’s role in much of Australia’s social life at the time, 
and was to remain that way, with decreasing emphasis perhaps, over the next decade 
or so.  
The Attorney General, Neil O’Sullivan, who was very shortly replaced by Sir Garfield 
Barwick, and the Secretary of the Attorney General’s Department and Solicitor 
General, Sir Kenneth Bailey, were anxious that the Copyright Law Review Committee 
should not undertake a lengthy fundamental examination of the social, economic and 
legal aspects of copyright. That was because it was thought it had already been 
undertaken by the Gregory Committee in the United Kingdom which led to the 
enactment of the Copyright Act 1956 of that country.  
The first and major term of reference, therefore, was to advise which of the 
amendments recently made to the law of copyright in the United Kingdom should be 
incorporated into Australian law. Then, rather incidentally, the Committee was asked 
to consider what other alterations should be made. The Committee did not feel irked, 
or hampered, or hemmed-in in any way by the terms of reference. On the contrary, it 
considered that the approach adopted was desirable. They gave reasons why one 
should not depart unduly from the British precedent, reasons which would not be 
regarded as very cogent today.  
Emphasis was given to the close connection between the law of the two countries for 
many years. Also, where a person wished to maintain rights in the United Kingdom, as 
well as in Australia, in the same work, there was, as the Committee said, “great 
advantage in being able to rely on legal provisions that were substantially the same in 
each country.”  
The Committee also had the view that there was an advantage in being able to rely on 
the decisions of English courts in order to help interpret our law. Furthermore, it was 
said, and probably rightly for that period, that text books and articles on copyright 
would appear more frequently in Britain than in Australia.  
It reminds me of an occasion where two years earlier, when I was a post-graduate 
student at Harvard, I was discussing with my Administrative Law Professor, Louis 
Jaffe, a topic for a research paper. He suggested I look into Australian and American 
law relating to jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional issues. I told him that in respect of 
Australia at that time, most of the law was English. He looked at me with great surprise 
and said “I had no idea colonialism was so all pervasive”.  
Ben Atkinson in his history of copyright law, I’m sorry, in his true history of copyright 
law, (which presumably distinguishes it from the pack of lies that we get elsewhere), 
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has suggested that this desire to follow Britain led the Committee to neglect Australia’s 
national interest in respect of its lack of consideration of the posthumous term of 
copyright and of the import provisions.  
As to the term, the Committee didn’t examine the question as a matter of economic 
self-interest, as the Canadian and New Zealand bodies had done in 1957 and 1959, 
respectively. For the Spicer Committee, the requirements of the Berne Convention 
incorporated into British law were of overwhelming importance. The economic 
interests of Australia as primarily a copyright user, were shortly dismissed in favour of 
what was described as “justice to the overseas authors”.  
One of the Committee members, the Reverend Dr Percy Jones, Vice Director of the 
Conservatory of Music at the University of Melbourne, and Organ Master at St 
Patrick’s Cathedral, was most vigorous on this issue. When I wrote in the report that 
factors other than the balance of payments were involved, such as justice to overseas 
authors, those words were largely taken from him. I thought then, and think now, that 
it was a very simplistic view of justice, and I remember saying I didn’t think natural 
law laid down the life of the author of 50 years as the most just period of copyright, 
and there was no question of the balancing of conflicting interests.  
The report also refers to the United Kingdom as one of the main users of Australian 
copyright material, and states that Australian authors should receive the same 
copyright protection as British authors. The assumption is, throughout, that the 
predominant overseas market for Australian works would be Britain.  
The report does not enquire into arguments against the import monopoly provisions 
which were so prominent, as Ben has told us, in the parliamentary debates of the 1905 
Act. I was probably remiss here, I did as I will explain shortly, an enormous amount of 
background work for this Committee, but one thing I didn’t do was to go to the 
Hansard in relation to the 1905 Act. If I had, and I had placed that material before the 
Committee, it is quite possible that they would have considered it to a greater extent, 
although whether it would have changed their view is another question. But I do not 
recall that anyone noted the provisions, or any strong submissions were made to the 
Committee on the matter.  
It may be that some more consideration would have been given to it had the 
Committee known of the recent misfortune of Sir Kenneth Bailey. He returned from a 
conference in New York with a record of the latest New York musical hit, My Fair 
Lady. To his great embarrassment and confusion, he discovered that he had smuggled 
in a prohibited import. He told a small group of us. I rang my colleague, the Director 
General of Customs and told him the full story. “What should I do?” he asked. His 
colleague, apparently, told him to do nothing, but to go away and sin no more. I think 
actually, he said he would get in touch with the copyright owners, who no doubt said 
much the same thing.  
49 
One issue which Australia had no need to worry about for more than 40 years was 
constitutional power. Before 1968, Australian copyright law was governed by the 
Imperial Copyright Act of 1911. It operated throughout the Empire but in the case of 
the self governing dominions, it applied only if each dominion Parliament decided it 
should apply with or without modifications. Nevertheless, once applied, it applied as 
imperial law.  
In adopting the 1912 Act, the Parliament was not applying its constitutional powers, it 
was applied by virtue of a provision of the 1911 Act. So, the issue of what is the extent 
of the copyright power, or any other power didn’t arise because the Act applied by 
virtue of paramount force. So it’s not true to say, as I think Ben said in his overheads, 
that the 1912 Act incorporated the British provisions. It “applied” the British 
provisions and applied them as British or imperial law.  
But once, of course, Australia decided to bring its own Act, or to change that law, then 
the question of constitutional power of course arises.  
The orthodox view is that the words of the Constitution have the meaning that they 
had when the Constitution was enacted, a view which has been very strongly opposed 
by the gentlemen sitting in the front there.2 This raised questions whether copyrights 
under section 51(18) covered the rights in gramophone records and in TV broadcasts 
looking back to 1900. The particular problem with the broadcast was that unlike 
copyrights existing in 1900, it was not in any permanent form, but was a fleeting 
image. The Committee, sensibly enough, decided not to explore those questions. They 
did point out that broadcasting power could perhaps be of assistance.  
Nevertheless, lack of constitutional power was given as a reason, and sometimes “the” 
reason, for not recommending protected rights in certain areas. It was the reason for 
denying protection to an artist’s moral right, although I think most of the Committee 
thought of this as a rather strange continental motion, and to the performer’s right, 
and similarly in relation to the protection of sporting spectacles, apart from the offence 
created by the Broadcasting Act.  
The wider scope given today to the external affairs power, and other powers, and the 
somewhat broader approach to constitutional interpretation, with Justice Heydon 
dissenting, would be relevant if the Committee were inquiring today.  
Another feature of the 1950s, as far as I was concerned, was that there seemed to be no 
people around who had any deep knowledge of copyright law, or any interest in the 
theory of copyright law. That applied to all members of the Committee and to its 
Secretary. Nobody was teaching copyright law, or, indeed, any intellectual property 
law. When I was informed by Sir Kenneth Bailey that I was to be Secretary of the 
                                                             
2 A reference to the Hon Michael Kirby, whose opinions on constitutional power, expressed in 
judgments, were not identical to those of Professor Zines. 
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Committee, I spent the next two or three weeks reading Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright – I think the 9th Edition – from cover to cover. I then started on the 
minutes of the international conferences beginning with that of the Berne Convention, 
armed with my knowledge of high school French and a French/English dictionary.  
None of the Committee members had any greater knowledge of the subject. Whether 
there were any copyright experts in Australia then, or academics in the subject, they 
did not, if I remember rightly, bring themselves to our attention, or make submissions.  
One is only to look at the size and vitality of this gathering to realise how much 
Australia totally differs from that foreign country 50 years ago. 
Thank you. 
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THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1968: ITS PASSING AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Professor Adrian Sterling 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
I hope you will allow me to begin by giving some biographical details to show how it is 
that I come to be here today and to have the pleasure and privilege of addressing you. 
After graduating and being admitted to the Bar in Sydney, I went to England and was 
called to the English Bar. By a strange chance I took up work in 1954 with IFPI, the 
international organisation representing the record industry in legal matters. So I came 
to specialise in national, regional and international copyright law: I stayed with IFPI 
till 1974, when I returned to the Bar in London, eventually in 1992 entering academia 
to teach international copyright law in the University of London, where I still teach 
this subject. 
When at this Conference I look at the Australian Copyright Act, I see it from two 
perspectives: firstly as regards my participation in the debates on the 1967 Copyright 
Bill, and secondly from the point of view of a copyright lawyer having spent over 50 
years working in the field of international copyright. So I start with a description of 
some of the events which occurred during the debates on the Bill in 1967–1968, then 
give general summaries of how I see the achievements of the Act, and of Australia in 
the copyright field generally. In another paper, I describe some of the challenges facing 
copyright as I see them. 
May I say that it gives me particular pleasure to give this address in Old Parliament 
House, where so much Australian history has taken place, where I came in 1967/1968 
                                                             
1 LL.B. (Sydney, 1948); Bar of New South Wales (1949); Bar of England and Wales (1953). 
Professorial Fellow, Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute, Queen Mary, 
University of London, Visiting Professor, King’s College, University of London. Professor 
Sterling is one of Australia’s most distinguished copyright law scholars, and the author of the 
leading reference work World Copyright Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008 (3rd edition), a unique 
compendium of the international law of copyright. © J.A.L. Sterling 2009. 
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to make representations on the Copyright Bill, and which calls to mind friends and 
colleagues I met then. 
PART I: THE PASSING OF THE ACT 
Background to the 1968 Act 
As indicated by previous speakers, Australian copyright law grew as a branch of the 
copyright tree planted in the UK in 1710 with the passing of the first copyright law, the 
Act 8 Anne c.19. Following the 1710 Act a number of Acts extending the scope, 
duration etc. of copyright were passed in the 18th and 19th Centuries in the UK, 
culminating in consolidation and formulation of a comprehensive copyright law in the 
UK Copyright Act 1911, which by one legislative means or another extended or was 
applied throughout the British Empire as it then was. 
Soon after Federation in 1901, Australia adopted its first Copyright Act (1905). This 
incorporated provisions of UK copyright legislation (not at that stage consolidated), 
and introduced a number of fresh concepts in approaches to copyright law.2 Following 
the passing of the UK Copyright Act, 1911, the Australian Copyright Act 1912 was 
passed, broadly following the provisions of the UK Act. The UK pattern of preliminary 
recommendations by a Copyright Committee3, followed by publication of a Bill was 
reflected in Australia by the Report of the Spicer Committee 1959, followed by the 
presentation of the Copyright Bill 1967. The 1967 Bill led to intense debate and a 
political crisis (see below) but the Bill as amended passed into law in 1968, coming into 
force in 1969.  
At the international level, the Berne Convention sets the copyright standard for the 
world. The original text of the Berne Convention (1886) was revised at Conferences in 
1908, 1928 and 1948. The 1948 text was the most recent version of the Convention 
prior to the passing of the 1968 Act in Australia, and (as had all previous texts) the 
Convention dealt with author’s rights, but not with the related rights of performers, 
phonogram producers or broadcasting organisations. After 1948, in accordance with 
resolutions (“voeux”) adopted at the 1948 Revision Conference, studies began for the 
creation of a separate Convention dealing with these related rights.  
So it was that in 1961, the Diplomatic Conference for the adoption of a Convention for 
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
                                                             
2 For history of Australian copyright legislation, with detailed description of the political and legal 
background to the 1968 Act, see Benedict Atkinson, The True History of Copyright 1905–2005: the 
Australian experience (Sydney University Press, 2007). 
3 Report of the Copyright Committees 1909 (Gorell Report), 1952 (Gregory Report 1952 (UK) 
Report) and 1955 (Whitford Report). 
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Organisations took place in Rome, 10–26 October. Some 40 States (among them 
Australia) sent delegates to the Conference, Australia being represented by Mr. Clive 
Weston of the Commonwealth Department of Labour and National Service. 
International and non-governmental organisations were also represented. I was 
fortunate to be present at the Conference as a member of the delegation of one of the 
non-governmental organisations (IFPI). 
While the rights of record producers and broadcasters to authorise the reproduction 
etc. of their phonograms and broadcasts were recognised without opposition, there 
were two main controversial issues at the Rome Conference, namely the rights of 
performers to control the subsequent uses of their performances (whether in sound 
recordings of films) and the question whether performers and phonogram producers 
should have the right to receive remuneration for the broadcasting and public 
performance of their sound recordings.4 
In the event, the Rome Convention provided (1) that the protection provided for 
performers shall include the possibility of preventing certain acts of broadcasting, 
fixation etc. of their live performances (Article 7), and (2) the right of performers and 
phonogram producers to receive remuneration for broadcasting and public 
performances of sound recordings; this right was voted into the Convention (Article 
12) at the Plenary Meeting on 25 October, 20 votes for, 8 votes against and 9 
abstentions.5 
Among the countries voting for Article 12 were the UK and Australia. Australia’s vote 
did not represent mere passive following of the UK, as I know from my discussions 
with Mr. Weston at the Conference. Australia was entirely free to decide on which way 
to vote on each issue, and indeed I had no idea of how Mr. Weston would vote until 
the crucial votes were taken on 25 October. Australia’s acceptance of the principle of 
Article 12 was to have relevance in the debates on the 1967 Bill. 
                                                             
4 For general description of the provisions of the Rome Convention, see J.A.L. Sterling World 
Copyright Law (3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) (“WCL”) Chapter 20, and for the eventual 
outcome of the dispute on the question of performers’ rights in films (Articles 7 and 19 of the 
Convention) see WCL para.20.09(1). The dispute concerning performers’ rights in their filmed 
performances was not finally resolved in 1961. It continues today (cf the lack of consensus necessary 
to adopt the WIPO draft Treaty on Protection of Audiovisual Performances at the WIPO Diplomatic 
Conference in 2002). 
5 Article 12 permits Contracting States to make reservations on the acceptance or exercise of the 
right. See also B below. 
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The need for new legislation 
The United Kingdom had updated its Copyright Act 1911 in 1956. Then in Australia 
followed the Spicer Committee 1959, and its recommendations.6 In 1967, a Copyright 
Bill for legislation to replace the Australian 1912 Copyright Act was published by the 
Commonwealth Attorney General. The Bill completely overhauled the copyright law 
and introduced new provisions, not all related to the solutions adopted in the UK. In 
this section I wish to deal only with one crucial issue in the debates, concerning one 
provision of the Bill.  
A crucial issue and its resolution: the record performing right 
The debates on the Bill leading to the adoption of the UK Copyright Act 1911 were 
preceded by the Report of the Committee on the Law of Copyright Report 1909 
(“Gorell Committee”).7 Submissions to the Gorell Committee on behalf of producers 
of sound recordings (“record producers”) included the following passage: 
[We desire recognition of] copyright protection for the artistic and 
manipulative skill employed in the creation of the phonogram, subject, in 
the case of copyright works, to the rights of the original author … We claim 
that a two-fold copyright protection should be accorded to the phonogram, 
on precisely the same lines as the Convention accords protection to the 
cinematograph …8  
The Gorell Committee reported:  
The Committee think that protection should be afforded by legislation to 
the manufacturers of discs, cylinders, rolls and other mechanical devices, 
necessary to be used in the course of producing sounds, against piracy of 
these objects or their reproduction, either by means of direct copies or by 
means of copies produced by sound or otherwise. The grounds for this 
recommendation are that, as was pointed out in the evidence which has 
been placed before the Committee, these discs and other records are only 
produced at considerable expenditure by payments to artists to perform, so 
as to record the song, etc., and by the expenditure of a considerable amount 
of ingenuity and art in the making up of these records; and that therefore 
                                                             
6 Report of the Committee appointed by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia to 
consider what alterations are desirable in the Copyright Law of the Commonwealth 1959 (“Spicer 
Committee Report”).  
7 Report of the Committee on the Law of Copyright, Dec.1909, Cmnd 4976, Parliamentary Papers 
1910, Vol.21. 
8 Gorell Committee Report, pg.44.  
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the manufacturers are, in effect, producing works which are to a certain 
extent new and original, and into which the reproduction of the author’s 
part has only entered to the extent of giving the original basis of production. 
Therefore, the Committee regard this as one of the things which can be 
subject of the copyright and further recommend that public performances 
by means of pirate copies of these records should also be treated as an 
infringement of the rights of the manufacturer.9  
Reflecting the recommendation of the Committee, the UK Copyright Act 1911 
provided as follows in s.19(1): 
Copyright shall subsist in records perforated rolls and other contrivances by 
means of which sounds may be mechanically reproduced in like manner as 
if such contrivances were musical works … 
Following the increased use of records for purposes of public performances in cafés, 
theatres etc. and in broadcasting, in 1933 the Gramophone Company Limited, in order 
to confirm the ambit of the copyright granted by s19(1), to took a test case against a 
restaurant company (Cawardine) in whose premises a Gramophone Company record 
of a musical work10 had been played in public. Mr. Justice Maugham upheld the 
plaintiff’s claim that the copyright accorded to the record under s19(1) of the 1911 Act 
subsisted independently of the author’s copyright (if any) in the recorded work, and 
embraced all the attributes of copyright under the 1911 Act, including the public 
performance right.11  
On the basis of the decision in Cawardine, the UK record industry founded 
Phonographic Performance Ltd, for the exercise of the record performing right 
recognised under the 1911 Act, and licensing of such use of records in public places 
and broadcasting was then commenced. 
After the revision of the Berne Convention in 1948, the UK Government decided it 
was appropriate to consider revision of the 1911 Act, and set up the Committee on the 
Law of Copyright (Gregory Committee). The Committee’s Report was presented in 
1952, and recommended the retention of the record performing right. 12 
                                                             
9 For discussion of the Committee’s recommendation see J.A.L. Sterling “Intellectual Property Rights 
in Sound Recordings, Film and Video”, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, para.6.21). 
10 Overture to The Black Domino by Auber (died 1871) (out of copyright). 
11 Gramophone Co. Ltd. v. Stephan Cawardine and Co. [1934] 1 Ch.450. The judgement was not 
appealed. For further description of the case and the history of the record (phonogram) performing 
right and its recognition in national, international and regional law, see WCL paras 90.01 – 90.15.  
12 Report of the Committee on the Law of Copyright Oct. 1952 (Cmnd 8662, Parliamentary Papers 
1951–52, Vol.9), para.184. 
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When the Copyright Bill 1955 was presented in the House of Lords, two members of 
the Upper Chamber declared their determined opposition to the retention of the 
record performing right in the new legislation. “This right got in by a side-wind”, 
thundered Lord Jowett, supported by Lord Lucas of Chilworth, “and we are 
determined to see its abolition”. 
Some months of intense lobbying by the record industry and broadcasting interests 
then followed.13 In the event the right was retained in section 12 of the Copyright Act 
1956 (and still remains in the current legislation, the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988, sections 16(1)(d), 20).  
The campaign for the international recognition of the record performing right had as 
above described come to fruition with the recognition of the right in Article 12 of the 
Rome Convention. 
The scene shifts to Australia. The Spicer Committee Report 1959, having considered 
the various arguments and the history of the recognition and exercise of the right, 
recommended the retention of the right.14 When a new Copyright Bill was being 
prepared in Australia, the indications were that the matter would be hotly contested in 
the debates on the forthcoming Bill. Accordingly in February 1967, I (then Deputy 
Director General of IFPI) was at the request of the Australian record industry 
association sent to Australia to assist the association in its campaign for the retention 
of the record performing right. Throughout my visits to Australia in this connection, I 
was in close consultation and full agreement with the association on all decisions and 
steps to be taken.  
As a first step, I sought a meeting with the Minister in charge of the Bill, Nigel Bowen 
Q.C., as he then was. He received me courteously in his Chambers in Macquarie Street, 
Sydney. I began by saying that this was not a political, but a legal issue and spoke of the 
history and exercise of the record performing right. When I had finished I expected 
some searching questions, even, I hoped, some tiny indication of the Attorney-
General’s view. But Nigel Bowen simply said “Now I will hear the other side. Good 
morning”. A great lawyer. 
Later, in February 1967, I went to Canberra with the industry representatives and had 
extensive meetings with Lindsay Curtis, the Attorney-General’s officer responsible for 
dealing with matters connected with the proposed legislation. Lindsay was the perfect 
civil servant, courteous, receptive and impartial, and more than that, highly intelligent, 
an excellent draftsman and blessed with a warm personality and a great sense of 
humour. There was much drafting of submissions and exchange of views, not only 
                                                             
13 Then Assistant to the Director General of IFPI, I took part in 1955/1956 in the making of 
representations to Parliament on the issue. 
14 See Spicer Committee Report para.260, and for extensive review of the question, paras 228–264. 
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about this issue, but also on the issue of the conditions applying in respect of the 
compulsory licence to make sound recordings.15 I then returned to the UK. 
In May 1967, the Attorney General published the Copyright Bill. The record 
performing right was retained. A fierce controversy broke out. The Government of the 
day was a coalition of the Liberal Party and the Country Party. The radio stations 
opposed retention of the right – but the unexpected development was that the small 
country radio stations providing programs to lonely homesteads and farms of 
settlements in the outback went to their Country Party MPs and said that payment of 
royalties for the broadcasting of records would mean that in many cases they would 
have to terminate their programmes, removing the services and the entertainment to 
large numbers of persons in the country areas. While the Liberal Party wished to retain 
the right, the Country Party opposed the right’s retention, and said it would leave the 
Government if the Liberals insisted on retaining the right. This would have meant an 
election, and thus the issue had created a political crisis. 
At the invitation of the Australian record industry I returned to Australia in October 
1967. After meetings with the industry I went to Canberra and the Attorney-General 
received me in his rooms here in Old Parliament House. The first thing he said was 
“Mr. Sterling, you told me this was not a political issue and now the Government is 
about to fall because of it”. I made such apology as one could in such circumstances. 
“You had better stay here in Canberra and see my people in my Department”, said Mr. 
Bowen. That was all: we did not speak again. 
I settled down in the old Hotel Canberra near Parliament House and commenced a 
series of meetings with Lindsay Curtis and industry representatives.16 I did not meet 
                                                             
15 Two of my fellow students from Sydney University Law School (Class of ’48) who were in 
Parliament in 1967, were T.E.F. (Tom) Hughes and Lionel Murphy. I went to see them (separately) 
and asked for their support of the record performing right. Tom Hughes (Liberal Party) said he 
would support the right, as did the Liberal Party. Lionel Murphy (Labor Party) said “But what are 
you doing for the little man?” by which he meant the rank and file performers in bands and 
orchestras. I said I would do what I could to encourage the Australian record industry to support 
participation for performers in royalties paid for the record performing right, and he said on that 
basis he would support the right. 
16 The old Hotel Canberra was then a modest building, one might say redolent of the charm of 
colonial days, in the dining room of which Members of Parliament were often seen, and where, it was 
said, the political future of Australia was forged in, it was hoped, confidential conversations. Walking 
in the sylvan surrounds to Parliament House each morning, one had to be on the alert, as magpies 
were constantly attacking passersby and it was reported that Parliamentarians had been issued with 
pop-guns to ward off avian attacks. Two vignettes, both of Prime Ministers, which stay in my mind 
from visits to Parliament House in 1967/1968, were the dapper figure of Harold Holt as he made a 
statement to the Chamber and departed from the front bench (at which some of us will be privileged 
to sit at this Conference) with a sprightly step that reflected his athletic attributes, always to be 
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any representatives of those opposed to the retention of the right. The pattern was that 
we would meet Lindsay Curtis and put a proposal on behalf of the industry. Lindsay 
would convey this to the “other side” and we would meet again in a few days to 
consider the reply: this process continued for some weeks.  
Finally, it was announced that the Government would amend the Bill to specify, inter 
alia, the general rules on the maximum royalties payable for broadcasting of records 
by commercial and non-commercial stations. Thus the matter was resolved, and the 
right was retained in the 1968 Copyright Act and remains there still, with the 
provisions on maximum royalties (ss 85, 152), the right now being embraced in the 
right of communicating the sound recording to the public. It is understood that there 
are now moves for the deletion of the maximum royalty provisions on the basis of 
changed circumstances, technological developments etc. 
The campaign in Australia did not end the national battles for the recognition of the 
right. The same dispute between the industry and the broadcasters arose again in 
Canada in 1970 – on that occasion with victory for the broadcasters, as Mr. Trudeau’s 
Government voted in the Canadian Parliament for the retrospective abolition of the 
right (after the Canadian record industry’s successful case before the Canadian 
Copyright Tribunal in which the Tribunal fixed tariffs for the exercise of the right).17 
Twenty-eight years later the Canadian Parliament voted for the re-instatement of the 
right.18 In the United States, the right has been recognised (after long debates) in the 
US Copyright Act (s106(6)) limited to public performance by means of digital audio 
transmissions, and debates still continue for the extension of the right.19 
In sum, the record performing right has been recognised in the majority of national 
copyright laws (estimated as those of approximately 100 counties), at the international 
level in the Rome Convention 1961, and in the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty 1996, and at the regional level in the Cartagena Agreement 1969 (founding 
                                                                                                                                                    
associated with his memorable departure, and the courtesy with which John Gorton greeted me as I 
passed him early one morning in the entrance hall (though I was totally unknown to him).  
17 The main argument used by those opposed to the recognition of the right in Canada in 1970 was 
not based on legal or equitable grounds, but on an allegation (unsubstantiated, and vigorously denied 
by the Canadian industry and performers) that the royalties for exercise of the right would go to the 
United States. 
18 I have been asked by the editors of this publication to record personal memories of the events here 
related, so I mention that on the cold December night in 1970 when I left the Canadian Parliament 
building after the abolition vote to fly back to London, I purchased at the departure airport a bottle of 
Champagne which I vowed to open when the right was re-instated, something I was able to do 
twenty eight years later.  
19 For details see WCL paras 90.03 – 90.15. 
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Parties Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and in the European 
Community Rental and Related Rights Directive, as consolidated in 2006. 
The history of copyright contains many examples of the influence of personalities. In 
Australia in 1967/1968, possibly determinative was the decision of John Sturman, then 
General Manager of the Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA), in 
deciding APRA’s role in the dispute concerning the record performing right. In those 
days, the “cake theory” was much supported by those in author’s right circles. The 
argument ran that broadcasters and other users could only pay a certain amount for 
the use of protected material, and if record producers and performers were to have a 
share, there would be less of the cake for beneficiaries of author’s rights. It would have 
been entirely understandable if John Sturman had taken the same view. When I met 
him in Sydney in February 1967, however, he said “You have your problems. We have 
ours. You argue your case and we will argue ours. I will remain neutral on this issue”. 
John Sturman’s attitude was of critical importance, and I am glad to have this 
opportunity to recognise that. 
PART II: ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE 1968 ACT 
General 
Seen from the international point of view, the 1968 Act is remarkable for its detail and 
its length: some 600 pages, the longest Copyright Act in the world, as far as I know. A 
number of provisions of the Act offer precisely described solutions to a number of 
challenges posed to modern copyright by technological and other developments: some 
of these provisions are mentioned in B-D below. In addition, it should be mentioned 
that from the overall point of view, Australia has made distinctive contributions to 
copyright law and learning, both in the past, and today as regards the continuing 
development of copyright law in the world context (see E below).  
Provisions on moral rights 
Amendments to the 1968 Act in 2006 contained some 87 sections relating to moral 
rights, constituting, as far as I know, the most extensive and detailed legislation on 
these rights in any copyright law. While the granting of moral rights of attribution and 
integrity for authors and performers follows the provisions of the Berne Convention 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996, the provisions go into 
great detail as to what constitutes infringement, what remedies are available etc. Here I 
wish to mention one aspect of these provisions which has attracted international 
attention, particularly in common law countries, namely the provisions on defences 
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against claims of infringement of moral rights:20 these provisions introduce a concept 
of “reasonableness” as a defence in relation to allegedly infringing acts.  
Thus, as regards the attribution right, there is no infringement if in the particular case 
the defendant establishes that it was reasonable in all the circumstances not to identify 
the author. Section 195AR(2) provides that in determining such reasonableness a 
number of factors are to be taken into account, which include (besides factors relating 
to the nature of the work, and the purpose, manner and context in which the work is 
used) any practice in, or contained in a voluntary code of practice in, the industry in 
which the work is used, or any difficulty or expense that would have been incurred as a 
result of identifying the author. There is a similar “reasonableness” defence as regards 
alleged infringement of the integrity right where the defendant establishes that it was 
reasonable in all the circumstances to subject the work to the treatment of which 
complaint is made (s195AS). There are also “reasonableness” defences as regards 
alleged infringement of performer’s moral rights (ss195AXD, 195AXE). 
The abovementioned defences concerning practices, and difficulty and expense of 
identification, are, it is believed, unique to the 1968 Act. They are, in the international 
context, important for international study in the context of the exercise of moral 
rights, not only generally, but particularly as regards use of protected material in 
online communication. 
The fair dealing provisions 
Section 41A of the 1968 Act, introduced by amendments adopted in 2006, provides 
that a fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an 
adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work (or an audiovisual item (section 
103AA)), does not constitute an infringement of copyright in the work (or item) if it is 
for the purpose of parody or satire.  
There are apparently no similar provisions in copyright legislation of other common 
law countries providing that fair dealing for the purpose of parody or satire does not 
constitute infringement: in these other countries a defence on the basis of parody or 
satire lies under the general fair dealing (or in the US, fair use) rules.21  
                                                             
20 Ss 195AR (author’s attribution right), 195AS (author’s integrity right), 195AXD (performer’s 
attribution right) and 195AXE (performer’s integrity right). 
21 In the UK a proposal for a fair dealing exception regarding caricature, parody or pastiche is 
contained in the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property 2006, Recommendation 12. In some civil 
law countries (eg, Belgium, France) there are specific legislative provisions for parody, but in other 
civil law countries defences are under general provisions or limitations. See WCL para.13.22. 
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Space and format shifting 
The 1968 Act, as amended in 2006, contains detailed provisions regarding exceptions 
from copyright infringement in respect of space shifting (section 109A) and format 
shifting (sections 43C, 47J, 110AA).22  
I do not know of any legislation in any other country dealing specifically and in detail 
with space and format shifting, as in the Australian Copyright Act. 
PART III: AUSTRALIA’S ACHIEVEMENTS IN COPYRIGHT: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Judicial achievements 
Here are some of the Australian cases which have attracted international interest, 
particularly in common law countries: references to them will be found both in court 
decisions in other jurisdictions, and in Government and other reports and studies on 
current issues in copyright. 
Australasian Performing Right Assn. Ltd. (APRA) v. 3DB Broadcasting Co. 
Pty Ltd23 [recognition of record performing right] 
Bulun Bulun and anor v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd24 [protection of traditional 
knowledge: concept of application of principles of confidential information 
to sacred tribal knowledge] 
Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc25 [private international law: allegedly 
defamatory material on US website, accessed in Victoria: defamation law of 
Victoria applicable]  
IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd26 [analysis of concept of 
originality] 
Moorhouse v University of New South Wales 27 [principles applying in 
assessing liability for authorising infringement of copyright] 
                                                             
22 See WCL para.10.05. Recommendation 8 of the abovementioned UK Gowers Review proposes 
introduction of a limited private copying exception for format shifting for works published after the 
law comes into effect. 
23 [1929] VLR. 107; 35 A.L.R. 109; WCL, para.90.02. 
24 [1998] FCA 1082. 
25 [2001] VSC. 305; [2002] H.C.A. 56 (HC); WCL, para.3.31. 
26 [2009] HCA 14 (HC). 
27 (1975) 133 CLR. 1; 49 ALJR. 267; 6 ALR. 193; [1976] RPC 151 (HC); WCL, para.13.10. 
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Rank Film Prodn. Ltd v Dodds28 [hotel rooms: liability for unauthorised 
viewing in hotel rooms of TV programs containing material protected by 
copyright] 
Telstra Corpn. Ltd v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd29 
[liability for unauthorised provision of protected material in “music on 
hold” service for telephone subscribers] 
Telstra Corpn. Ltd v Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd 30 [labour as 
criterion of originality] 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper31 [infringing authorisation 
through linking to sites hosting unauthorised copies of protected material] 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v. Sharman Licence Holdings Ltd32 
[infringing authorisation of unauthorised file sharing] 
In this connection special mention should be made of the World Trade Organisation 
Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on section 110(5) of the United States 
Copyright Act. This Report on the interpretation of the “three step test” laid down in 
Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) has made a major contribution to the appreciation and application of this 
fundamental provision of the TRIPS Agreement throughout the world. The Chairman 
of the Panel was Hon. I.F. Sheppard, formerly President of the Copyright Tribunal 
established under the Copyright Act 1968.33 
Academic achievements 
Australia has produced a number of academics internationally recognised for the 
contribution of their writings and teaching of the theory and practice of copyright. 
The doyen of this group is Professor W.R. Cornish. Among publications of 
                                                             
28 [1983] 2 NSWLR 553; 2 I.P.R. 113 (NSW SC, 1984); WCL, para.9.10; (cf Rafael Hoteles SL, Case 
C306/05, [2007] E.C.D.R. 2 (European Ct of Justice)).  
29 (1995) 31 I.P.R. 289 (Fed.Ct.); (1997) 71 A.L.J.R. 1312; 146 A.L.R. 649; [1997] HCA 41 (HC). 
30 [2001] FCA 814 (Fed.Ct.); [2002] FCAFC 112; [2002] 55 I.P.R. 1 (Full Fed. Ct, 2002); WCL, 
para.7.16. Cf. Telstra v APRA supra. 
31 [2006] FCAFC 187 (Full Court, Fed. Ct); WCL, para.13.53. 
32 [2005] FCA 1242; [2006] FCA 1 (Fed. Ct); WCL, para.13.53. 
33 Panel Report on United States Copyright Act, s110(5) (Hon. IF Sheppard, AO, QC, A.V. Guarion, 
CL Guada) 15 June 2000, ref WT/DS160/R: in WTO Dispute Settlement Reports, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). See also WCL para10.14. 
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international renown by Australian academics are those of Professor Cornish,34 and of 
Professor Brian Fitzgerald35, and the classic text of Professor Sam Ricketson The Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886–198636, with its 
second edition, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne 
Convention and Beyond (with Professor J.C. Ginsburg)37, and in the Australian context 
Professor James Lahore’s Intellectual Property in Australia – Copyright. 38 Recent 
publications of international interest include Dr. Elizabeth Adeney’s The Moral Rights 
of Authors and Performers: an International and Comparative Analysis39, and (with J. 
Davis) Dr. Tanya Aplin’s Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials40 and 
numerous learned articles by Professor Peter Drahos and others, as well as the 
historical survey of Benedict Atkinson above mentioned. 
Organisational achievements 
The Australian Copyright Council and the Copyright Society of Australia promote 
research projects, and hold seminars, and generally provide information on copyright, 
available for Governments, academics and practitioners, and the public generally, with 
up to date and detailed studies on the background to, and recent developments 
concerning, copyright law in Australia, also covering regional and international 
developments: the online availability of this material being particularly valuable. 
Organisations representing authors and other copyright owners in Australia have long 
been established and continue to develop and play their part, not only in the 
administration of copyright, but also in contributing to studies on copyright reform. 
Achievements in the communication area: worldlii and austlii 
The World Legal Information Institute was established on the initiative and continues 
under the direction of Professor Graham Greenleaf of the University of New South 
Wales. The Institute provides access to over 800 databases in over 120 countries and 
territories via the Free Access to Law Movement, embracing Legal Information 
Institutes in Asia, Australasia, Canada, the Commonwealth, Hong Kong, New 
                                                             
34 See e.g. Cornish, W. R., Llewelyn, D., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and 
Allied Rights (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2007). 
35 See e.g. Fitzgerald, B., Gao, F., O’Brien, D., Shi, S.X., eds Copyright Law, Digital Content and the 
internet in the Asia-Pacific (Sydney University Press, 2008). 
36 Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, Kluwer, 1987. 
37 Oxford University Press, 2006. 
38 Sydney, Butterworths, looseleaf 1977. 
39 Oxford University Press, 2006. 
40 Oxford University Press, 2009. 
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Zealand, Pacific Islands, Southern Africa, United Kingdom and Ireland and the USA, 
also Droit Francophone and regional sites including Europe (European Union and 
European Community legislation, European Court of Justice reports etc.), Caribbean, 
Middle East etc., together with other material (law journals, law reform etc.), forming 
compendious and convenient access to legal materials throughout the world. For ease 
of navigation, and breadth of comprehensive coverage the service is as far as I know 
unrivalled. 
CONCLUSION 
Australia has achieved legislative, judicial, academic and other accomplishments of 
world renown in the field of copyright. It is my hope that Australia will continue to 
give to the world the benefit of its expertise in this field, for the benefit of all peoples. I 
believe that this is the time, in collaboration with New Zealand, for Australia to 
provide new initiatives in the Asian Pacific area, as described in my other material 
submitted to this Conference.  
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4 
THE FRANKI COMMITTEE (1976 REPORT) AND 
STATUTORY LICENSING 
 
John Gilchrist 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Franki Committee reported in 1976 on a new technological means of 
disseminating information. It was tasked: 
To examine the question of the reprographic reproduction of works 
protected by copyright in Australia and to recommend any alterations to the 
Australian copyright law and any other measures it may consider necessary 
to effect a proper balance of interest between owners of copyright and users 
of copyright material in respect of reprographic reproduction. The term 
‘reprographic reproduction’ includes any system or technique by which 
facsimile reproductions are made in any size or form.2  
The Committee made over 30 recommendations for reform of the Copyright Act. I 
propose to concentrate on the two most significant ones. Both recommendations raise 
21st century issues and illustrate the perennial problem in finding an equitable balance 
of interests in the law between owners of copyright and users of copyright material in 
response to technological change.  
                                                             
1 John Gilchrist is Senior Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of Canberra. He was Secretary 
of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (the Franki Committee) and as an 
officer of the Australian Attorney-General’s Department was heavily involved in the development of 
the Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) (No 154 of 1980) which implemented many of the Franki 
Committee recommendations. John has a particular interest in publishing and the early history of 
copyright and has researched and published in this area. 
2 Australia. Report of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (October 1976) 
Introduction 1.01. 
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THEMES OF THE REPORT 
The Report of the Committee contains a number of themes which still resonate as 
copyright policy concerns today.  
 One was the Committee’s concern for the free flow of information. To quote 
from Section 1 of the Report “Australia is geographically isolated from the 
major centres of scientific and industrial research and the vast area of the 
Australian continent raises special problems in relation to the dissemination 
of information, particularly in the remoter parts”.3 
There are a quite a number of references in the Report to the public interest 
in ensuring the free flow of information for education and research and for 
the scientific, technical and social development in Australia.4 
 The second concern was that Australia was (and still is) a substantial 
importer of copyright material and it should be hesitant in adopting a radical 
solution to the problem of a kind that is unlikely to find widespread 
acceptance amongst member countries of the multi-lateral copyright 
conventions.5 
 The third concern of the Committee was that its recommendations should be 
consistent with Australia’s international convention obligations and not 
divorced from what might be called “world standards” so far as the balance of 
the rights of the copyright owner and interests of the user were concerned.6  
 And finally it was not only concerned with the question to what extent should 
copyright owners benefit from the use of the new technology (reprography) 
on the grounds of principle, but to what extent it was practical for them to do 
so.7  
The concern about the free flow of information was and is a concern to Australia and 
has gained momentum worldwide. Over the last decade it has gained momentum and 
we now use the term “access to information” to describe it. At the time of the Franki 
Committee’s deliberations there was a strong public criticism about the effect of the 
British Publishers Marketing Agreement, which was to carve up most of the English 
speaking world between British and American publishers, with the result that 
countries like Australia were deprived of access to cheaper American editions of 
                                                             
3 Ibid, 1.37. 
4 Ibid, 1.02, 1.40, 1.51, 4.06, 6.40, 7.07. 
5 Ibid, 1.35,  
6 Ibid, 1.27. 
7 Ibid, 1.19–20, 1.35–37, 2.53. 
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works. This problem was also aggravated by the slowness of British publishers in 
producing cheaper paperback editions of works in comparison with their American 
counterparts.  
While action initiated by the US Justice Department in 1976 led to a consent decree 
that prohibited American publishers from engaging in market allocation with British 
publishers,8 this issue has resonated until the present day despite changes in publisher 
practice and some changes to the Copyright Act relaxing commercial import barriers. 
These concerns about difficulties of access swayed the Franki Committee. Within the 
Report there were a number of recommendations that sought to respond to 
complaints about the unavailability of texts in Australia and the unreliability of 
delivery when ordered from overseas. In a number of their recommendations the 
Committee provided for wider copying rights using the formula “where a work cannot 
be obtained within a reasonable time at a normal commercial price”.9 
I now turn to the two most significant recommendations of the Franki Committee – 
the clarification of the fair dealing provision (s 40) and the statutory licence scheme for 
the multiple copying of copyright works which became s 53B of the Copyright Act and 
is now embodied in Division 2 of Part VB of the Act (s 135ZJ and 135ZL).  
THE FRANKI COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
A Clarification of fair dealing for private use (s 40) 
The Australian Copyright Council Ltd had made submissions to the Franki 
Committee that all copying should be remunerated upon the basis that authors should 
receive a royalty for each copy page made of any work within copyright. In Britain the 
Whitford Committee also reached a similar view by concluding that all reprography be 
remunerated and that fair dealing be confined to hand or typewritten copies.10 The 
Franki Committee took the view that as a matter of principle a measure of copying – 
by reprographic or other means – should be permitted without remuneration. It did so 
after examining the laws of other countries – to examine using their term ‘world 
standards’ – and the requirements of the copyright conventions.  
At one stage in the Committee’s deliberations it appeared that the fair dealing 
provision for research or private study would undergo only very modest reform, 
                                                             
8 United States v Addison-Wesley Publishing Co CCH 1976–2, Trade Cases 70.640. 
9 Report of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (October 1976) 2.60, 
3.19, 4.20, 6.58. 
10 United Kingdom. Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (the 
Whitford Committee) Cmnd 6732 (1977) [291]. 
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despite widely expressed criticism from many who made submissions – from 
copyright owners to users – that the provision was too vague and uncertain in practice.  
The Committee recommended clarifying the section by inserting a list of factors to be 
taken into account in determining what constitutes a fair dealing, which was derived 
from a similar list in the then US Copyright Bill’s provision of fair use. But this was 
hardly a radical step since the factors listed were supported by case law. 
 The further step was to recommend a deeming provision. That is, certain copying for 
research or study was deemed to be a fair dealing, namely the making of a single copy 
of a periodical article or a reasonable portion (10% or one chapter, whichever was the 
greater) of another published work.11 
I did not have a vote on the Committee but was encouraged by the Chairman to 
participate in discussions and I had a hand in persuading the Committee to suggest a 
reform that would respond to a widely held view about the vagueness of the provision 
in its practical operation. When confronted by a clear problem, it seemed important 
not to shy away from its resolution. The clarification of section 40 still stands, and I am 
pleased to say has since been enhanced to deal with other media.  
Two members of the Committee recommended that the fair dealing provision should 
be extended to cover private and personal use (following the laws of many civil law 
countries) rather than limit the provision to the rather more scholarly pursuits of 
research and study.12 This recommendation was not adopted by the Government, 
although in practice I did not see this as a dramatic change to the operation of the 
provision, simply because the recommendation was still limited by the notion of fair 
dealing, which did not govern the concept of personal or private use adopted in civil 
law countries.  
What the legislative reform of section 40 of the Copyright Act did was to clarify the 
rights of users of copyright material and recognise in particular the practical needs of 
users of informational literature, particularly periodicals.  
B Statutory licence scheme for the multiple copying of copyright works by 
educational establishments. 
The second significant recommendation – the major reform of the Franki Committee 
– was the legislative enactment of a licence scheme for the multiple copying of 
copyright works.  
                                                             
11 Australia. Report of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (October 
1976) 2.60. 
12 Ibid, 2.67. 
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The scheme provided for a statutory licence permitting an educational establishment 
to make multiple copies of parts of a work and in some cases of whole works for 
distribution to students, subject to recording the copying taking place under the 
scheme and an obligation to pay an appropriate royalty if demanded by the copyright 
owner or the owner’s agent within a prescribed time.  
The Committee said it was conscious that the idea of a statutory licence would not 
appeal to some copyright owners who would regard it as a derogation from their rights 
under the Copyright Act but felt the public interest in education and need for access to 
works in educational establishments justified this approach. It did not consider it 
would breach the provisions of the Berne Convention and Article 9 dealing with the 
right of reproduction.  
1. Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have 
the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any 
manner or form. 
2. It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
3. Any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for the 
purposes of this Convention.13 
The Committee considered a total coverage of copyright owners in the scheme was 
practically important for users but that ultimately voluntary licensing by owners may 
provide a more attractive option to educational establishments. That of course has 
come about. The Copyright Agency Ltd has a well-established voluntary sampling 
system outside the operation of the statutory scheme. 
When the Franki Committee made its recommendations there were only three 
schemes operating or proposed in the world. All in non-English speaking countries.14 
Legislative effect had been given to a licensing scheme in the Netherlands and the 
Swiss were proposing a similar scheme. The Swedish scheme was a voluntary 
agreement between the Swedish Government and 17 Swedish organisations including 
                                                             
13 Australia. Report of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (October 
1976) 10.06 and at World Intellectual Property Organisation, Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works (1886 as revised) 
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html at 12 August 2009, and Berne Convention 
(Paris text 1971) www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/overview.html at 12 August 2009. 
14 Australia. Report of the Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (October 
1976) 6.33 
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the Association of Swedish Authors and the Swedish Publishers Association and was 
limited to government schools.  
In particular the substance of the agreement proceeded on the basis that the various 
organizations could be expected to represent 95% of the copyright owners whose 
works were likely to be copied.15 These were works in the Swedish language. At the 
time in Australia no voluntary arrangement could have guaranteed that level of 
coverage security for users. 
REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (No 154 of 1980) embodied the Government’s 
response to the Franki Committee’s Report. It was not a complete legislative 
implementation of its recommendations. The recommendations have been 
characterised accurately as tending to favour the interests of users of copyright 
material as against the interests of copyright owners. But the Government did not 
adopt some unremunerated copying recommendations. One example is that the 
Committee recommended that a library of a non-profit educational establishment be 
permitted to make up to 6 temporary or ephemeral copies of a copyright work 
provided it had not been separately published or if it had been, copies of it could not 
be obtained within a reasonable time at a normal commercial price. That would have 
legitimised the so-called ‘reserve stack’ copying which had been a practice of those 
libraries for some time. 
The Franki Committee took the view that the entitlement of an educational 
establishment to make multiple copies of a work under its statutory licence scheme 
was to be addition to whatever might be done under its recommendations on fair 
dealing and “reserve stack” copying. Case law since the Copyright Amendment Act 
1980 came into force suggests that the multiple copying licence has reduced reliance 
on fair dealing in so far as copying could be said to fall within the “teaching purposes” 
(now “educational purposes”) of the statutory licence (Re Haines and Director General 
of Education of New South Wales v Copyright Agency Ltd16 and Copyright Agency Ltd v 
Charles Sturt University (No 2).17  
Overall the Committees recommendations constituted a response to what was 
perceived to be a strong public interest in accessing works particularly in the 
informational category. They were however mindful of the fact that the rate of change 
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in technology was great and thought it desirable to examine the state of the law at 
regular intervals.  
The Franki Committee’s recommendations were expanded to include institutions 
assisting handicapped readers and the scheme established by the Copyright Amendment 
Act 1980 was among the first in the English speaking world. Statutory licensing was since 
been further expanded under Part VB of the Copyright Act. One significant change 
adopted in the Copyright Amendment Act 1980 was the introduction of a host of offence 
provisions to ensure adherence to the statutory scheme. This was a significant step in the 
use of criminal sanctions to underpin this private property right. On reflection I consider 
there were too many.  
The use of offence provisions to outlaw commercial activities in breach of copyright is 
defensible in most circumstances, but questionable when the criminal sanctions are 
aimed at the recording and retention of records by public institutions fulfilling an 
educational need and aimed at both individuals and the institutions which employ them. 
Another option may have been to give legislative power to enable a court to award 
additional damages (punitive or aggravated) for infringement of copyright in 
circumstances of some breaches such as the making of a record that is false or misleading 
in a material particular. As a matter of policy criminal offence provisions should be used 
cautiously in the underpinning of personal property rights.  
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5 
A BRIEF PERSPECTIVE: THE HISTORY OF 
COPYRIGHT IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
Professor Susy Frankel 1 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
I wanted to thank the Ngunnawal people for their welcome this morning. We from 
New Zealand believe in thanking the traditional owners, and in fact, in New Zealand, 
the real owners of the land. I see that Ruth has actually left so I hope that’s passed on.  
The Attorney General did mention the Copyright Tribunal, this morning and Ben also 
mentioned that in his talk. I did want to briefly mention it and I hope at some stage 
during this day and a half (I chair the New Zealand Copyright Tribunal) that we can 
return to the modern role of the Copyright Tribunal.  
Just to put an issue out there for you to think about, the modern role of the Copyright 
Tribunal might be a fast track mechanism that actually involves some due process, as 
opposed to those fast track mechanisms like notice and take down, where due process 
is arguably missing. So I say that provocatively. Not because I think tribunals are the 
answer, but it’s certainly worth discussing. 
I do want to thank Brian and Ben for organising the Conference. I’m not going to say 
much about them in the interest of keeping to time, but I am eternally grateful to Brian 
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as an academic who is one of the Australians, and there are a few of them, who are 
aware that New Zealand is on the map. I say this facetiously of course.  
I’d like to pay a personal tribute to Adrian Sterling. He was one of my teachers. In fact, 
I took a course at Queen Mary the first year that Adrian and Gerald Dworkin2 offered 
the international copyright course. And in trueness to his statement about the role of 
authors, he took the class on a field trip. Among many places, we went to Keats’s 
house, just to see copyright in action. He was never so blunt as to point out that we 
were in an author’s house but the message filtered through. Thank you, Adrian and 
Caroline, for taking us there. 
I want to add that I think copyright freedom is also about cultural freedom. If we 
reduce everything to economics, life is a bit sad. My father’s an economist. I’m a 
lawyer – need we say more. It’s about culture. It’s about dynamic culture and it’s also 
about cultural independence. More on that tomorrow perhaps. 
Having said it’s about culture, I’m now going to ironically turn to the price of cars. It 
was not until the price of cars became excessively beyond the reach of the average 
person in New Zealand that New Zealand changed its copyright law considerably from 
that of Britain. Through much of the 19th and 20th Centuries, New Zealand’s 
copyright law was a replica of Britain’s copyright law. The 1994 New Zealand Act saw 
some differences to that of the UK law, but for the most part, those differences did not 
signal any radical policy changes.  
So why did the price of cars achieve this first major separation from UK law? Many of 
you will realise it’s because New Zealand protects industrial design through copyright. 
There is a Registered Designs Act but the primary form of industrial design protection 
is copyright. 
PROVENANCE OF NEW ZEALAND COPYRIGHT LAW 
The history of copyright law in New Zealand unsurprisingly reflects New Zealand’s 
history as a colony of England. New Zealand’s modern copyright law draws heavily on 
United Kingdom legislation and cases from that jurisdiction are relied on and often 
followed in judgments of New Zealand courts. For most of the 20th century New 
Zealand copyright law was very similar to United Kingdom copyright law. Despite 
these close ties to United Kingdom copyright law, some significant differences can be 
found in New Zealand’s law both before the 20th century and in the 21st century.  
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COPYRIGHT LAW BEFORE THE 1913 ACT 
The 18th ordinance enacted in New Zealand, after the signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi3, was the Copyright Ordinance 1842.4 The passing of that law was something 
that the Governor of the day seemed to note as occurring early in the colony’s life.5 
The ordinance provided:6 
An Ordinance to secure the Copyright of Printed Books to the Authors 
thereof. 
WHEREAS it is desirable that the copyright of books should be secured by 
law to the authors thereof:  
BE IT ENACTED by the Governor of New Zealand, with the advice and 
consent of the Legislative Council thereof, as follows: 
1. The author of any book which shall hereafter be printed and published, 
and his assignees, shall have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such 
book for the full term of twenty-eight years to commence from the day of 
first publishing the same, and also, if the author shall be living at the end of 
that period, for the residue of his natural life. 
2. If any person shall during the period or periods aforesaid print reprint or 
import, or cause to be printed re-printed or imported, any such book 
without the consent in writing of the author or assignee of the copyright 
thereof, or shall, knowing the same to have been so printed reprinted or 
imported without such consent as aforesaid, sell publish or expose for sale, 
or cause to be sold published or exposed for sale, or have in his possession 
for sale, any such books without such consent as aforesaid, every such 
person shall be liable to an action at the suit of the author or assignee, in 
which action double costs of suit shall be allowed, and shall also, upon a 
verdict being given against him in such action as aforesaid, forfeit and pay 
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the sum of fifty pounds to the use of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, 
for the public uses of the Colony and the support of the Government 
thereof. 
The main impetus for the ordinance seems to have been to protect a forthcoming 
dictionary of Maori grammar.7 The work in question had been written by the 
Reverend Maunsell’s, who was a significant figure in the Maori church. That New 
Zealand should enact a copyright law for such a purpose is telling of the nature of New 
Zealand at the time and foreshadows what is today one of the biggest challenges of all 
of New Zealand intellectual property law.  
Today New Zealand is a country which is poised to consider how much to protect 
traditional knowledge, known to Maori as matauranga Maori, as it relates to works 
akin to copyright and other intellectual property rights. Whether laws protecting 
matauranga Maori in some way will be enacted will depend on the recommendations, 
and government action based on those recommendations, arising from a forthcoming 
Waitangi Tribunal report. The Waitangi Tribunal hears claims brought by Maori 
pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The report relating to protection of Maori traditional knowledge and related issues 
arises from a claim brought by Maori against the Crown about New Zealand’s flora 
and fauna and to the use of Matauranga Maori.8 New Zealand already has trade mark 
laws which take account of some Maori interests.9 If New Zealand law, in the future, 
creates greater protection of Maori interests in intellectual property or related laws, 
New Zealand law will be quite different from that of the United Kingdom or Australia. 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN NEW ZEALAND FOR MOST OF THE 20TH 
CENTURY 
For most of the 20th century New Zealand’s copyright law was the same as English 
law. The Copyright Act 1913 adopted the United Kingdom Act of 1911 and the 
subsequent Acts in New Zealand of 1962 and 1994 were substantively based on the 
United Kingdom 1956 and 1988 Act respectively. Some points of difference from the 
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United Kingdom Acts can be found in the New Zealand Acts, but the differences are 
not substantive policy differences.  
In some ways this is hardly surprising, after all the United Kingdom law of 1911 was 
framed as part of an effort to secure copyright laws as consistent as possible in all of 
the Empire, so as to protect British works abroad. The law reform followed the 
Imperial Copyright Conference in which some agreement with the colonies was 
reached.10 Sherman and Bentley summarise the goals of the British 1911 reform:11 
The law at the time, which was “incomplete and often obscure”, was 
governed by no fewer than twenty two Acts of Parliament, passed at 
different times betwen1735 and 1906; and to those should be added a mass 
of Colonial legislation, frequently following blindly the worst precedents of 
English law…the new Copyright Bill …makes a clean sweep of all of these 
enactments and proposes to set up in their place a homogenous code of 
copyright law on sound and generous lines’. 
Thus, New Zealand’s law of 1913 reflected this homogenous code which spread across 
the Empire as far an in as much detail as the British could persuade colonial 
legislatures to do. New Zealand was quite obedient in this respect. 
It was not until the price of cars became excessively beyond the reach of the average 
person in New Zealand that New Zealand changed its copyright law considerably from 
that of the United Kingdom and the imperial copyright tradition.  
So why did the price of cars motivate a major change of direction from United 
Kingdom law? New Zealand’s copyright law includes, in the scope of its subject matter 
the protection of industrial design.12 Drawings and models, which lie behind the 
design and eventual production of motor vehicles, are protected copyright works in 
New Zealand. There is a Designs Act, which registers some designs, but the primary 
form of industrial design protection is copyright.13 Thus, copyright law could used to 
prevent the importation of cars made in out of New Zealand. 
THE PRICE OF CARS 
In the 1980’s New Zealand progressively instituted a free market and deregulated 
economy. As a result of that economic policy New Zealand stopped manufacturing 
                                                             
10 See Brad Sherman and Lionel Bentley, The Making of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge 
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11 Ibid, page 128 fn 119, citing Copyright Law Reform (1910) 216 Quarterly Review 482. 
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13 Design Act 1953. 
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goods which could be more cheaply made elsewhere. One of the sectors most radically 
affected in the early years of this economic policy was car assembly. Major car 
manufacturers, including Ford, Mitsubishi and Toyota, closed their New Zealand 
assembly operations. There was and is no comparative advantage in car assembly in 
New Zealand. But, New Zealanders do drive cars and they drive cars long distances. 
New Zealand may have only 4 million people on a small land mass compared to 
Australia, but New Zealand is a slightly larger land mass than the United Kingdom. 
Not assembling cars locally meant they were imported and this in turn resulted in cars 
being expensive.  
The solution to escalating car prices was to allow the parallel importation of cars, 
which would eventually come primarily from Japan and Korea. But the appointed New 
Zealand distributors, of the car manufacturers, used copyright law to make sure that 
cheaper imports entered New Zealand. The price of cars then provided the political 
motivation to change copyright law and allow parallel importing of all copyright 
products including films, sound recordings and computer programs.  
Since allowing parallel importing, New Zealand has tweaked the law to make parallel 
importing a balance between the interests of New Zealand consumers and copyright 
owners. For example, a copyright owner of a film for instance has a nine month 
exclusive window to make the film available in New Zealand before parallel imports 
are permitted.14 Also, when there is a dispute over whether parallel imported goods are 
legitimate or otherwise the burden of proof is on the importer to show there is not an 
infringing copy.15 Usually the burden of proof would be on the party alleging 
infringement. 
COPYRIGHT LAWS FOR THE BENEFIT NEW ZEALAND 
Since the 21st century began, when it comes to enacting intellectual property laws, 
New Zealand policymakers have been conscious that copyright and other intellectual 
property laws should be for New Zealand’s benefit. All intellectual property reform, in 
the last decade has, at the policy and Bill stages, included statements that one of the 
purposes of the relevant law reform is for the benefit of New Zealanders and New 
Zealand’s economic benefit. Whether this is, in fact, true in substance is debatable, but 
the policy of intellectual property laws for local benefit is a good starting point.  
The most recent copyright policy debate was focused digital copyright protection and 
culminated in the Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008. There are 
many difference of detail between New Zealand’s digital copyright laws and those of 
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the United Kingdom, European Union or United States approach. One key difference, 
for example, is that technological protection measures are only protected where they 
prevent copying rather than access to copyright works.16 
New Zealand does have copyright law that is different in some respects from other 
common law countries. Those laws are based on a common standard, which is no 
longer determined by United Kingdom law, but by international agreements, 
including the TRIPS Agreement.17 Sometimes little differences in legislation can create 
bad outcomes because often there is no case law to test those little differences. The law 
then becomes uncertain and users of copyright works such as librarians, educators or 
authors themselves, don’t quite know what is legitimate and what is infringing. 
However, major differences that can be achieved within international frameworks on 
the grounds of local policy interests are important. Parallel importing is one of those.  
New Zealand may well end up having less copyright freedom once it strikes a trade 
deal with the United States.18 Even though small, New Zealand it has experienced trade 
negotiators. Keeping parallel importing of copyright goods will be an important goal 
for these trade negotiations because of the obvious and proven benefit for New 
Zealand consumers. 
 
 
                                                             
16 Copyright Act 1994, s226A. 
17 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of Marrakesh 
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these negotiations see Susy Frankel “Intellectual Property and the Trans-Pacific Partnership” in 
Jane Kelsey (ed) No Ordinary Deal: Unmasking Free Trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
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6 
“WE ARE ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES”: 
CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
HISTORY: FAULT LINES IN THE MAP OF 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT  
 
Dr Sara Bannerman1 
 
 
“Canada consents to enter Copyright Convention.”2 These six words, sent by Canada’s 
Prime Minister in reply to the British government’s inquiries as to the willingness of 
the colonial governments to enter the Berne Convention, masked domestic tension that 
surrounded the issue of copyright in Canada. Canada would follow Britain into the 
Berne Convention but Canada, as a British dominion and, eventually, a middle power, 
would have a very different story from other, more familiar, copyright histories. 
Canada’s path crossed hidden fault lines that would later appear in the political map of 
international copyright.  
Current mappings of the politics of international copyright – alignments that classify 
the various copyright interest groups – tend to mask the tensions within these 
categories. Such categories and classifications have a powerful ability to mask tensions, 
to organize, to mobilize, and to shape the history of copyright.  
In this paper I will make three arguments, drawing on the historical experience of 
Canada with the Berne Convention between 1886, when the Berne Convention was 
founded, and 1971, its last revision. First, Canada, though aligned with the most 
powerful countries on issues of international copyright, has a unique and important 
history with international copyright that is very different from the histories of the 
major powers. Second, for many middle powers, the Berne Convention was a symbol of 
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progress in international law, and a hallmark of a civilized country. Canada has 
aligned with the major powers on issues of international copyright. Though this 
alignment has not always comfortable, it stems in part from a desire to be associated 
with ideas of progress and civilization, and to be aligned with one’s largest trading 
partners. Third, I ask, what contribution do middle powers make to the international 
copyright system today?  
I 
CANADA’S COPYRIGHT HISTORY IS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF 
THE MAJOR POWERS  
Canada’s historical experience with the Berne Convention has been very different from 
the experiences of the major powers. Like many of today’s middle powers, Canada 
signed on to the international copyright treaty in 1886 not as an independent country 
but as a British colony. Canada had no foreign affairs institutions or diplomats and 
was not directly represented at the founding meetings of the convention. 
Economically, unlike France or Great Britain, nineteenth-century Canada, like many 
other colonies, stood to gain little from the new international regime; Canada’s 
copyright industry was almost non-existent.  
In 1886 just 574 copyrights were registered in Canada, and, since Canadian authors 
had almost no international recognition, few Canadian authors would benefit from the 
internationally expanded copyright protection that would come about through 
Canada’s participation in the Berne Convention.3  
Competitively, the Berne Convention put Canada at a disadvantage. Canadian printing 
and publishing was in competition with the printers and publishers of the United 
States – a country that did not yet recognize international copyright. American 
publishers could reprint the works of foreign authors without permission and without 
any legal requirement to pay royalties to foreign authors. Canadian publishers, under 
the Berne Convention, would not have this freedom.  
As a result, the Canadian printing and publishing industry suffered, affecting authors 
as well.4 Although the industry was expanding – by 1881 the number of people 
employed in the industry had almost doubled since 1771, and over the next ten years 
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employment in the industry would grow by 30%5 – it was also seen to be struggling. 
Novelist and journalist William Kirby argued, in an 1885 letter to Canadian Prime 
Minister Macdonald, that his concern was “not primarily to secure copyright to 
Canadian authors – they have plenty of that,” but to “give our publishing industries 
such fair play and protections as they might obtain or the trade will become extinct in 
Canada.”6  
Nineteenth-century Canada’s strides towards independence from Britain in foreign 
affairs were slow and gradual. By 1886 there was an increasing trend for Canada to 
send representatives to international negotiations, and it was established that British 
colonies were to be consulted on matters of international treaties.7 However, 
consultation with Canada and the other British colonies, in the case of the initial 
negotiations for the Berne Convention, was minimal, and no Canadian representative 
accompanied the British delegation at the founding meetings of the Berne Convention. 
On 9 September, the British delegates signed the Berne Convention, making the 
following declaration:  
Plenipotentiaries of Her Britannica Majesty state that the accession of Great 
Britain to the Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works 
comprises the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and all the 
Colonies and Foreign possessions of Her Britannica Majesty.  
At the same time, they reserve to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty the power 
of announcing at any time the separate denunciation of the Convention by one or 
several of the following Colonies or possessions in the manner provided for by Article 
XX of the Convention, namely: India, the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the 
Cape, Natal, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia, 
Western Australia, and New Zealand.8  
There was a conflict at the root of Canada’s position as a party, under Britain, to the 
new convention – one that would disturb and threaten the new Union. While the 
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Canadian government moved to make Canada a part of a copyright system that was 
being portrayed as the advancement of civilization, there were also significant 
differences between Canada and the countries that initiated the Berne Convention. 
Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Germany housed major publishers 
with interests in publishing in foreign countries, while Canada was a net copyright 
importer. They were highly developed, and Canada was still developing. They had a 
flourishing literary culture; Canada did not. 
The differences between Canada and the lead countries in the movement to establish 
the Berne Convention only grew wider. Although Canada had agreed to join Berne, by 
1889 there were strong arguments that Canada should control its own copyright law, 
independently from Britain, and denounce the Berne Convention. Canada’s decision to 
join the Berne Union would soon be called an act of “profound…almost criminal – 
negligence” on the part of Canadian politicians, because the principles of the 
international agreement were out of step with what many Canadian interest groups at 
the time were calling for.9 Canada, shortly after joining the Berne Convention in 1886, 
reversed position; for years following Canada’s initial accession, Canada would 
attempt unsuccessfully to denounce the agreement. 
Canadian Minister of Justice John Thompson, who came to see the Berne Convention 
as being highly disadvantageous to Canadian interests, felt that the convention allowed 
foreign copyright holders to gain a monopoly on publishing their works in the 
Canadian market, causing Canadian printers and publishers to lose out. The benefits 
that Canadian copyright holders received under the Berne Convention did not equal, 
in Thompson’s view, the harm caused to Canadian printing and publishing industry: 
the condition of the publishing interest in Canada was made worse by the 
Berne Convention…The monopoly which was, in former years, complained 
of in regard to British copyright holders is now to be complained of, not 
only as regards British copyright holders, but as to the same class in all 
countries included in the Berne Copyright Union. Canada is made a close 
market for their benefit, and the single compensation given by the 
convention for a market of five millions of reading people is the possible 
benefit to the Canadian author…[who has been described as] “belonging 
rather to the future than to the present.”10 
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Thompson also felt that the terms of the Berne Convention largely favoured densely 
populated and highly urbanized countries such as those in Europe, but that such terms 
were unsuited to relatively less developed countries like Canada: 
The Berne Convention had in view considerations of society which are 
widely different from those prevailing in Canada. In Europe the reading 
population in the various countries is comparatively dense; – in Canada, a 
population considerably less than that of London is dispersed over an area 
nearly as large as that of Europe. In the cities of Europe, especially in Great 
Britain, the reading public is largely supplied from the libraries, while, in 
Canada, as a general rule, he who reads must buy. In European countries the 
reading class forms but a fraction of the whole population, while in Canada 
it comprises nearly the whole population.11 
Opposition to the agreement from printers, publishers, and related industries grew 
and mobilized. As a result, a Canadian copyright act was unanimously passed in 1889 
containing domestic printing requirements and a compulsory licensing system that 
were not compatible with the Berne Convention.12  
The Copyright Act of 1889 contained domestic printing requirements that were 
disallowed under the Berne Convention, which did not allow member states to require 
any formality as a condition of copyright.13 The new act required first or simultaneous 
printing and publishing in Canada – that is, printing and publishing in Canada within 
one month of publication or production elsewhere.14 Works that were not first printed 
and published in Canada or printed and published in Canada within a month of their 
publication or production elsewhere would not be eligible for the protections provided 
by Canadian copyright.  
The Copyright Act of 1889 went further. The failure to meet the domestic printing and 
publishing requirements of the act would have opened the way for the grant of 
compulsory licenses to reprint the work in Canada without permission of the 
copyright owner under compulsory licensing provisions. These compulsory licensing 
provisions, designed to make access to books more affordable in Canada, and to 
enable Canadian printers and publishers to better compete with the Americans, who 
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did not yet recognize international copyright, were also seen to be incompatible with 
the Berne Convention. Therefore Canadian Parliament, in a unanimous decision, 
requested denunciation of the Berne Convention.15  
The British, who had ultimate control both of Canadian legislation and Canadian 
foreign affairs, refused to let the Canadian act enter into force, and refused to allow 
Canada to denounce the Berne Convention. The British government was loathe to 
allow Canada to abandon the Berne Convention, as denunciation would break up the 
system of copyright uniformity throughout the British Empire. It infuriated some 
members of the British government that a colony such as Canada might threaten to 
break up the Berne Union. Henry Bergne, who had been a British delegate to the early 
meetings creating the Berne Convention, wrote: 
An International Union has only just been accomplished, with great 
difficulty, and on principles which commend themselves to the civilized 
world. To this, Great Britain and all her Colonies are parties, with the 
express and unanimous consent of the latter. Is a British colony, like 
Canada, for the sake of their infinitesimal interest in the publishing 
business, or for the supposed benefit of Canadian readers, to be the first to 
withdraw, and so to raise a hand to destroy the Union, which comprises a 
population of four or five hundred millions?16 
Bergne and others feared that if Canada were to withdraw from the Berne Convention, 
other countries would follow. A British committee studying the matter wrote that if 
“the interests of publishers or printers were allowed to prevail over those of authors, 
the lead given to Canada would not improbably be followed by other colonies, and 
thus the whole system of Imperial copyright would be broken up.”17  
Denunciation, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Knutsford informed 
Canada’s Governor General in 1890, would be unnecessary since the 1889 act 
contravening the Berne Convention would not receive the necessary approval from 
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Britain.18 British imperial power was used to forcefully keep Canada in the Berne 
Convention.  
Thompson, who became Canada’s fourth Prime Minister in 1892, was furious at this 
refusal to recognize Canadian copyright sovereignty. He wrote long letters to the 
Imperial government; he refused to meet with British representatives who came to 
negotiate on the issue, and finally he went to London to negotiate on, among other 
things, the copyright issue.19 At Windsor Castle on December 12 1894, Prime Minister 
Thompson died of a heart attack. His body was returned home to Canada in a boat 
with the sides painted black, and the dream of Canadian copyright sovereignty – and a 
copyright that differed from the norms of the Berne Convention – was never 
realized.20 
The histories of copyright that focus on major powers such as England, France, and 
the United States tell a story about copyright that is very different from Canada’s story. 
It is often assumed that Canadian copyright history has been uneventful, and that 
Canada’s association with the Berne Convention has been uncontentious and 
unproblematic. However, the Canadian history stands as a reminder that the 
international copyright system was built and held together by imperial power. The 
Canadian history reminds us of the power struggles and conflicts that were part of the 
Union’s history from the very beginning. 
It would not be long before Canada’s course in international copyright would once 
again change direction. Following World War I, perceptions of Canada and its place in 
the world shifted; Canada’s participation in the Great War meant that Canada now 
viewed itself as an independent participant in international affairs, and there were 
feelings that the rebellious copyright policies of the past might tend to make Canada 
an “outsider in the general community of nations.” 21 At the same time, Britain began 
to loosen its grip on the handlebars of Canadian copyright and, with the Canadian 
Copyright Act of 1924 Canada, under Britain, moved to implement the Berne 
Convention.  
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II 
CANADA’S ALIGNMENT WITH MAJOR POWERS ON ISSUES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN EASY 
Canada used its copyright policies to gain status – to project an image of Canada as a 
“civilized country”. Although other alignments were considered, and Canada in the 
1960s and 1970s took particular note of its commonalities with the “developing” 
countries, generally Canada has aligned with the more powerful countries – afraid that 
if the country took any other route, the country would be considered as “an outlaw 
among the copyright nations of the world,”22 an “outsider in the general community of 
nations,”23 and a “non-harmonious and non-musical instrument” within the concert 
of nations.24 
Today, Canada is aligned, as a part of Group B, with the United States and the other 
industrialized countries. This was not always the case; Canada also has a history of 
copyright conflict with the US. In the nineteenth century, Canada was used as the back 
door to Berne protection for American authors who, by publishing in Canada, 
received protection throughout the Berne Union. 25 This led to a dispute between the 
two countries, with Canada refusing for some time to grant to Americans Canadian 
copyright protection.26 Later, Canada’s 1924 Copyright Act contained special 
provisions that sought to retaliate for the US manufacturing clause.27 Disputes 
continued over the manufacturing clause but were mitigated when both countries 
signed the Universal Copyright Convention in 1952. Canada’s copyright relationship 
with the US was never easy, and its association with the major powers has not been 
unproblematic. 
Canada’s acquiescence to the norms embedded in the Berne Convention, and the 
country’s alignment with the major powers on international copyright issues, had 
much to do with the association between the Berne norms of international copyright 
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and ideas of progress and civilization. For many, the Berne Convention symbolized the 
forward march of international law, civilization, and progress.28 Progress has, as 
Shanin points out, gone by various names: ‘modernization’, ‘development’, ‘growth’, 
‘civilization’.29 According to Shanin, this vision of progress portrays:  
all societies … advancing naturally and consistently “up”, on a 
root from poverty, barbarism, despotism and ignorance to riches, 
civilization, democracy and rationality, the highest expression of 
which is science. This is also an irreversible movement from an 
endless diversity of particularities, wasteful of human energies and 
economic resources, to a world unified and simplified into the 
most rational arrangement. It is therefore a movement from 
badness to goodness and from mindlessness to knowledge, which 
gave this message its ethical promise, its optimism and its 
reformist “punch”.30 
The world has thus been classified according to particular systems and ideas of 
progress – some societies and peoples as “developed”, others as “underdeveloped” – 
and some in the middle.31 These ideas have their own power alongside material 
realities; because of its powerful ability to organize, to mobilize, and to legitimize the 
actions of powerful interests and states.  
Escobar shows that the discourse of development, beginning in the 1950s, became 
universally accepted and omnipresent.32 The discourse of development, according to 
Escobar, constructs the “developing” world through conceptual maps, categories, and 
social practices.33 The discourse and categories of development have been powerful 
not only in constructing the “developing” world; they have also been influential in 
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creating conceptualizations of the “developed” world and the copyright policies and 
positions acceptable for “developed” countries.  
Just as nineteenth-century Canadian politicians grappled to identify the copyright 
policies most appropriate to the leading British colony and to a “civilized nation”, 
paddling within a sea of discourse largely generated by the international interests that 
had encouraged the creation of the Berne Union, Canadian officials in the early 1970s 
struggled to find a position on international copyright that encompassed Canada’s 
position as a net copyright importer, similar in that sense to developing countries, and 
an industrialized country aligned with some of the biggest copyright exporters. The 
weight of categorization, of commonsense notions of the type of country Canada was, 
played a significant role in the determination of what copyright policies Canada took.  
The year 1967 marked a crisis in international copyright. Newly independent 
countries, beginning in the 1960s, raised important questions about whether the Berne 
system of international copyright was appropriate to developing countries who were 
importers, rather than exporters, of copyright materials and for whom international 
copyright created a net outflow of payments. They noted the lack of availability and 
high price of copyright materials, and wished to see a copyright system that would do 
more to solve these problems.  
They called for major changes to the Berne Convention that would allow for the 
compulsory licensing of works to make foreign works available at affordable prices in 
developing countries. This led to the failure of the 1967 revision of the Berne 
Convention, with both developing and developed countries unhappy with the 
compromise that was reached.34 This crisis in the Berne Union prompted fears that 
either the core countries or the developing countries might withdraw en masse from 
the Union.35  
Scepticism about the appropriateness of the Berne Convention to countries at various 
stages of development also appeared in Canada. Beginning in the 1950s, doubts were 
raised about whether Canada had been “well advised” in joining the Berne Convention. 
The 1957 Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Industrial 
Designs took the view that the Berne Convention represented a European approach to 
copyright, granting high levels of copyright and placing the rights of authors in the 
forefront. The Commission suggested that a more American approach--with a 
utilitarian view of copyright that understood copyright as serving the public interest 
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above the interests of authors--might be more suitable to Canada as a net copyright 
importer.  
The Commission reported: “It may be that, in becoming a party to the Berlin Revision 
of the Berne Convention in 1923, Canada was not too well advised. Apart from Haiti 
and Brazil no nations in the Western Hemisphere are members of the Berne 
Union…”36  
In the 1960s, following the Royal Commission’s report, Canada attended fewer 
meetings related to the Convention and its revisions, and refused to sign or implement 
the revision of 1967. Many countries refused to ratify that revision due to its 
controversial provisions for developing countries. Canada’s refusal was for different 
reasons; Canada’s prime objection was not with the provisions for developing 
countries; rather, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs questioned whether 
Canada’s participation in the Berne Convention, and the high levels of copyright 
protection granted under the convention, was in the national interest:  
Successive revisions of the Berne Convention have progressively extended 
the monopoly rights of copyright holders. The current revisions suggested 
for the [1967] Stockholm conference are intended to extend these rights still 
further. Unfortunately, this raises the question of the cost in relation to the 
value of present copyright legislation as a device for encouraging creativity 
in Canada before the Economic Council’s report is available. An important 
consideration in the study of this matter is the fact that as much as 90% of 
the total cost (about $8 million) of copyright to the public in Canada is 
accounted for by the protection given foreign works. In turn, compensation 
to Canadian authors by way of payments from overseas to Canada is 
minimal. That raises the fundamental question of whether protection of the 
kind Canada is committed to by adhering to the Berne Union is in the 
national interest.37  
The Secretary therefore recommended to Cabinet that Canada should refrain from 
supporting any proposed revision to the Berne Convention that would reduce the 
government’s flexibility of action.38 Canada did not sign the revised Berne Convention 
of 1967.39  
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At the same time, the crisis that resulted from the 1967 conference in Stockholm 
sparked a new resolve that Canada should become a more influential and active player 
within the Berne Union. Some Canadian government officials hoped that the 
discourse of development now being established within the Berne Union, having been 
absent when former colonies like Canada joined the Union, might be translated to 
apply to Canada.  
A government committee, formed in 1969 to assist in the formulation of Canada’s 
position in response to the crisis in international copyright, recommended an 
adaptation of the definition of ‘developing country’ such that Canada might benefit 
from concessions made to developing countries under the Berne Convention.40 The 
committee argued that, “Canada's position is somewhat analogous to that of 
developing countries when compared to countries with higher exports of copyright 
material.”41 A Memorandum to Cabinet explained: 
Although Canada is undoubtedly a “developing country” in so far as 
copyright is concerned (because of the large import imbalance of trade in 
copyrighted material), nevertheless it is not so considered by the two 
Conventions. A “developing country” under U.N. definition is considered a 
country which has an average per capita income per year of $U.S. 300 or 
less. In my view [Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Stanley 
Basford], any country with a very large export-import imbalance in 
copyrighted materials should be entitled, like the developing countries, to 
maintain a somewhat lower level of international copyright protection.42 
The Memo to Cabinet recommended, “That the Canadian delegation suggest to the 
Joint Study Group that, in so far as international copyright is concerned, the definition 
of a “developing country” should not be based on per capita income, but on a 
substantial import imbalance of trade in copyrighted material.”43  
The reformulation of the concept of “developing country” in such a way as to include 
Canada was absolutely radical. Such a precedent might have opened the door to a 
variety of definitions of developing countries based on the balance of trade in different 
areas, making possible a cascade of unexpected country coalitions and policy 
alignments unthinkable under the existing categorizations. It is unsurprising that an 
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idea so radical and so different from the regimes of representation and the practices of 
categorization that were being inscribed in international institutions at the time did 
not go far; a note on file called this aspect of the committee’s recommendation “utter 
nonsense”: 
Efforts to claim Canada is a “developing country”… are usually greeted with 
derision. We have the 3rd highest per capita income in the world and this is 
partly due to our importation of capital and know-how.44 
The idea that provisions for developing countries should apply to Canada conflicted 
with the established discourse that by now placed Canada as a middle power, 
associated with industrialized countries.  
Canadian copyright policymakers in the late 1960s and early 1970s nevertheless felt 
that that international copyright, as implemented under the Berne Convention, 
primarily responded to the interests of the copyright-exporting nations. A 1977 report 
by Andrew A. Keyes and Claude Brunet in 1977 concluded that:  
the fully developed nations, largely exporters of copyright material, have a 
stronger voice in international copyright conventions, and a tendency has 
existed over the past half century for developing countries, including 
Canada, to accept too readily proffered solutions in copyright matters that 
do not reflect their economic positions.45  
As a result of such perceptions, Canada attempted to form a coalition of ‘intermediate’ 
countries who were not officially “developing” countries, but who were net copyright 
importers. Canadian government officials envisioned that Canada might “for the first 
time… play a leading role in shaping the course of international copyright by fostering 
and leading a block of countries with interests similar to Canada.” Officials felt that 
this coalition “could conceivably control a certain balance of power, given active 
participation.”46  
Canada hoped, through this vehicle, to press for major structural change to the 
international copyright system that would allow different countries--including net-
copyright importers like Canada--to adhere to different levels of copyright protection, 
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according to domestic circumstances.47 However, this initiative to redraw the political 
map of international copyright failed due to Canada’s inability to attract sufficient 
support, and due to fears that such a stance would affect Canada’s relations with 
countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and France.48  
In an effort to resolve the crisis of 1967, simultaneous diplomatic conferences were 
held in 1971 to come to a more workable compromise and to revise both the Berne 
Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention in a way that would unify, and 
prevent the breakup, of the international copyright system.49 Its radical initiatives 
having failed, Canada supported the revision process and aligned itself generally with 
the major powers. Adopting a middle power image, Canada portrayed itself at the 
1971 diplomatic conference to revise the Universal Copyright Convention not as a 
developing country, but as “both developed and developing”, an intermediary that 
understood the needs of both developing and “developed” countries:  
The delegate of Canada emphasized the great interest of his government in 
the problems of international copyright and the work of the Conference. 
This special interest arises from a combination of factors, including the 
existence within Canada of dual languages and cultures, and the problems of 
reconciling copyright protection and technological innovations in a country 
of immense size.50 
Canada portrayed itself as a middle power leader: a country in a unique situation that 
allowed it to understand the positions of all sides: 
Finally, Canada thought, in cultural matters, that it was half-way between 
industrialized and developing countries, which enabled it to understand the 
                                                             
47 Canadian Delegation to the Extraordinary Joint Session of the Permanent Committee of the 
Berne Union and the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention. 
Report of the Canadian delegation on the extraordinary joint session of the Permanent Committee 
of the Berne Union and the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention, 
Paris, February 3 to 7, 1969. RG25 Vol. 10902 File 55-19-1-ICC Pt 1-1. 
48 Ibid. and Canadian Delegation to the Washington Meeting, Memorandum to the Minister: 
Report of the Canadian delegation at the Washington meeting, September 29–October 3/1969, 10 
October 1969: 2 and 4. Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada, RG19 Vol. 5574 File 8510–C785–1 
Part 2. 
49 Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Unesco House, 
Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971. Paris: Unesco, 1973; Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision 
of the Berne Convention (Paris, July 5 to 24, 1971). Geneva: World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 1974. 
50 Records of the Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Unesco House, 
Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971, 62. 
93 
problems of both and to foresee perhaps the possibility of reconciling the 
interests at stake.51 
Canada, however, did not sign the 1971 revision, and a rhetorical hint of Canada’s 
rethinking of the map of international copyright remained; the Canadian delegation 
declared, “We are all developing countries.”52  
The 1971 conferences resulted in revised texts of the Berne Convention and the 
Universal Copyright Convention that were widely accepted. At the same time, the crisis 
of 1967 had shown that copyright revision would no longer be easy. Following the 
1971 agreement, no further major revisions have been attempted. The 1971 text of the 
Berne Convention is still in force today, and formal country groupings, established 
under the UN system, have solidified political alignments on international copyright. 
Under this system, Canada is aligned as a part of Group B, the group of the most 
powerful countries.53  
III 
WHAT CONTRIBUTION DO MIDDLE POWERS MAKE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM TODAY?  
Mark Neufeld argues, drawing on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, that the middle 
power language that portrays Canada as an honest broker is used by dominant groups 
to advance and legitimise Canadian foreign policy and the existing international order. 
However, he also argues that the language of middlepowermanship has come to be 
used by dissident groups who, beginning in the late sixties and early seventies, recast 
the idea of a “middle power” “to signify the influence enjoyed by a country like 
Canada, and the potential such influence offers to effect radical progressive change in 
terms of disarmament, economic development and wealth re-distribution, 
environmental policy and democratization of the foreign policy-making process.”54  
Countries like Brazil, Argentina, and India are still pushing for changes in the 
international copyright system, and some would argue that Canada should play a part 
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in advocating for progressive change. A 2004 proposal to WIPO’s General Assembly 
from a group of developing nations (Proposal By Argentina And Brazil for the 
Establishment of a Development Agenda For WIPO) raised issue with both the basic 
assumption that intellectual property protection contributes positively to international 
development, and WIPO’s core mandate, which is “to promote the protection of 
intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States.”55  
This proposal sparked a series of high-profile international meetings at WIPO in 
which WIPO’s mandate, impartiality, transparency, and core activities, as well as 
intellectual property’s contribution to international development, were broadly 
questioned. The meetings resulted in an agenda, approved by all member states, 
intended to make WIPO more transparent and responsive to the needs of developing 
countries. However, some of the original key proposals made by developing countries, 
such as a treaty on access to knowledge and an organizational restructuring at WIPO, 
were not included in the final agenda.  
In the discussions, Canada was aligned with the Group B of industrialized countries 
that opposed such radical proposals.56 Similarly, in discussions surrounding a World 
Blind Union proposal for a narrower treaty aimed at rectifying current shortages of 
accessible works for the visually impaired, Canada has been aligned with the major 
powers who have been hesitant to commit to a treaty, preferring other non-binding 
approaches.57 Canada’s emphasis during the discussions has been on the importance 
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of maintaining flexibility within any international instrument (whether binding or 
non-binding) for a variety of domestic approaches to ensuring access.58 
Since the 1970s Canada has been aligned with the major powers. In 1984 the 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Department of 
Communications jointly prepared the paper From Gutenberg to Telidon: a White 
Paper on Copyright, issued as part of a public consultation on copyright reform, and 
set down the path that Canada would follow: 
Since Canadian creators receive national treatment protection in [countries 
that are Canada’s major trading partners and who belong to one or both of 
the major copyright conventions], they benefit from Canada’s participation 
in these conventions. The government intends that Canada’s international 
obligations be met in the spirit as well as in the letter of the law.59 
This philosophy has generally guided Canadian participation in international 
copyright agreements since 1984. As in 1928, when Canadian delegates were 
instructed to support any proposals that seemed likely to meet general approval of the 
governments represented, “particularly those of the leading countries, such as Great 
Britain, Italy and France”60, Canada today adopts the view that it must align on 
important issues with its largest trading partners.  
Canada is now, more than ever before, an active participant in the coalition of most 
powerful copyright exporters on matters of international copyright. Objections to and 
scepticism surrounding the appropriateness of Canada’s participation in the Berne 
Convention have been replaced with this Canadian version of a trade-based approach 
to international copyright. Support for counter-hegemonic projects has been held at 
bay by a vision of a Canada associated with the major powers.  
Change in international copyright is not impossible. Other countries like India, South 
Africa, Brazil and Argentina have been successfully enrolled by domestic and 
transnational interests to advocate change within the international copyright system; 
room for exceptions, such as the 1971 Appendix to the Berne Convention, which, 
though labelled “unworkable”, has been achieved; and copyright treaties that would 
advocate greater access to knowledge are even now being considered.  
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Such initiatives and visions press against the great weight of inscribed associations, 
norms, expertise, authority, institutions, and resources of a Union that has been in 
place since 1886. Such initiatives and visions are based in a hope that the regime of 
international copyright might be transformed, might overcome the exclusions of its 
past, and might embed this overcoming at the core of its ongoing practices. It is only 
by forming an awareness of the material and discursive structures of international 
copyright – an awareness that is formed by examining the historical experiences of 
weaker countries and groups as well as the views of the stronger ones – that such a 
transformative commitment can be made. 
 
 
97 
7 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THE COPYRIGHT 
ACT 1968 FORTY YEARS ON 
 
Professor Sam Ricketson1 
 
 
It seems such a short time, but, in the forty years since it came into operation, the 
Copyright Act 1968 has moved from being a rather peripheral enactment which was 
really only known to the few initiated in its mysteries to a sizable2 piece of legislation 
that lies at the centre of so much of our daily economic, social and cultural life. 
Ignored, reviled, admired or sanctified (it all depends where one is standing), it is a 
legislative achievement whose mid-life anniversary is well worth celebrating today. 
Indeed, real life and architectural analogies readily come to mind when one considers 
the Copyright Act 1968 in all its present day, much-amended, glory. Take real life first. 
If one remembers that it began its life as a relatively sleek and well muscled Act 
(although still more fully developed than its even slimmer 1911 and 1905 ancestors), it 
remained thus for well over a decade, but then gained steady accretions of muscle and 
flesh, with some nine substantive sets of amendments since 1980 that have now turned 
it into a bloated and blurred version of its original self. 
 Middle age is not treating the Act kindly, particularly when one considers the lateral 
extensions that have occurred, with the journey between some provisions that were 
previously simply numerical now requiring a clamber, several times over, through all 
the letters of the alphabet (just try going now from ss 131 to 133, and finding some 46 
                                                             
1 Professor Sam Ricketson is Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School, and Barrister, Victoria. 
He is one of Australia’s most famous and highly regarded specialists in intellectual property law, 
the world’s leading authority on the history and interpretation of the Berne Convention, and 
internationally renowned expert on international copyright law. He is the author of The Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886–1986, Kluwer, 1987, and (with 
Jane Ginsburg), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2005 (2nd ed). Professor Ricketson is the author of numerous 
other leading works and texts on intellectual property law.  
2 The adjective “monster” came first to mind, but this would be to ignore the far greater claims of 
our taxation, social security and corporations legislation to such a descriptor.  
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pages of intervening provisions from s 131A to s 132C; the trip from s 135 to s 136 is 
even more demanding, with some 102 pages of intervening text, beginning at s 135AA 
and ending at s 135ZZZE). Middle aged sag assumes a rather disconcerting image 
when one sees these alphabetical folds of legislative fat flowing over a now invisible 
waistline down to the ground. 
The metaphor should not be taken too far. It is all too easy to point to complex and 
wordy provisions, and rush to judgment as to their utility. Very often, however, they 
do mean something quite precise from the perspective of particular addressees, and 
represent delicate compromises that have been made between competing interests and 
policies (this is certainly true of the educational provisions in Parts VA and VB). 
Furthermore, some valiant attempts at slimming down have been made, although the 
difficulties involved should not be underestimated. In this regard, the simplification 
proposals of the former Copyright Law Review Committee (the “CLRC”) should be 
remembered.  
These embodied a new and original scheme of classification of subject matter and 
rights,3 as well as an extensive streamlining of exceptions and limitations.4 The 
difficulty, of course, lies in proposing such a radical weight loss program, when so 
many other issues, such as the internet and the digital agenda, were also clamouring 
for attention. Legislators and policymakers, perhaps, may be forgiven for not taking up 
the reformist programme offered them by the CLRC. A good piece of management 
advice might be, “never let the immediate crowd out the important”, but this is a 
nostrum that is usually impossible to act upon when developments occur at such a 
frantic pace, and appear to call for urgent and immediate attention.  
Architectural metaphors, however, may offer a more rewarding insight into the 1968 
Act and its achievements. The UK Whitford Committee in 1977 offered such a view 
when it described the development of UK copyright laws up to the time of the 
Copyright Act 1956 (UK) in the following terms: 
15. The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1710 ( 8 Anne c 19 ) and dealt 
only with books. This Act may be likened to a modest Queen Anne house to 
which there has since been Georgian, Victorian, Edwardian and finally 
Elizabethan additions, each adding embellishments in the style of the times 
…5 
                                                             
3 Copyright Law Review Committee, Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968, Part 2: 
Categorisation of Subject Matter and Exclusive Rights, and Other Issues (February 1999) 
4 Copyright Law Review Committee, Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968, Part 1: Exceptions 
to the Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners (September 1998). 
5 Copyright and Designs Law: Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and 
Damages (Cmd 6732, HMSO 1977) (“Whitford Committee”), paras 15 and 16. 
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In the case of the 1968 Act, one may not want to pause too long in contemplating the 
exterior (a very bland 60’s glass and concrete construction), or the internal fittings (the 
language and terminology of the legislative draftspersons is frequently dark and 
obscure). However, the layout of rooms is not without some coherence, even elegance. 
It is certainly instructive. Consider the following: 
 The ante-rooms and reception rooms: a rather cluttered cloakroom area (full 
of definitions and interpretations in Part II), leading to more spacious 
galleries with clearly defined sections for works and their exclusive rights, 
connecting factors, term of protection, and provisions on infringement (Part 
III, Divisions 1 and 2). The first time visitor can stroll through these and gain 
a reasonable understanding of what is contained in the rest of the building. 
 A parallel set of smaller reception rooms running along on the side for 
subject-matter other than works, with clearly defined alcoves for each specific 
subject-matter (Part IV, Divisions 2 to 6). The rooms likewise are reasonably 
accessible to the first time visitor. 
 Smaller rooms running off the side of each of the larger reception rooms: this, 
however, is where things start to become confusing. Some of the rooms are 
crowded, but still relatively accessible and possible to navigate, at least in 
some parts (for example, the fair dealing provisions in Part III, Division 3, 
and Part IV, Division 6, and the artistic work exceptions in Part III, Division 
7); others are lined with further series of compartments that are nonetheless 
reasonably easy to locate and are relatively self-contained (for example, the 
computer program exceptions in Part III, Division 4A); others again have 
some rather timeworn but familiar items of furniture where the “industry 
players” will have little difficulty (such as the provisions dealing with the 
recording of musical works in Part III, Division 6). But there are some rooms 
that are really quite dangerous to enter, either because they are so crowded 
that one needs an expert guide to find one’s way through (such as the library 
and archives provisions in Part III, Division 5) or because they have some 
nasty hidden traps that no amount of amending legislation has ever quite 
managed to remove (for example, the designs/copyright overlap provisions in 
Part III, Division 8). None of these rooms, however, are very comfortable for 
the first time entrant. 
 The large entertaining rooms that adjoin the reception areas, once reasonably 
welcoming, have also become steadily more cluttered: 
o The remedies hall (Part V), once clearly laid out and easy to walk 
through, has now had some complicated extensions made to it, for 
example, the technological circumvention measures, electronic 
rights management and safe harbour annexes (Divisions 2AA and 
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2A), to say nothing of the particularly hazardous and bristling 
basement area under the hall, where the criminal offence and penalty 
provisions (Division 5) are now filed away neatly for ready 
deployment.  
o The statutory licence halls (Parts VA,-VC), while complex in their 
appointments, are more readily justifiable, in that few will enter here 
unless they (a) are one of the affected parties, such as an educational 
institution or a collecting society, and (b) will almost invariably be 
accompanied by a skilled guide (in-house counsel, legal adviser, and 
the like). The same is true of the rambling Division 6 passageway 
which deals with the Copyright Tribunal. There is really no need for 
any member of the general public to wander down these halls and 
passage ways, although clearer signs, such as “Administration – only 
authorised personnel to enter”, might be helpful here.  
 There are some discreet (and discrete) rear rooms where entry will only be 
required for very specific purposes, such as Crown use (Part VII), or where 
the only appreciative audience will be lawyers and no one else will ever need 
to enter (I refer here to the transitional and miscellaneous sections in 
Divisions X and XI).  
 Finally, there are some large structures that really sit to the rear or side of the 
building, although there are some narrow connecting doors, often hard to 
find, that provide a linkage back to the main structure: moral rights (of two 
distinct kinds in Division IX) and performers’ rights (Part XIA). It might be 
tempting to liken these to conservatories, and the plants to be found inside 
are certainly exotic, at least so far as Australian copyright law traditions are 
concerned. They are fragile and delicately framed, and readily cut down. 
It is all too easy to flog a metaphor too far, but the above serves to illustrate the large 
and sprawling structure and scope of the Copyright Act 1968. To return to our earlier 
metaphor, the Act is a complex organism, but is not an invertebrate: there is still an 
identifiable and recognizable spine running through it and providing it with a 
semblance of sense and organisation. The above metaphors also enable the making of 
some larger points: 
1. Simplification, while desirable at one level, is not a goal in itself: so long as the 
relevant provisions are accessible and meaningful to those who must deal with 
them, it is of little consequence that they are not comprehensible to the rest of us 
(if we never have to use them). There are horses for courses: it may be defensible 
for the provisions of Parts VA and VB to rejoice in their present complexity if 
they nonetheless provide clear pathways for the relevant parties to track their way 
through and to achieve some acceptable resolution. Complexity, on the other 
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hand, may be unforgivable in the case of sections of more general application: for 
example, do we need over 40 pages of text to give effect to moral rights provisions 
that are comprehended within a few lines of text in the relevant international 
conventions?6 
2. Some complexity is also understandable (and hence forgivable) as an index of 
human failing. The parallel importation provisions, for example, reflect the deep 
public policy divisions that have arisen, and continue to arise, over this difficult 
question, particularly in relation to books. Complex procedures and timelines 
simply embody the results of the uneasy compromises that have been reached 
here, and reflect the lack of resolution applying at the policy level. 
3. Nowhere is this complexity and policy division more exposed than in the case of 
exceptions and limitations: the proliferation and dissemination of these 
throughout the Act underlines sharply the need for some kind of simplification or 
streamlining, even perhaps the adoption of a single, flexible, open-ended, 
omnibus fair use provision, as suggested by the CLRC over a decade ago. But 
while this might reduce the Act significantly in length, would it really achieve its 
goals of clarity and simplicity, other than to displace the work of negotiation and 
compromise on the part of legislators, lobbyists and officials to the courts? In the 
long term, this may well mean more expense and time, and less comprehensive 
solutions. Matters that are unlitigated may simply lead to holes in protection 
where no one benefits. 
4. Some of the causes of the more recent legislative bloat in the 1968 Act come from 
external sources, rather than being the direct fault of our legislators and policy 
makers. While we have sought diligently, perhaps too much so in the case of 
performers’ moral rights, to give effect to our international obligations under the 
Berne Convention, the WCT and the WPPT, we have had some other things forced 
upon us in the form of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, with its 
bewildering series of provisions that seek to transplant and replicate US legislative 
provisions Down Under. Such deals are always fraught with difficulty, even where 
there might be the expectation of longer term benefits in other areas that have 
nothing to do with copyright, such as beef and primary products. So far as the 
Copyright Act 1968 is concerned, this has recently added significantly to its bulk 
and complexity. 
5. For all its defects, the 1968 Act has still had its admirers in other places, for 
example, in Singapore7 and Malaysia8 where it has provided a model for local law 
                                                             
6 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art 6bis, and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art 5.  
7 Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore), Chap 63. 
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making. This may suggest that the floor layout still remain usable, even if there is 
too much furniture cluttering up some of the rooms and annexes. In terms of 
legislative export, we should seek to build upon this experience and improve the 
product. 
The speakers in the present session have each provided fascinating insights into the 
history and development of this significant piece of private legislation.  
Ben Atkinson has highlighted some of the important pre-history, going back to the 
1911 Act and the even more interesting legislative predecessor, the Copyright Act 1905 
which was the first truly national copyright enactment in Australia.  
Two other speakers, Leslie Zines and John Gilchrist, have drawn attention to two 
particularly important stages in the early life of the 1968 Act: its beginnings and the 
work of the Spicer Committee, and the first significant response to technological 
development, in the form of photocopying and the Franki Committee review.  
Each of these inquiries was considerably more reflective and extensive than anything 
we have seen in more recent history. Spicer, indeed, was pre-computers and long 
before the advent of the networked environment; copyright in those days was seen as 
rather peripheral, of concern only to those involved in the “soft areas” of the arts: 
music, theatre, and publishing. Nonetheless, there were significant commercial 
interests involved, in particular those of broadcasters and sound recording companies, 
while the concerns of educationalists and libraries were also beginning to be voiced. 
Nonetheless, nearly nine years elapsed before the 1968 Act was finally passed 
(although Adrian Sterling tells a revealing story of some of the lobbying on the part of 
the record industry that preceded this).  
Once passed, however, the new Act seemed to slumber in its slips for a decade or so, 
while the importance of one particular new form of technology – the photocopier – 
was pursued in the courts,9 and then ultimately became the focus of the next 
significant review by the Franki Committee. After this, the floodgates of regular review 
and amendment were opened up, and this has remained a continuous torrent. 
Copyright in this latter period moved much more to the centre of things, although 
perhaps without the time, care and resources that were possible in the case of the 
Spicer and Franki reports. 
Sara Bannerman and Susy Frankel provide interesting perspectives from the outside. 
Both Canada and New Zealand, despite their common colonial backgrounds with 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Copyright Act 1987 ((Malaysia). 
9 See, in particular, UNSW v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1, and see further S Ricketson and D 
Catterns, “Of vice-chancellors and authors: UNSW v Moorhouse” in Andrew T Kenyon, Megan 
Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), Landmarks in Australian Intellectual Property Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2009, pp 97–109. 
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Australia, have different copyright histories, marked by a measure of independent 
initiative not present in our own. Even at an early stage, Canada was unhappy with the 
application of the Berne Convention to it (Bannerman’s account of the visit of the 
Canadian premier, Sir John Thomson’s visit to Windsor to seek permission to 
denounce it is similar to the much later, and successful, effort by the Australian prime 
minister, James Scullin, to secure the appointment of Sir Isaac Isaacs as the first 
Australian-born governor general), and the notion of Canada as a developing country 
and “copyright middle power” is an appealing one for Australia to aspire to, in seeking 
to establish its own international copyright identity.  
Susy Frankel, in the case of New Zealand, points to one particular instance of decisive 
independence, in the case of parallel importation prohibitions. There are others: for 
example, the recommendations of the Dalgleish Committee in relation to the question 
of term (New Zealand, unlike Australia, saw little advantage for it in the adoption of 
the 50 year post auctorem term of protection).10  
In all, this has been a fascinating and event-filled forty years of copyright history in 
Australia, and one that will clearly merit further investigation of its internal workings 
by historians such as Ben Atkinson. The onset of early middle age suggests that some 
weight loss may be in order, but the relevance and centrality of the Act to our national 
economic, social and cultural life can be doubted no longer.  
 
                                                             
10 The Report of the Copyright Committee (NZ, 1959), par 41. Note also similar reservations that 
were expressed by the equivalent Canadian inquiry: The Report on Copyright of the Canadian 
Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Industrial Designs (1957). See further 
Ricketson and Creswell, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Designs and Confidential 
Information, Thomson LBC, 3rd ed 2006, [6.75]. 
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8 
REMARKS INTRODUCING KEYNOTE SPEAKER 
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE LESSIG 
 
The Hon Michael Kirby 
 
 
Ladies and gentlemen and Professor Lessig, we are very lucky to meet on this day in 
this wonderful building and to have had such a fantastic session this morning. I mean, 
I missed the first couple of speakers because I had to attend an Australia Day Council 
Breakfast in Sydney (which is one of those awful American traditions that seems to be 
spreading to our country) and then came down here, but I came in time to hear the 
tremendous talk given by Professor Zines and also by Professor Sterling and I think we 
were very fortunate to have heard their input.  
I knew all of those people – I knew Sir John Spicer – I appeared before him as a young 
barrister quite often when he was the Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Industrial 
Court. He was a very fine and very temperate judge and he had some very angry judges 
who would sit with him. I attended his funeral in Toorak and he was a very fine and 
intelligent man. I knew Sir Nigel Bowen – he was my Chief Judge when I was 
appointed to the Federal Court of Australia and he was a considerable intellectual 
property lawyer. And I knew Bob Franki, just as Franki, who was a very courteous 
(and as John Gilchrist and I were saying) a very dignified person who if he gave his 
word, that was it. And I was very glad to hear a tribute paid to Lindsay Curtis who was 
truly one of the most fantastic officers of the Commonwealth that I ever worked with.  
When I was appointed Chair of the Law Reform Commission back in 1975, Lindsay 
was the officer of the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department who worked 
with me and he was truly a brilliant man and a really hard worker. He helped to get the 
Law Reform Commission established. He helped to get the Administrative Review 
Council established. He himself worked with John Ewen in drafting the Administrative 
Decisions Judicial Review Act (the ADJR Act) which is one of the most influential 
statutes of the Commonwealth in bringing the rule of law to a reality in our country.  
His daughter is Lyndal Curtis, whose name you would have heard quite often on the 
ABC. She contacted me recently to say would I record something for her children so 
that they would know what a magnificent person Lindsay was, who died too young? So 
I’ll tell her of what was said about him today, because we should remember these 
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wonderful civil servants who give their all, and are anonymous, but they are really very 
influential in our nation.  
Now, two little comments, if I may, just very briefly before we get into the business of 
this session. Number one, I would say to Ben Atkinson, don’t change your script about 
the source of the constitutional power in relation to the original, or the second 
Copyright Act. Though the imperial rulers of Australia no doubt thought that all the 
colonial parliament out there in Australia was doing was implementing their will.  
There is an alternative theory which has gained force during the course of the last 
century, that of the sovereignty of the people of Australia being the source of the 
Constitution, and their having voted in the referenda for it, that the source of the 
power of the Federal Parliament to do anything lay in the sovereignty of the people of 
Australia, and in the constitutional document of this country, and that therefore, in 
incorporating the imperial Act, they were doing what they thought was appropriate for 
the people of Australia, and the sovereignty of Australia.  
Ben, you can put a footnote – I will let you put a footnote. There is an alternative 
theory about the source of the imperial statute in Australia, but don’t ever give away, 
ever – ever give away the sovereignty of the people of Australia.  
Now the second point is, when I walked in, did you see this? I was sitting down 
humbly and quietly after my address this morning, and Leslie Zines said “some judges 
in this country, a minority view, take the view that the Constitution is a living 
document”, and then pointed at me! Now, if you look at what judges actually do in the 
High Court – if you look at what they did on the meaning of the word “jury” – I mean 
they didn’t go back and say “well only men can sit in juries in federal trials, only people 
of property can sit in juries” – they updated it. Was that originalism?  
If you also look at Sue v Hill 1 about a subject of the Queen, there is no doubt that in 
1900, a subject of the Queen would have been a subject of the Queen, and that would 
have been it, and therefore, by saying, well, this was a subject of the Queen in the United 
Kingdom and that [therefore] she was disqualified from being a member of the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth, then that was not an originalist view. This is a debate 
they have in the United States – I’m telling you Professor Lessig, we have it here, and 
there are some who adhere to the view that you have got to go back to that original text. 
They don’t actually have to have 1776 dictionaries in this country, only 1900, but it’s not 
what they do, and therefore, we’ve got to keep our eye on what is actually done. I didn’t 
want that to pass. I just want you to have the benefit of my views on that.  
                                                             
1 [1999] HCA 30. Hill, a dual citizen of Australia and the United Kingdom, won election to the 
Australian Senate, and a voter challenged her election on the grounds that, under section 44(i) of 
the Constitution, a “subject or citizen” of a “foreign power” is not entitled to stand for 
Parliament. The High Court found that the United Kingdom is, under s.44(i), a “foreign power”. 
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It was fantastic to hear Adrian Sterling in his tribute to Lindsay Curtis. Telling of 
Attorney General Bowen. Telling that this was legal, not political. I hope no-one in the 
room believes any of this is legal, not political. And saying the motto of this Conference 
– I took a note – tremblingly I wrote down “easy access with easy licensing”. I would 
suggest there may be an alternative theory, and I think this might be closer to the view 
of our speaker.  
This is, “easy access with justifiable licensing”, because there is a question as to what is 
the justifiability of licence. See, we don’t want lots of easy licensing for unjustifiable 
purposes. We want easy, maybe easy technical, licensing, but only in circumstances 
where there is a true public interest, and I thought that that was the whole purpose of 
this conference to be talking about thinking again, conceptually and freshly, about 
what is the purpose of intellectual property law, and copyright law in particular. I 
really found the session this morning terrific.  
Now, this afternoon, we have one of the great gurus of the intellectual property law 
world, Professor Lessig of Stanford, previously at Harvard and at Chicago, the great 
universities of the United States of America, the writer of all of those books that you 
know. I was the first to quote him in the High Court of Australia in an extended 
footnote, and also, I quoted Brian Fitzgerald. That’s why he loves me, just because I 
quoted him. What wonderful leaders we have here with Sam Ricketson and really 
fantastic people who think through and look deeper at these issues.  
I had the privilege to go to a conference at King’s College in London and the keynote 
speaker was Lawrence Lessig, and he came along and he really conveyed two really 
original ideas to my mind and did it very, very clearly, as he will now do today.  
The first was the idea of code, and how we are talking about a very important issue 
which has puzzled me since my law reform days. In this age of rapid technology and 
changes in biotechnology, information technology, and so on, how can a parliament 
keep up? The somewhat sobering news that Lawrence Lessig brought was, well, in part, 
that that is a question that has been bypassed, because now, often with information 
technology, and the multinational corporations that control it, the law is effectively 
embedded in the technology, and the local legislature is not always capable of 
changing how it works. The universality of the technology, which is what Professor 
Sterling was talking about, is really controlled by this phenomenon, and “code” is his 
word for it. I thought that was a really important point.  
Professor Lessig really gave a fantastic presentation of the ideas that he has to the 
conference in London and I’m sure he is going to do so again today. So, without 
further ado, I would invite Professor Lessig to come forward, and to present, and then 
we are going to have an interaction afterwards, so that there will be a real dialogue at 
this meeting. 
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 “CULTURE WARS”: GETTING TO PEACE 
 
Professor Lawrence Lessig 1 
 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
I start with some stories and then an observation on the way to an argument about 
what we should do about “The Culture Wars”.  
The first story 
A long time ago in a place far away (Europe), the elite spoke Latin while the 
masses spoke “vulgar” languages (English, French and Germany). The elite 
ignored the masses. The masses ignored the elite. 
The second story 
In 1927, Huxley, wrote this:  
In the days before machinery men and women who wanted to amuse 
themselves were compelled, in their humble way, to be artists. Now they sit 
still and permit professionals to entertain them by the aid of machinery. It is 
                                                             
1 Professor Lawrence Lessig is Director of the Edmund J Safra Foundation Center for Ethics at 
Harvard University, a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and former Professor of Law at 
Stanford Law School. He is a founder of the Creative Commons organisation, which enables 
copyright holders to license their work online for primarily non-commercial purposes, and 
Change Congress, an organisation dedicated to changing the system that requires members of 
Congress to solicit private donations in order to fund election campaigns. Professor Lessig is 
perhaps the world’s most famous exponent, and critic, of copyright policy in the United States. 
He has written seminal works on information policy, focusing on the social and economic effect 
of government regulation of the use of digital communications technology. He has written 
several seminal works, including Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) and Remix: Making 
Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (2008). 
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difficult to believe that general artistic culture can flourish in this 
atmosphere of passivity.2 
John Philip Souza had uttered that very same idea about two decades before. Souza 
was testifying at the United States Capitol about what he called “the talking 
machines.” As he said:  
These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic development of music 
in this country. When I was a boy … in front of every house in the summer 
evenings you would find young people together singing the songs of the day 
or the old songs. Today you hear these infernal machines going night and 
day. We will not have a vocal chord left. The vocal chords will be eliminated 
by a process of evolution, as was the tail of man when he came from the ape. 
This is a picture: the picture of young people singing the songs of the day or the 
old songs. It is a picture of culture that we might call, using modern computer 
terminology, a kind of “read-write” culture. It’s a culture where people participate 
in the creation and re-creation of their culture. In this sense it is read-write.  
Souza’s fear was that we would lose the capacity to engage in this read-write 
culture because of these “infernal machines”. They would take it away – displace it 
– and in its place we would have the opposite of read-write culture, what could 
call, using modern computer terminology, a kind of “read-only” culture. A culture 
where creativity was consumed, but the consumer was not a creator; a culture, 
which was top-down, where the “vocal chords” of the millions of ordinary people 
have been lost. 
If you look back at the 20th century, at least in what we call the “developed world”, 
it is very hard not to conclude that John Philip Souza was right. Never before in 
the history of culture had its production become as concentrated. Never before 
had it become professionalised. Never before had the ordinary people’s creativity 
been effectively displaced and displaced for precisely the reasons that Souza spoke 
of because of these “infernal machines”. The 20th Century was the century of read 
only culture, and it stands against a background of read-write culture from the 
beginning of man.  
Why was it like this? The answer is technical, or at least largely technical. This was 
the age of broadcasting and vinyl. It produced a culture that could do little more 
than passively consume. It enabled efficient consumption, thus “reading”, but 
inefficient production, at least by ordinary people, thus “writing.” It was an age 
wired for mass reading; it was an age that discouraged mass writing.  
                                                             
2 Huxley, Aldous, The Doors of Perception Harper & Bros, 1954. 
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The third story 
In 1919, the United States voted itself dry. By a constitutional amendment, the 
nation launched a war against an obvious evil: the dependence upon intoxicating 
liquors. This was a war waged first by the progressives of the era, people who 
thought they could use law to make man better.  
A decade later, this war was largely failing. The police found it increasing difficult 
to stop the illegal trade of intoxicating liquor. They therefore adopted new 
techniques to fight back. One such technology was the wiretap. And in a case 
involving Roy Olmstead and other defendants,3 the Supreme Court had to 
consider whether this technique, the wiretap, was legal.  
To answer that question, the Supreme Court looked at our Constitution — in 
particular to the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment reads:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
The question the Court had to answer was whether police attaching a wiretap to 
the telephones of Roy Olmstead and his associates, without any judicial 
authorisation, violated this prescription against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures”. 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, former President William Howard Taft, 
looked at the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. These, he held, were to protect 
against “trespassing.” Wiretapping, however didn’t necessarily involve any 
trespass. There was no need to enter the apartment of Mr Olmstead to tap his 
phones. The police just needed to attach an alligator clip to the telephone wire 
once it left the apartment. Since there was no trespass, Taft held, there could be no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And thus was there no constitutional 
proscription against the government tapping telephones in the United States until 
the Court reversed itself until 1968.  
More important than the opinion of the Court was a critical dissent by Justice 
Louis Brandeis. There was a principle at stake here, Brandeis wrote. That principle 
                                                             
3 Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 (1928). The Supreme Court considered whether police 
wiretapping of the telephone of a bootlegger, Roy Olmstead, violated rights of privacy and against 
self-incrimination protected by the fourth and fifth amendments of the Constitution. The Court 
upheld Olmstead’s conviction for bootlegging and he served a four year prison sentence. 
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was to protect against a certain kind of invasion. It was, in other words, to protect 
“privacy.” But how you protect privacy is a function of technology. Citing an 
earlier case, Brandeis wrote, “time works changes” in those technologies. And thus 
the objective of the Court must be to translate old protections into a new context.  
Brandeis lost, and the wiretap won. But by 1933, the war against intoxicating 
liquor had been deemed a failure. Increasing costs — the rise in organised crime, 
the fall in civil rights — and vanishing benefits — everyone drank, Prohibition 
notwithstanding — led the country to realise that perhaps costs outweighed the 
benefits. In 1933, Prohibition was ended and peace was declared by a 
constitutional amendment that repealed the constitutional amendment that had 
banned the sale of intoxicating liquors.  
But the important point to recognise here was that what was repealed was not the 
aim to fight dependence on alcohol. All that was “repealed” was the idea of using 
war, or this metaphorical war, as a means to fight that dependence on intoxicating 
alcohol 
Observations  
Think about the idea of “writing”. Writing is a quintessentially democratic activity. 
I don’t mean that we vote upon what you are allowed to write. I mean instead that 
we expect everyone to have the capacity to write. Indeed, we teach our children 
how to write, and we measure the quality of their education on the basis of how 
well they write.  
Why is it that we teach our kids how to write? I can understand why we teach 
them how to write in 1st grade to 8th grade, when they learn the basics to 
understand how to use words to communicate. But why do we waste our time 
teaching them to write from about 9th grade to college? Why do we tell them they 
have to write essays on Shakespeare or Hemingway or worse still, Proust? Why 
would anybody force their children into this activity? What do they expect to gain, 
because I can assure you, as a Professor who reads the writing of many students, 
that the vast majority of this writing is just “crap”. So why do we do it?  
The answer is obvious, but we should remark it nonetheless. We all understand 
that we learn something in the act of writing even if what we write is no good. We 
learn, if nothing else, respect for just how hard this creativity is, and we learn the 
value of the ability to engage in that creativity. 
Now within this democratic activity of writing, think about a particular activity 
called “quoting.” I had a friend in college who wrote essays that were essentially 
the stringing together, in the most elaborate and artistic way, of quotes that he had 
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gathered from other writing, in order to make a point that was the point of his 
essay. He always got the very highest grades for that writing. He took it for granted 
that he could take, and use, and build upon, other people’s writing, without 
permission from anyone — at least so long as he cited the original source 
accurately.  
So long as you cite, we believe you can take and build upon anybody’s work. 
Indeed, imagine what it would be like the other way round, imagine having to ask 
permission before you quoted someone’s work. Imagine how absurd it would be 
for my friend to call the Hemingway estate to ask for permission to quote 
Hemingway in his college essay. Imagine how absurd it would be, and then you 
would understand how you too believe writing and quoting are an essentially 
democratic form of expression. Democratic in the sense that we all take for 
granted the right to take, and use, other people’s work freely. 
Argument 
Think about writing or creating in a digital age. What should the freedom to write, 
or the freedom to quote, or the freedom to remix, in a digital age be?  
In answering that question, notice the parallels with the stories that I told you.  
As with the fight over Prohibition, right now in the United States, we are engaged 
in a war, the copyright wars, war which my friend, the late Jack Valenti, Head of 
the Motion Picture Association of America, used to refer to as his own “terrorist” 
war, where the terrorists in this war are our children.  
As with the fight Souza was engaged in, this war is inspired by artists and an 
industry terrified that changes in technology will effect a radical change in how 
culture gets made.  
And as with the war that led to prohibition, there is a fundamental question about 
these copyright wars that we need to raise: are the costs of this war greater than the 
benefits?  
To answer that last question — in my view, the critical question — we have to 
think first about the benefits of copyright.  
Copyright is a solution to a particular kind of problem. In my view, it is an 
essential solution to an unavoidable problem. Without the restriction on speech 
that copyright is, we would, paradoxically, have less speech. Copyright limits 
freedom, the freedom to unreservedly copy other people’s work, or compete with 
the original creator of creative work, in order to inspire more free speech.  
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We limit this freedom — through regulation — to give creators the incentive they 
need to create more free speech. But as with privacy, the right regulation is going 
to be a function of the technology of the time. As technology changes, the 
architecture of the right regulation will change as well. What made sense in one 
period will make no sense in another. Instead, we need to adjust the architecture of 
regulation, so the same value protected before in a different context can be 
protected now in the new context.  
With copyright, what would that right regulation look like today?  
I believe with Souza that we need to distinguish between the amateur and the 
professional, but recognise that we need a copyright system that encourages both. 
We need the incentives for the professional, but also freedom for the amateur.  
How could we achieve that?  
If we watch the evolution of digital technologies, we can begin to see how the law 
could cope with both.  
Think of this evolution in two stages: The first stage begins around 2000. In this 
stage, digital technologies simply extend the read only culture from our past. 
Technologies that make it massively efficient to get and consume culture created 
elsewhere: Apple is the poster child of this vision of culture, with its iTunes music 
store, allowing you for 99 cents to download any song you want to your iPod (and 
only to your iPod), and in the United States, at least mark yourself as cool. This is 
the vision my colleague, Paul Goldstein, spoke of when he described the “celestial 
jukebox” — enabling you at any time, whenever you want, to access any culture 
you want.4 This is a critically important model for providing and supporting 
culture, facilitating an enormous diversity of culture, and the spread and support 
for culture. But it is just one model of culture supported by digital technology. 
The second stage in this evolution begins around 2004. It is a revival of the read-
write culture from our past. The poster child for this image of culture is Wikipedia, 
and the enormous energy directed to that project. But I want to talk here about a 
slice of that culture that is distinct from Wikipedia — what I call “remix”.  
Some examples will make the idea clear.  
In the context of music: Everyone knows the White Album, created by the Beatles. 
That album inspired the Black Album, created by Jay-Z. That then inspired DJ 
Danger Mouse to produce the Grey Album. Four years later, Girl Talk sets the 
                                                             
4 Paul Goldstein published Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 
(Stanford University Press) in 2003. 
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standard, mixing together hundreds of songs to produce a single album, Feed the 
Animals.  
In the context of film: In 2004, the film Tarnation made its debut at Cannes. It was 
said by the BBC to “wow Cannes.” This was made with $218: A kid took video that 
he had shot through his whole life, and using an iMac given to him by a friend, 
remixed it in a way to wow Cannes and win the 2004 Los Angeles Film Festival.  
Or finally, in the context of politics: Consider Will.I.Am’s work, taking the words 
of Obama and mixing them with music. Or still my favourite, think about the 
work of Johan Soderberg, mixing images of George Bush and Tony Blair, with the 
song, Endless Love.5  
This is remix. But these are still examples of creativity which is in some way 
broadcast, though by using the Internet.  
More interesting is the way that this platform has become a platform for 
communities to remix the work of other communities. You Tube has become the 
best example of this. Take, for example, Superman Day Parade, or Superman 
Retires, which mixes cartoon footage of a mature Superman, Wonderwoman, 
Birdman, Mr T and others, and dubs dialogue that involves Mr T challenging “old 
man” Superman to a fight, and propositioning Wonderwoman. This video 
inspired a Simpsons remix on You Tube, which inspired a Bambi remix video. 
Or one final example from You Tube: a performance of the Canon in D Major by 
Johann Pachelbel by Funtwo: This arrangement has been seen by more than 60 
million people across the world, and more interestingly, it has inspired thousands 
of replications and remixes.  
These remixes are conversations. They are the modern equivalent of what Souza 
was speaking of when he romanticised young people singing the songs of the day, 
or the old songs. But instead of gathering on the corner, or the back lawn, now 
people from around the world use this digital platform to engage in a form of 
read-write creativity, powerful and original and (to anyone who will listen), 
inspirational.  
The importance in this has nothing to do with the particular technique: for the 
techniques have been available since the beginning of film or recorded music. The 
importance is that the technique has been democratised. It is the fact that anybody 
with access to a $1500 computer can make sounds and images that remix the 
                                                             
5 Soderberg remixed audiovisual material to create a 2003 video of George Bush and Tony Blair 
ostensibly serenading each other with the words of Endless Love, the duet performed by Lionel 
Richie and Diana Ross. Posted on You Tube in 2007 the video became a viral sensation. 
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culture around him or her and spread them broadly in ways that speak more 
powerfully to a younger generation than any words could.  
And here then is the key linking back to my first story. 
This is “writing” in the 21st century. It is not the “writing” that most of us do. 
Most of us write with words and sentences — this essay, for example. But that sort 
of “writing” in the 21st century will be the equivalent of Latin in the Middle Ages. 
Writing with images, sounds and video in the 21st century is the writing of the 
“vulgar.” They engage in it and if we ignore it, they, the vulgar, ignore us. 
Yet here’s the problem with this new way of writing: The norms and law from the 
20th century, as applied to this “writing” in the 21st century, are different. The 
norms that we apply to media are different from the norms we apply to text. With 
respect to text, the freedom to quote is taken for granted. With media, the norms 
assume you need permission first.  
Why did these norms develop and support such a difference in freedom? Again, 
the reason is technical. If you look at the architecture of copyright law, and the 
architecture of digital technologies, the reasons are clear. The architecture of 
copyright law triggers its regulation on the production of something called a 
“copy.” The architecture of digital technology says every single time you use 
culture you produce a copy. This is a radical change in the scope and reach of 
copyright law, for copyright law never purported to regulate every use of culture. 
Think about this point in the context of a book. Many uses of a book are simply 
unregulated by the law. To read a book is not a fair use of the book. It is a free use 
of the book, because to read a book is not to produce a copy. To give someone a 
book is not a fair use of the book, it is a free use of the book, because again, to give 
someone a book is not to produce a copy. To sell a book under the American 
copyright scheme is specifically exempted from the reach of the copyright owner 
because to sell a book is not to produce a copy. To sleep on a book is in no 
jurisdiction anywhere in the world a copyright relevant use of the book, because to 
sleep on a book is not to produce a copy.  
These unregulated uses are balanced by a set of important regulated uses, 
regulated so as to create the incentives necessary for authors to create great new 
works. To publish a book you need permission from the copyright owner because 
that monopoly right is deemed essential to create the incentive in some authors to 
create great new works.  
And then in the American tradition, there is a slim sliver of exemptions from 
copyright law called fair use: uses which would have otherwise been regulated by 
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the law, but which the law says are to remain free to encourage creativity or 
critique to build upon older work. 
This balance between unregulated, regulated and fair uses gets radically changed 
when digital technologies are brought into the mix. Because now, every use 
produces a copy, and thus now, the balance between regulated and unregulated 
uses gets radically changed. Merely because the platform through which we get 
access to our culture has changed, the presumptive reach of copyright law has 
changed, thus rendering this read-write material presumptively illegal under the 
regime we inherit from the 20th century.  
No one in any legislative body ever thought about this. There was no Act To 
Massively Regulate Every Creative Activity Act — anywhere. This is instead the 
unintended consequence of the interaction between these two architectures of 
regulation, copyright law and digital technologies.  
This unintended consequence is what I think of as Problem 1 in the copyright 
wars. Law is out of sync with technology, and just as before with the Fourth 
Amendment, in my view, that law needs to be updated. Just as the Fourth 
Amendment needed to be updated to take account of new technologies, copyright 
law needs to be updated to take account of these new technologies.  
Problem 2 is what people refer to as piracy, or peer-to-peer “piracy.” Here 
however, we must link to prohibitions. This is a war of prohibition, and this law of 
prohibition, like most wars of prohibition, has not worked, if by worked we mean 
reduced the “bad” behaviour. We have learned that kids who share files don’t read 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court. Here is a map of peer-to-peer file 
sharing in the United States. Here is the point where the Supreme Court declared 
this activity illegal, but we still see no drop off in the behaviour of peer-to-peer file 
sharing. Instead of reducing the bad behaviour, all this war has done is render a 
generation of criminals. This is Problem 2, a technology out of sync with the law, 
and just as with the Fourth Amendment, copyright needs an update to take care of 
this misapplication as well. 
What we should do? 
Abolitionism is growing among the denizens of digital culture. Copyright, in their 
view, may have been needed for a couple of hundred years. We don’t need it 
anymore. Other techniques (business models) and other technologies (digital 
rights management) provide all the “protection” creators need, on this view. 
Anything more is simply unnecessary government regulation.  
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I am not an abolitionist. But I do believe abolitionism will grow unless we find a 
way to update the law of copyright to better take into account new technology. We 
need a series of changes in law. I am going to outline two here. 
First: the law has to give up its obsession with the “copy.” The idea of a law being 
triggered upon reproduction in the digital age is insane. Instead the law needs to 
focus on meaningful activities. “Copying,” in a digital age, is not meaning, 
meaningful.  
“Meaningful” in turn should be determined by the function of use. If we 
distinguish between copying and remixing, and between professionals and 
amateurs, we get something like this matrix. 
  
 Copies Remix 
Professionals 
Copyright 
Amateurs 
 
The presumption of copyright law today is that all of this is regulated in the same 
way. Professional or amateur, copies or remix: it’s the same law that gets triggered. 
The first point to recognize: Never has the law of copyright purported to reach this 
broadly, and it makes no sense for the law to reach that broadly now.  
 
  Copies Remix 
Professionals Copyright  
Amateurs   
 
Instead of course the law has to regulate efficiently here with professionals 
controlling the distribution of copies of their work. For if it doesn’t regulate 
efficiently here, then we can’t create the incentives that some professionals need to 
create their work.  
 
 Copies Remix 
Professionals Copyright  
Amateurs  Free 
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But equally clearly, amateurs remixing culture should be free of the regulation of 
copyright law. There should be a simple clear directive that this activity should be 
set free of any regulation, without needing a lawyer to provide an opinion that 
such use is “fair.”  
 
 Copies Remix 
Professionals Copyright Mixed 
Amateurs Mixed Free 
 
In the middle, we have two harder cases — instances where the law has some 
important role in restricting use, but where that restriction must be balanced with 
important freedoms. Amateurs distributing copies of work should, to some degree, 
be privileged (I should be free to share my favourite song with my brother), but in 
some sense controlled (I should not be free to share my favourite song with my 
10,000 best friends). Likewise, professionals involved in remix need the freedom to 
remix without requiring the permission of every copyright owner, but plainly, 
some derivative work is rightly owned by the copyright holder. 
This map of reform is essentially libertarian. I am arguing for a fundamental 
deregulation of a significant space of our culture, and for focusing the regulation 
of copyright law in those areas where it can do some good. If we need regulation 
here, that regulation should at least demonstrate its necessity. Too much 
regulation is allowed to pass without any such demonstration.  
Second: We need a change of law in the context of peer-to-peer piracy. We need to 
recognise that this decade-long war has been a failure. Some respond to failed wars 
by waging an ever more vicious campaign against the enemy. My response is to 
sue for peace, and find a better way to achieve the objectives of the war. The 
objectives of this war are to compensate creators for the exploitation of their work. 
We can provide that compensation without waging war against our kids.  
For the last decade, many of us here have been bouncing around from hearing 
many decent proposals to address this fundamental problem, compulsory licenses 
to the voluntary collective licenses that the Electronic Frontier Foundation has 
proposed. All of these proposals seek to compensate the artist for the exploitation 
of her work without also breaking the Internet.  
When we reflect on these proposals, here’s the point I want you to see: if we had 
enacted any one of these proposals into law one decade ago, the world today would 
be very different, in very tangible ways:  
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1. Artists would have more money. The current campaign to sue peer-to-
peer “pirates” has given nothing of value to artists. When students are 
sued by the RIAA in America, artists get nothing from those lawsuits. 
Instead, the money simply funds further lawsuits, which means, the 
money simply goes to the lawyers. Whatever copyright law is for, it is not 
to provide a full employment act for lawyers. 
2. Businesses would have enjoyed more competition and more opportunity 
for innovation. If the rules had been clearer at the start of this last decade, 
then more companies than Apple could have stepped in to figure out how 
to exploit this opportunity for spreading culture more broadly. 
3. And certainly most important by a mile: If we had enacted these proposals 
a decade ago, we would not have raised a generation of “criminals.” As it 
is, we have millions of kids who have spent the last decade engaging in 
activities that they are told is criminal, but that in their own head seems as 
sensible as any behaviour that any normal person who “gets it” engages in. 
That creates a dissonance. That dissonance is a cost. It is a tax on their 
soul, as it alienates them from doing what’s right. 
When you weigh these different factors — profit to record companies on one side, 
and gains to artists, business, and the souls of our kids on the other — I suggest the 
cost of this war to this generation is high enough to force us to adopt a different 
way to secure the promise of copyright in the 21st century.  
In Europe we see this battle being fought in a very distinctive way. In France, we 
have recently seen the consideration of a 3- Strikes proposal, which basically says 
“Violate copyright law three times and your ISP has an obligation to kick you off 
the internet.” By contrast, Germany is now considering the Green Party’s proposal 
of a cultural “flat rate,” under which everyone pays a given amount in exchange for 
legalising non-commercial peer-to-peer sharing of copyrighted material.  
That contrast, in my view, frames the contrast of choices that we are facing around 
the world. The 3-Strikes proposal is the American response to hopeless wars — 
waging an ever more effective war against the enemy. The German cultural flat 
rate is a response that recognises that this war of prohibition has failed, and that 
we need a different way to secure the objectives of copyright: to ensure copyright 
owners get compensated for the use of their work.  
Australia and New Zealand have an enormously important role to play in that 
debate. Of course, New Zealand has recently considered and rejected the 3-Strike 
proposal and at least is speaking about a fundamental reconsideration about the 
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way copyright law regulates in the 21st century. There is also here in Australia, a 
significant question about the way copyright law will regulate in the future.  
My plea to you today is that you recognise the leadership you could play in this 
debate, and that you direct that leadership not to figuring out ever more fancy 
weapons to use against our kids, but to push all of us, and especially those of us in 
the United States, towards a position of sanity and sensibility for copyright in the 
21st century.  
  *  *  * 
I had the opportunity to speak at a conference at the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York. The conference was held in a beautiful room, with luxurious red 
velvet curtains and a plush red carpet. The aim of the conference was to explain to 
creators how they could comply with the law of copyright, and how they could rely 
upon the law of fair use.  
The law of fair use offers four factors that must be weighed by a judge before the 
judge can conclude that a particular use was “fair.” The lawyers organising the 
event decided that they would ask four lawyers to speak for 15 minutes each on 
each of the four factors — on the theory, I take it, that at the end of the hour the 
audience would be educated about fair use, and could go forward and create 
consistent with the law.  
As I sat there and looked out at the audience, it wasn’t an understanding that I 
saw. It was total confusion. That confusion then led me to a day-dream about the 
event, and about its purpose.  
Because as I looked around the room, I kept asking myself what that room remind 
me of. And eventually, it dawned on me. As a college student, I had spent a lot of 
time travelling throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. That room, I 
realised, reminded me of the soviet parliament. And that led me to ask:  
When was it in the history of the Soviet system when you could have convinced 
the Soviets that their system had failed? 1976 was too early, as it was puttering 
along okay in 1976. 1989 was too late: If you didn’t get it by 1989, you were never 
going to get it. So when was it, between 1976 and 1989, that you could have 
convinced them that the system had failed and, more importantly, what could you 
have said to these Soviets to convince them that the ideology that they had 
romanticised had crashed and burned, and to continue with the Soviet system was 
to betray a certain kind of insanity.  
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Because, as I listen to lawyers insist that “nothing had changed,” and that “the 
same rules should apply,” and that “it is the pirates who are the deviants,” I 
recognised that it is we, lawyers, who are insane.  
This existing system of copyright could never work in the digital age. Either it will 
force kids to stop creating, or it will force upon the system a revolution. In my 
view, both options are not acceptable.  
Extremism invites extremism in response. And the extremism of the rights holders 
today has created the extremism of abolitionism. I think both extremes are wrong. 
Thus in this war, I am Gorbachev, not Yeltsin: an old communist who’s trying to 
preserve this old system in a new time against extremisms from both sides. 
Extremisms that would destroy the system of copyright that we have inherited.  
Some of you might not care about destroying the system of copyright. So then 
allow me one final plea: We have to recognise this: We can’t kill this form of 
creativity; we can only criminalise it. There is no way we can stop our kids from 
engaging in this form of creativity; we can only drive their creativity underground. 
We can’t make them passive; we can only make them “pirates.” The question we 
have to ask is, is that any good? In my country, kids live in an age of prohibition, 
constantly living their life against the law. We need to recognise: that life is 
corrosive, and corrupting to the rule of law, at least the rule of law in a democracy.  
That is a cost of this war. In my view, it is large enough to say that our first moral 
obligation must be to find a way to stop this war. Now. 
Thank you very much.  
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOWING 
PROFESSOR LESSIG’S ADDRESS MODERATED BY 
THE HON MICHAEL KIRBY 
 
THE HON MICHAEL KIRBY 
Could I say that I left hanging in the air the second point that Lawrence taught in a 
very different lecture that he gave in London, but it is relevant, and I would like to ask 
him about it, and that was the lesson you taught about the difficulty of securing change 
because of the corruption of our political system by reason of the intermeshing of 
politics with reform.  
In a week’s time, I go to New York for a meeting with the Council on Foreign 
Relations,1 and the UNAIDS Global Reference Panel,2 which is relating to how, in the 
new Obama world, we adjust our response to the AIDS epidemic, given that President 
George W. Bush tripled the funding of AIDS assistance, which was a very good thing, 
but [in a way] designed to exclude the United Nations and the UN AIDS machinery – 
as some have sometimes unkindly said, because of the very large resources that were 
paid into his electoral funds by the pharmaceutical industry.  
And I think it would be helpful, you have given us as it were, if I dare use this 
expression, the road map, but we really have got to know, does the road map lead 
anywhere given the intermeshing of industry and politics and the funding of politics in 
all of our countries? 
PROFESSOR LESSIG 
Yes, it’s a great question, because in fact as some of you know, about a year ago I said 
that I was shifting my academic work away from these questions of free culture and 
balance in copyright to focus on what I call this problem of institutional corruption 
                                                             
1 The Council on Foreign Relations is a non-profit think-tank based in New York City, the 
mission of which is to improve understanding of the ‘world and the foreign policy choices facing 
the US and other countries.’ 
2 UNAIDS Global Reference Panel on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights. 
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which is not the problem, of say, Rod Blagojevich, who was the Governor who tried to 
sell a Senate seat for money, or Randy Duke Cunningham, who would sell defence 
contracts in exchange for kick-backs to himself.  
Not that kind of corruption, but instead the kind of corruption which is endemic in 
the American political system, where politicians spend between 30% and 70% of their 
time raising money to get back to Congress, and therefore become enormously 
sensitive to the wishes of those who provide the greatest amount of funding. I think 
this is a central part of the problem, fixing that problem.  
And it’s not, as you said, just an American problem. Take for example, the situation of 
the democracy gap that exists in Europe right now. The EU recently has been 
considering the question of whether to extend the term of copyrights for recordings. 
The recording term was 50 years. This of course was an issue at the centre of my work, 
because we began our organising around the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, which extended the term of existing copyrights by 20 years in the United States. 
The EU wanted to extend the recording term from 50 years to 95 years.  
And when that was being considered in the United States, we brought a challenge, 
when it was being considered as legislation, and then we brought a legal challenge to it 
once it was enacted, challenging the constitutionality of this extension. The extension 
challenge was supported by a brief that was signed by about 17 economists including 
five Nobel Prize winners including such lefty liberals as Milton Friedman, oh I’m 
sorry, wait, he’s a right wing Nobel Prize-winning economist.  
 Milton Friedman said he would only sign this brief if it argued that there could be no 
public good that would come from extending an existing copyright, and if the term 
“no-brainer” was in the brief somewhere, so clear was it, that this could serve no public 
interest. When Europe was considering the same issue, a whole bunch of respected 
institutions around Europe considered the question.  
Gowers ran a Commission in Britain about intellectual property generally, and 
concluded that it could “never make sense to extend the term of an existing 
copyright”. In Holland, there was an equivalent study by a very respected intellectual 
property centre that made a similar conclusion about how this could not serve the 
public interest at all. Yet just last month, the EU voted to extend the term of existing 
copyrights for recordings, again, solely because the industry has such an enormous 
influence on policy makers. They acted independently of what makes good sense from 
a public policy perspective.  
Now, you know, when I changed my work, there was this moment, this ah-ha 
moment, that kind of showed me that I wasn’t as smart as I thought I was, because I 
should have figured this out a long time ago. But the ah-ha moment was watching Al 
Gore give his speech about global warming, and one of my closest friends was the 
director of his film, An Inconvenient Truth, so I got to follow him around and watch 
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him give this speech a bunch of times. But one of the points that Gore makes, less so in 
the film, more in his actual speech, is that the very same dynamic that I am 
complaining about in the context of intellectual property, has lead the United States to 
make it impossible for them to address the question of global warming.  
Even today, with Barack Obama as President, and the Democrats controlling both 
Houses of Congress, I would predict there is a 57% to 60% chance that this Congress 
will not be able to enact global warming legislation because 12 Democrats could not 
afford to vote against the oil or coal industries, and continue to raise the money they 
need to get back to Congress.3  
The ah-ha moment was recognising, wait a minute, it’s not just esoteric questions like 
copyright where this corrupting influence is driving bad policy. Absolutely every single 
fundamental public policy question America faces, including the most important 
questions, global warming, health care, the financing systems, are stopped because of 
exactly this corruption.  
My view was that unless we find a way to deal with that, we won’t be able to deal with 
copyright, or global warming, or any of these other issues either, and so, yes of course, 
I am sceptical that we can address these issues before we address the others. But what 
we can do is at least make it obvious to people who have the principles of copyright in 
their heart, that really are genuine scholars, or lawyers, focused on what copyright 
should be about. It is at least possible for us to get those people to recognise what is 
good policy and if we can’t get policy makers to implement it, at least we can get the 
profession to recognise it. And that, I think, is an enormously important first step, that 
at least gets us towards the place where policy makers can be shamed into doing what 
we all recognise is the right thing. 
THE HON MICHAEL KIRBY 
Some of those comments would have caused ah-ha moments to us in Australia 
because we have certain similar issues as in the United States. Now Brian can we have 
five minutes for a few questions? Oh, we’ve got eight minutes. 
Ok, short questions or comments. Yes – and if you wish to identify where you are 
from. 
                                                             
3 In 2009, 12 Democrats on the House of Representatives’ energy subcommittee, all from auto-
manufacturing, or coal or oil producing states, wavered on voting for President Obama’s climate 
change bill. The bill stalled in the Senate in 2010. 
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BRIANNA LAW FROM WIKIMEDIA AUSTRALIA 
In your talk about how copyright law might be reformed, you make a distinction 
between amateurs and professionals, and I wonder if with digital reproduction 
lowering the cost of producing and disseminating works, is that still meaningful and 
how can we define that? 
PROFESSOR LESSIG 
Yes, it’s absolutely true that the line between amateurs and professionals is going to be 
a hard one to draw. But just because we lawyers are very good at turning any black and 
white distinction into grey, indeed that is how we are trained, that is why we are paid 
so much money, we can turn black and white into grey, we should recognise that there 
are radically different reasons that people create.  
Some people create for the money and they should be respected because they are great 
creators, they are trying to be a professional, they are trying to make their creativity, 
make it so they are free to create.  
But there are other people, the original meaning of the word amateur, who create for 
the love of their creating, not for the money. And when they engage in that act, what 
they are doing has nothing to do with money, and indeed, if you introduced money 
into the mix, it would change the kind of creativity. You from Wikimedia know this 
very well. Wikipedians are people who create access to knowledge because they want 
to share that knowledge. If Jimmy Wales4 were to institute a system of paying editors 
for editing Wikipedia entries, I think the quality of the editing would go down because 
people participate in that economy of creativity for the love of what they are doing. 
And we need to respect that there are those economies that we want to continue. 
Indeed, everybody wants to continue. Think about the sharing economy of two lovers, 
right. Introduce money into that economy, you have radically changed the nature of 
the interaction there, in ways that even conservatives who love the market would say 
no, no, no, we don’t want the market to be functioning there.  
The point is to see that we have these different motivations for creativity, and we need 
to respect them, and have a system that can respect them, even though there are going 
to be places where it’s hard to tell the difference. We need to work hard to figure out 
how the law needs to negotiate the differences, but still not lose sight of the fact that 
there are important kinds of creativities on both sides of that line. 
                                                             
4 Co-founder and public face of Wikipedia. 
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THE HON MICHAEL KIRBY 
Adrian Sterling, I’ve got to give you a fair go now. I think it might be a chance for you 
to ask a question. 
PROFESSOR ADRIAN STERLING 
Thank you very much. I’m one of those persons that Professor Lessig referred to as a 
person with copyright in his heart, and a little while ago, I heard lots of discussion 
about what Professor Lessig said and how bad for copyright it was, and how terrible it 
was. So I thought, well perhaps one should look to see what he actually says. So I got a 
copy of his book, Remix, published in October last year by Penguin and read it 
through and came to the conclusion that I agreed with everything that he said. This 
afternoon, I’ve heard him repeat some of that and also bring us up to date, and I still 
feel the same way.  
And I want to make just one or two very quick remarks of how I would suggest one 
takes into consideration reaching that objective that Professor Lessig has brought 
before us. No abolition, but compensation for right-owners, and recognition of the 
rights of the amateur in Remix, and so forth.  
The first thing is, I would say, I don’t think that we need, or should have, a revolution. 
Revolutions sometimes don’t end up where they want to be directed. What we need is 
an evolution, and I don’t believe that evolution can be achieved, which we would all 
want to, by trying to get international changes to the conventions, which we would 
need, if we were going to change radically the conditions on exclusive rights of 
copying, reproduction and communication to the public that are granted by the 
conventions. We have to remember that in the Berne Convention diplomatic 
conferences, there must be unanimity of voting to change the Convention. We will not 
get unanimity on changes of that nature.  
Therefore, my suggestion is that the road we follow is to consider what rights are in 
existence now, and how they should be administered. It’s the administration of those 
rights, rather than changing the rights and I believe firmly that those who administer 
the rights of authors and others, have it within their power to evolve licensing systems 
and to evolve ways of administering rights, which will fully meet that matrix which 
Professor Lessig has showed us. That is, as it were, the free area, the regulated area for 
payment, and those where there’s a cross-over.  
I do believe, though, that we need to have everything specified in the sense that it is 
legitimated. I would like to see the situation reached, where my use of somebody else’s 
work is legitimated either by a licence or by legal provision. But I want to know where 
I stand and I believe this can be achieved.  
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There is one area that I think Professor Lessig and all of us need to think about in 
order to achieve this great objective, which is moral rights. When my work is subject 
to remix in that unregulated area, what about my moral rights. 
Now, we have to recognise that moral rights are under the Convention, so we have to 
see how we are going to meet that. Thank you. 
THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KIRBY  
Ok, moral rights or licensing. 
PROFESSOR LESSIG 
First, I am grateful to you for doing what I have always thought too few of my 
opponents have done, which is to actually read what I have said, and to engage in that 
act of understanding. There has been too little of that, and I take responsibility for 
inflaming the passions of this, I understand. But my hope is to make peace by 
understanding, exactly the way that you have done. 
Number two, I also agree that evolution is what’s important here. As you will 
remember in my book, I talked about my colleague, Terry Fisher’s, proposal for 
radically changing the way copyright law functions, through basically eliminating the 
property right character of copyright, and replacing it with a whole system of basically 
sampling use and compensating on the basis of that. And I say that I don’t support 
that because it is too radical a change. But the German Green Party’s proposal for the 
culture of flat rate is actually backed up with a very careful analysis of how that is 
consistent with the international conventions, and I think that’s the kind of evolution 
that is needed here. 
Finally, I’ll confess with respect to moral rights, it might be here that there’s the 
greatest potential for conflict. If there’s a point of agreement, I would say it’s this. My 
view is not that we should give up moral rights. Indeed we should encourage respect 
for moral rights in just the sense that people should identify and criticise people who 
misuse other people’s work. So moral rights, in the sense not just of attribution, but in 
the sense of maintaining the integrity. The only difference we might have is whether 
that criticism should be engaged in a court as opposed to in the public sphere.  
The principles of free speech from America would tend to say that, if you have an 
argument about how I’m respecting you, that is an appropriate argument to engage in 
contexts other than legal jurisdictions. It’s kind of an engagement to have in the 
context of open public discourse. So, I should say, this person has misused that 
person’s work, and we should say, shame on you for doing that, and we should punish 
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you in all of the ways that we punish people without using courts. But the burden of 
legal jurisdiction here is too great.  
Now I understand there is room for disagreement here, and the European traditions 
are much stronger, and as they have been grafted into Japan and many parts of Asia, 
much stronger than in the American tradition, but I think this is a source of 
disagreement where we can genuinely understand each other, and try to make 
progress. 
THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KIRBY 
Can we have one more question? Yes very well, I think this gentleman here. 
MARK CALLAGHAN – AMPAL (AUSTRALASIAN MUSIC 
PUBLISHERS’ ASSOCIATION LIMITED) 
I was just going to make a couple of comments and like Professor Sterling, I was 
enthralled with today’s presentation. I thought it was a breath of fresh air frankly. I 
also echo his concerns about moral rights and I think ironically, it could be an area 
that could be agreed upon perhaps more readily than many others yet it is the most 
complex. I mean, take your reference to the use of Lionel Richie’s song to parody 
George Bush, I mean, he may genuinely have thought it wasn’t funny. I mean, he may 
be a Bush supporter and, you know, we need to respect that.  
I think one point that I would like to make, that I think is relevant to this debate, that 
doesn’t get raised a lot, is that there’s an additional difference I think in the context of 
comparing our modern re-write experience with a historical one, in that much of what 
goes on in that space in You Tube, and on the net and MySpace is commercialised 
activity. And I think that’s a very different overlay to what has happened in the past. 
And I think I just wanted to make that comment and say that pirate sites, for example, 
are commercial activities, whereas they are portrayed as being about sharing, although 
the people that run the sites are making money. 
PROFESSOR LESSIG 
Yes, so I mean it is a weird inversion. I can only speak about the law in America here. 
But if you think about a kid taking some videos, and remixing them, he could be 
engaging in that activity for purely non-commercial reasons. He uploads it to You 
Tube and You Tube’s use of it, in some sense, is deeply commercial. They are in the 
business of trying to make money. Yet the law says that what the kid does is illegal. But 
if You Tube takes the thing down within a certain number of days after having notice 
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of the copyright violation, YouTube is immune from any responsibility. And I think 
that is exactly backwards.  
I think what the kid does, should be completely privileged, a free type of creativity. If 
it’s uploaded to You Tube or the equivalent, then I think it’s totally appropriate to say 
that there should be some, you know, flat rate license or some blanket license that is 
covering the music that’s inside that, that has to be paid for by the commercial service, 
so that it compensates the artist for the commercial use of their work. Just like a public 
theatre has a blanket license for songs that are performed in the public theatre, so too 
in the context of what You Tube is doing. Yet we haven’t got to that position at all yet 
and I think, you know, we certainly need to find a way to get there. 
THE HON MICHAEL KIRBY 
Brett Cottle – one last question or comment. 
BRETT COTTLE CEO AUSTRALASIAN PERFORMING RIGHT 
ASSOCIATION 
Professor, I just wanted to take you back to the map of Europe where you contrasted 
the French approach to the German approach, and the cultural flat rate being 
proposed by the Greens in Germany. I don’t think you will be surprised to know that 
the authors’ societies are in violent agreement with you about that approach. The 
problem, of course, is how to get to that solution. It is a very difficult legislative path, 
and, of course, the people who would be paying the cultural flat rate, would inevitably 
by the ISPs. My question to you really is, how do you think we can get, by regulation, 
to that path, to that position. 
PROFESSOR LESSIG 
Well, it’s good to see you again. We had the pleasure of debating in Europe about these 
questions about a year ago. I think that there are two steps to getting us there. First, we 
need to have a debate which isn’t the debate between three strikes and the culture of 
flat rate, but a debate that brings more traditional rights’ holders into the space that 
says exactly what you have just said. That we support a move towards this, and lets 
figure out how to implement it. 
Number two, we need some experimentation between jurisdictions. I don’t think any 
of us has a clear sense of what’s going to create the right balance between artists and 
the public, and we need to find some – we need to see something about how it’s 
actually being implemented in different jurisdictions. Now, as you know, as was 
commented before, that turns out to be pretty hard, because of the uniformity of IP 
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rules enforced by agreements internationally. But I think that if we had a genuine and 
good faith conversation between the rights’ holders, and the community, about this, 
and allow some diversity in the implementation, we could move towards a system that 
we begin to recognise as actually achieving those objectives. 
One important thing, though, is to bring the whole of the artistic community into this 
discussion. And I’m sure you are aware there’s this extraordinary Heidelberg 
manifesto that has been created in Germany by a bunch of authors who are absolutely 
against the internet, they are against anybody having access to their work on the 
internet, and they have created this huge public outcry against a lot of these changes, 
because they happen to be the most popular writers. They all happen to all be over the 
age of 60 too, but the most popular writers in Germany.  
And I think there’s a great amount of misunderstanding here about what exactly we 
should be achieving. I think if we found more ways for people like you, and people like 
me, to stand on a common platform, and point to the kind of answer that would be the 
right answer, then we can have lots more progress in getting to it than we’ve had in the 
last 10 years, I think. 
Thank you very much for your attention. 
THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KIRBY 
We’ve already thanked Professor Lessig, but I want to make two little comments in 
closing. 
First, I tried to keep, out of the corner of my eye, an eye on you all, and I noticed you 
all looking at the text that was coming up, instead of looking at the man who was 
presenting, and doing it so eloquently. I’ve learned from having watched Professor 
Lessig before, it’s a whole experience just watching him, instead of watching all the 
text, though he makes the text very watchable because he puts pictures and other 
things in there, and you’re waiting to see what comes next. 
The second thing is, and it won’t go away, the issue of a democratic politic and how it 
copes with this issue. I mean we can have dreams of how one would have radical 
change, but Adrian put a little bit of a real issue into the mix there. And it’s 
appropriate we should think about that in this House, because when I was young, 
when I was first the Chairman of the Law Reform Commission, this was the 
Parliament of Australia. It was a temporary or provisional Parliament House. It was 
opened in 1927, the Parliament having from the beginning of Federation been in 
Melbourne, in the Melbourne parliamentary building in Spring Street in Melbourne, 
and then they moved up here and King George VI as he later became, the Duke of 
York and his wife, the Duchess of York, later the Queen Mother, came here. 
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There’s a wonderful portrait of it actually in the King’s Hall, which shows them 
arriving, and the troops lined up, most of whom would have fought in Gallipoli and on 
the Somme, and it is important for us to remember, though we are a small country, we 
are very very mature democracy. We have the fifth oldest still working constitution in 
the world and this is the chamber of the fifth oldest continuous constitutional nation 
in the world. And therefore, when Professor Lessig throws out a challenge to us from 
his vantage point, and from his tremendous ability to see things conceptually, which is 
what we wanted him to come and do for us, and what he’s done for us, then we’ve got 
to take that seriously.  
Our Parliament has moved up the hill, but ours is still the fifth oldest Constitution in 
the world, and the fifth oldest continuous democracy, and this is its House, and we are 
privileged to sit in this House and to reflect on all of the battles and the democracy that 
were fought out here. And if you have time, just wander, just cast a glance into the old 
House of Representatives, green carpet as in the Congress, as in the House of 
Commons, and into the Senate, where there’s red carpet.  
And that is the heart of democracy in this nation. So we’ve really got to think about 
what we’ve said, and I think that on top of a magnificent morning of a great cake – 
what a cake we’ve had today. A terrific morning of history and of interest and of 
personalities. We’ve had this most insightful session and I’d ask you once again to 
thank Professor Lessig. 
PROFESSOR BRIAN FITZGERALD 
Well thank you both, I’m not sure which one of you travels more, or which one of you 
was more passionate about your topic, but all I know is I’m thankful that both of you 
are here. Tremendous presentation Larry. I know it’s a very difficult time, you’re 
moving from Stanford back to Harvard, and you’re in the process of doing it, and it’s a 
horrible time to have to travel across the world to a far-flung place like Australia. 
Thank you very much. 
And Michael Kirby, the Honourable Michael Kirby, thank you for coming down in 
between all of the engagements that you’ve had yesterday, and today, for what has 
been truly a memorable session. Thank you. 
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COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY 
 
Professor Julie E. Cohen 1 
  
 
Thank you all. It is a pleasure to be here. What you are going to hear is not a single 
paper but rather a condensed version of a couple of book chapters.  
What I want to argue today is that copyright law, or at least American copyright law, 
which is my area of expertise, is premised on a defective model of creativity, and that 
that deficiency in copyright’s model of creativity is a direct consequence of the tools 
that lawyers and theorists have brought to the task of understanding the creative 
process. 
Legal scholarship is closely aligned with the tradition of liberal political economy, and 
therefore with the foundational principles on which that tradition rests. So, in 
particular, liberal theory regards the self as a disembodied abstract being; it treats 
knowledge as transcendent and existing on a plane separate from and superior to 
culture; and it treats the self and culture as fundamentally distinct entities. Those 
commitments exact a very high price when we start talking about copyright, because 
creativity operates at the interface between self and culture, and plays out in the 
concrete and materially determined contexts in which people live and interact. 
I would like to do three things in my time today. First, I want to critically examine 
copyright’s model of cultural development as it builds from those fundamental 
assumptions. Then we will take a look at some examples drawn from a variety of art 
forms and genres, and will use those examples to illustrate an alternative model of 
cultural development that more closely aligns with how creative people actually work 
                                                             
1 Professor Julie E. Cohen, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, is one of the 
leading scholars of copyright and intellectual property law in the United States, with a special 
interest in the effects of copyright and privacy law and policy on information regulation. She is 
co-author of Copyright in a Global Information Economy, Aspen Law & Business, 2010 (3rd ed) 
and several scholarly book chapters, articles and essays. Professor Cohen has focused attention 
on the effect of networked communication and society on the production of culture. She is at 
present working on a book examining the ‘networked self’ in the context of copyright law, 
surveillance, privacy law, and internet architecture. 
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on a day-to-day basis. Finally, I will say a couple of things about how we might actually 
proceed to revise copyright law in accordance with that alternative model.  
COPYRIGHT’S MODEL OF CREATIVITY 
First let’s take a look at copyright’s implicit model of cultural development. You know, 
certainly, that copyright scholars don’t agree on whether current copyright laws strike 
the right balance between authors and the public. Some people argue that expanded 
rights are necessary to counteract the effects of technologies for mass reproduction 
and redistribution. Others disagree, and argue that to exploit the democratising 
potential of new digital media technologies, copyright protection should be balanced 
by a more robust set of exceptions. Earlier today, Professor Lessig characterised those 
debates as the copyright wars.  
Even so, copyright law is premised on a set of assumptions about the relationship 
between copyright and creativity that most people, on both sides of the debate, 
generally accept. Legal scholars on both sides of the copyright wars largely assume that 
copyright supplies incentives for authors to produce creative work, but that the 
creative process is essentially internal and unknowable. They assume that copyright 
can strike a satisfactory balance between the needs of authors and the needs of 
audiences as long as it includes well tailored exceptions for uses of great social 
importance. They assume that because copyright attaches only to creative expression, 
and not to underlying ideas, copyright can avoid frustrating future authors. A lot 
hinges on whether those assumptions are right.  
Let’s start with authors and the question of where creativity comes from. Legal 
scholars who advance rights based arguments for copyright have generally described 
creativity in terms of an individual liberty whose form remains largely unspecified. 
Sometimes this argument relies on self reporting by artists; when asked about why 
they create, artists tend to describe a process that is intrinsically unknowable. When 
legal scholars consider those self reports, however, they also add something. They 
characterise creative motivation as both intrinsically unknowable and essentially 
internal: a gift of self, or a ‘black box’ inside the mind of the author. The belief in 
creativity’s essentially internal aspect does not match the experience that artists 
describe at all. Artists may not be able to tell us why they create but they can tell us a 
great deal about the where, what and how of particular creative processes: what they 
were looking at, what they were reading, what they were listening to, who they were 
talking to, and so on. Social scientists who study the creative process have found that 
these things matter a lot. 
Economically minded scholars have focused on the marketable by-products of 
creativity. For scholars of the ‘copyright maximalist’ persuasion, creative motivation 
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matters only to the extent that we presume it is enhanced by the possibility of an 
economic reward. The details of why somebody would create this rather than that are 
irrelevant; market signals will take care of the details. Critics of the maximalist model 
challenge the argument that copyright always supplies an incentive to produce more 
creative material. They argue that sometimes creative motivation has no market 
origins. Even so, they generally agree with the maximalist view that the specifics of 
creative motivation are irrelevant. As James Boyle puts it, “It is irrelevant that people 
create, only that they do it”. If creativity is not purely internal, if it’s a function of what 
authors were looking at, and reading, and listening to, then the details matter.  
What’s missing from both rights based and economic accounts of copyright is careful 
consideration of the complicated interrelationship between authors and their 
surrounding cultural environments, within which works of artistic expression are 
created and used. Copyright law is an important factor in that environment, but it is 
only one factor, and we should want to know more about the other factors in play.  
Next, let’s consider the ways in which copyright defines and enforces rights in 
expression. In general, the drafters of copyright law have attempted to define rights 
that will extend to most commercialization of works of authorship. To shield certain 
uses, they have defined exceptions and limitations, and in most cases they have tried to 
define them narrowly. Of particular interest to many copyright scholars, there are 
almost no exceptions or limitations that cover what Jessica Litman has called “lawful 
personal use” of copyrighted works. Exceptions and limitations instead tend to be 
directed at public uses of high social value.  
Copyright scholars have different positions on where lines between rights and 
limitations should be drawn. Generally speaking, though, they tend to agree that 
markets for copyrighted use are more or less value neutral with respect to copyright’s 
ultimate goal of progress. Put differently, they tend to think relying principally on the 
market to order uses of copyrighted works allows the forward march of progress to 
proceed without interference, and without attempting to decide which kinds of 
progress are best. We can argue about whether or not the market needs to be corrected 
in particular cases, or whether we need a new exception or limitation, but otherwise 
we should leave well enough alone.  
One may object, first, that that account of progress makes some rather large 
assumptions about the transcendent nature of knowledge, and the linear forward 
marching character of progress. Those assumptions don’t square with a large and 
growing body of work in the social sciences that suggest that knowledge and cultural 
context are much more interrelated. That objection is extremely important, but I don’t 
want to talk about it today.  
More concretely, one might object that before we decide just how far rights in creative 
works ought to extend, we ought to have some idea about how the other side of the 
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progress equation works. Once a creative work is prepared and released, how do 
audiences interact with it, how do they receive it, what do they do with it? We say that 
copyright is supposed to promote the dissemination of knowledge and learning, but 
before we assume that the process is working well, we ought to have some 
understanding of what users of copyrighted works do with those works, and how and 
why they do it.  
Copyright lawyers have answers to those questions, but the answers turn out to 
depend on some extraordinarily one-dimensional models of user activities and 
interests. Sometimes people talk about a particular kind of user, who I will call the 
economic user, who enters the market for copyrighted content with predetermined 
tastes in search of the best deal or sometimes in search of a free deal. Copyright rules 
targeting commercial exploitation and rules about secondary liability for technology 
providers are designed for that user. They presume that, in general, copyrighted works 
must be paid for to be enjoyed in any of the ways that the user might want to enjoy 
them. In the context of those rules, the reasons for wanting to copy or reuse created 
material are typically deemed unimportant.  
At other times, some scholars talk about a different user who I call the romantic user. 
This person is quite an amazing being whose life is an endless cycle of sophisticated 
debate about current events, high quality blog posts, discerning quests for the most 
freedom-enhancing new media technologies, and home production of high quality 
movies, music, remix culture and open source software. This user’s reasons for 
copying or reusing content are so important that they are typically the reason for 
creating the exceptions and limitations that I mentioned. In general, though, copyright 
scholars don’t spend a lot of time thinking about the processes by which one would 
become a romantic user, or by which romantic users come into being.  
Now the interesting thing about these models is that copyright scholars have very little 
idea how these users relate to one another, so little that it sometimes sounds like they 
are talking about members of different species. But of course they aren’t different 
species or even different people. The economic user and the romantic user are often 
the same person. We should want to know a lot more about how that person comes to 
encounter and use cultural products, and to understand his or her own experiences.  
Finally, let’s consider copyright’s end-product, the works within which copyright 
protection subsists. We all learn on the first or second day of the copyright course that 
rights subsist only in the words “creative expression”, which is fundamentally 
separable from its underlying ideas. When disentangling the two gets complicated, we 
tell our students they can approach that problem by using levels of abstraction to 
separate the ideas from the expressions. The ideas, along with similar entities like 
processing and functional principles, exist in the public domain, where they are 
building blocks that anyone may use to construct new creative edifices.  
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The problem with this theory is that it is just plain wrong. It is created out of whole 
cloth, based on nothing more than legal theory’s assumptions about the relationship 
between culture and true knowledge. Remember again that legal political theory 
presumes that knowledge and ideas are abstract and transcendent, separate and 
distinct from the particulars of the expression that embodies them and the culture that 
surrounds them. We regard culture as an imperfect bridge to knowledge. We are 
confident that the repeated iteration of ideas through different modes of expression 
will lead us to progress, and that granting copyrights in the expression won’t frustrate 
that process. 
This model of cultural transmission is unique to intellectual property law. Nobody else 
thinks about cultural transmission this way. Scholars who study the arts and literature 
have catalogued an extensive list of imitative activities, including illusion, pastiche and 
so on, that are central to the ongoing process of culture production. All of those 
activities require the reuse of expression and proceed on the presumption that idea 
and expression are fundamentally indistinguishable. For artists positioning themselves 
relative to the previous generations, and relative to the surrounding culture, ideas and 
expression cannot be separated.  
The part of the story about end-products that deals with the public domain is also very 
odd, and is so regardless of one’s position in the copyright wars. The term “public 
domain” has pronounced geographic connotations, but we tend to worry about what 
is in the public domain, rather than where it is. The public domain comes to be seen as 
a mythical Heisenbergian place that is always accessible everywhere, whether or not 
that is actually true. There is a vital and enormously important advocacy movement 
for the public domain that has grown up over the last decade, and sometimes the 
rhetoric of that movement actually makes this particular problem worse. Its advocates 
use terms like “enclosure” to describe what is wrong with copyright today, and 
“commons” to describe what copyright ought to create, and those are geographic 
terms as well. The discourse of the public domain, which proceeds without 
acknowledging the geographic assumptions, can operate to minimise the questions of 
where public domain resources are actually located in real space, relative to the people 
who need to access them.  
To understand the cultural work that copyright does, and the role that it plays in our 
emerging information society, we need to do better than this. We need to confront and 
study the interdependencies between self and culture, including the ways that people 
become authors, the ways that users receive copyrighted works and the way that 
people use copyrighted works in the real world. And we shouldn’t begin that process 
presuming that copyright’s artificial model of the way that culture proceeds is the right 
model.  
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A DIFFERENT MODEL OF CULTURAL CREATION  
Now for the fun part.2 Before articulating a different model of cultural production it is 
useful to look at some real world examples. We are all familiar with the seemingly 
endless parade of contemporary examples of cultural borrowing. So here are two 
contemporary examples.  
The first is a progression of four slides, beginning with some things that served as 
inputs but were themselves copyrighted: an obscure Japanese art film, The Hidden 
Fortress, and a very popular American comic book series, The Adventures of Buck 
Rogers in the 25th Century, pieces which were combined in an inspired pastiche by the 
folks who brought us Star Wars – Episode IV: A New Hope. The film Star Wars – 
Episode IV: A New Hope ultimately became an empire of its own, and in turn inspired 
acts of borrowing and reworking. For example, you can visit www.blamesociety.net to 
view the adventures of Chad Vader, Lord Vader’s little brother, who came into being 
when somebody asked what if someone with Lord Vader’s distinctive physical and 
personality attributes ran a grocery store in New Jersey. Or, if your tastes run more to 
being the characters that you have imagined for so long, you can have a Star Wars 
themed wedding or party instead.  
Here’s a different example – the lawsuit between the Associated Press and an artist 
named Shepard Fairey. Fairey created the poster Hope, using as a template a photograph 
taken of Barack Obama by a freelancer for the Associated Press. Why did he do it? Well 
that was an image of Barack Obama that he could get. It could have been anybody else’s 
copyright photograph, but it happened to be that one. Since Fairey is not personally 
acquainted with Barack Obama, and wasn’t able to get close enough to him to get his 
own photograph, he had to use somebody’s. This image, as transfigured in the portrait, 
helped to fuel a grass-roots popular movement that gained momentum on the internet, 
but it has been dignified after the fact as high art. Shepard Fairey’s painted portrait of 
Barack Obama, reproducing the image from the poster, has now been hung in the 
National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC. It has also been recycled back into popular 
culture. If you go to the website www.obamiconme.pastemagazine.com, you can create 
your own Fairey-style portrait. People have done some amazing things, including some 
that reference the other cultural example I talked about a moment ago, such as this 
portrait of Obi Wan Kenobi.  
We could go on in this vein for some time, and we could see, ad nauseam, examples of 
cultural works circulating, recirculating, being remixed and recycled in ways that 
involve the internet, but I don’t want to do that because the point I want to make is 
that the model of creative practice that these two sets of slides illustrate is much older 
                                                             
2 Professor Cohen’s lecture linked to a series of videos and audiovisual slides. Images from her 
presentation are not included in this book.  
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than the internet. It turns out that this basic pattern of the movement of culture, of the 
recycling of images back and forth between mass culture, establishment culture, and 
popular grass roots culture has existed for a very long time.  
Let’s look at some other examples. In 1920, photographer Louis Hine, working in the 
modernist medium of documentary photography, created an image of a nameless 
worker in a big factory, who became an iconic figure of modernist art. That figure was 
then recycled into a big budget work of mass culture, Charlie Chaplin’s movie Modern 
Times, which involves a nameless worker in a big factory, but in a distinctly non-
heroic way. The movie is a comedy of errors. Charlie Chaplin’s buffoonish character in 
the factory where everything goes amiss was then recycled into high art by American 
painter Larry Rivers, who took mass culture as his subject matter and created portraits 
of icons of mass culture within the settings in which they gained their prominence. 
And it’s not just the visual arts that work this way. Consider now a musical example. 
In 1899 Gustav Mahler took a nursery rhyme (Frere Jacques, or Bruder Martin in the 
German version) and turned it into the Third Movement of his Symphony No 1.  
What can copyright lawyers do with the examples on these slides? Well, we can start 
by acknowledging that the questions what do users do, and what do authors do, are 
really the same question. Everyone is a user of cultural works first and an author 
second, so we can start by replacing the artificial cardboard figures of the user and the 
author with a single figure, who I will call the situated user because that user is situated 
within his or her own culture.  
We can then lay out a model of creativity organised around the situated user that has 
five essential parts: 
 First – situated users engage with artistic and cultural works for multiple 
intertwined purposes, including consumption, communication, self-development, 
creative play. These activities shade into one another, and are impossible to 
disentangle, or understand, out of context. The ways in which situated users 
interact with creative works are so diverse as to defy easy characterisation. They 
use creative works to inform themselves and to fuel their own creative input and 
output, but also to imitate others, to perform cultural identities, and to build and 
sustain relationships. Some of these activities map to the economic user. They are 
just straightforwardly consumptive. Some activities map to the romantic user. 
They are bold exemplars of dissent. Many activities are mundane, and lie 
somewhere in between in that grey area that we haven’t looked at hard enough.  
 Second – the state of being a situated user entails cultural constraint. The everyday 
practice of users is constrained by the various social and cultural networks within 
which users find themselves. When those users become authors, their own 
creative output is subject to the cultural path dependencies that those networks 
create. Consider the following simple question: What should a painting of the 
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female face look like? [Images shown from a YouTube video titled “Women in 
Western Art”.] We are not going to watch the whole thing, but you get the point. 
This woman looks a particular way. Quite surprisingly, in every one of these 
paintings this woman does not look like the women in this room, or in this city, or 
in this country, or in this world. The images are much more uniform than they 
would be if creativity were simply an internal proposition rather than constrained 
by cultural demands. At the same time, though, the boundaries of the networks 
are fluid, so boundary crossings are frequent. Forms of expression can migrate 
from one network to another with astonishing speed. Consider first what happens 
when you cross traditional Malian music with the American blues. A result is the 
music of Ali Farka Toure. [Music played.] Then when you cross the music of Ali 
Farka Toure with that of Led Zeppelin, Jimi Hendrix, and other assorted 
American rock and roll influences, you get this: the rock music of Tinariwen. 
[Music played.] Boundary crossings between cultures happen because, of course, 
people within cultural networks are opportunistic. They see things that float in 
front of them and they grab them and mix them with what they already know. A 
different kind of cultural boundary crossing is illustrated by the obamicon.3 The 
boundaries between mass culture, high art, and popular grass roots culture are 
very fluid. Things circulate, and recirculate, across those boundaries. 
 Third – boundary crossings can create conflict because the artistic influences 
come into contact with the values of particular social groups. On your left is 
Tjangala’s Emu Dreaming, which became the subject of litigation when it was put 
onto a carpet without the original Aboriginal people’s permission, and in direct 
conflict with their religious practices. On your right is a nativity family that you 
could have bought from Target last year at Christmas time, showing you that 
Christianity does not take the same view of the commercialisation of its religious 
symbols. We have culture then as a kind of contest, in which different groups 
struggle about the forms of artistic expression, about what is permissible, and 
about what these expressions mean.  
Sometimes the struggle is resolved one way, and sometimes another. I don’t mean 
to be making an argument about how the carpet case should have been resolved. 
What I mean to be making is a more general point about what keeps the system of 
culture in motion. Situated users appropriate and use works of creative expression 
in many ways which are intertwined with and channelled by the forms of 
expression within those networks. 
                                                             
3 A reference to the obamicon.me website. The site allows users to create stylised images 
generated by uploading personal photographs that are electronically integrated on a template of 
Shepard Fairey’s “Hope” portrait of Barack Obama.  
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 Fourth, the creative practice of situated users is embodied and materially situated. 
Situated users use their bodies to communicate works to one another – for 
example, singing and dancing to popular songs, or repeating lines from favourite 
TV shows. Sometimes it is really obnoxious but this is what we do – dancing the 
Macarena, for instance. [Video played.] I looked for the video of Peter Costello 
being taught to do the Macarena on a talk show that you have here, but sadly it 
seems to have been taken down. [Video of teacher showing the Macarena moves.] 
This is very mundane stuff, not sexy remix culture, but this is a common 
denominator. This is what people do, and it is important, because this is how we 
process our culture. Sometimes the mundane way we process our culture is 
remixed into something more elevated. [Clip from the film Muriel’s Wedding with 
characters lip-synching to Abba music.] Here this music is more than just a 
shallow pop song. It’s embedded in a movie about ultimate female empowerment, 
although you would have to watch the whole movie to get there. Sometimes 
embodied cultural practice is strange. This is a prison in the Philippines where 
they do dance therapy. [YouTube video of prison inmates dancing to Michael 
Jackson’s “Thriller”.] That’s fun to watch on video and it’s probably on the list of 
100 things you have seen on the internet unless you are a loser, or old or dead or 
whatever. The loftier point is that culture is an embodied conversation. The body 
is how people process their culture. This has implications not just for whether we 
can copy, but for the scope of the rights of public performance and 
communication to the public, whichever name they are called in the country you 
are in. That is why I prefer the term “cultural landscape” to “public domain”. 
Creative practice by situated users involves working through what is ready to 
hand in the cultural landscape that is there around them. This means that often 
works of mass culture will be the raw material for a new creative effort. To 
experience, assimilate, appreciate, and have a conversation about works of mass 
culture requires behaviours like this. When we create our own works, we begin 
with real bodies and spaces.  
 Finally –The creative practice of situated users relies on interplay between what is 
ready to hand and familiar in the cultural environment, on one hand, and 
serendipity or play on the other. People are opportunistic. They latch onto 
whatever they encounter. Always the familiar, but also the unpredicted and the 
unpredictable. For authors, creative practice is most fruitful when it includes these 
encounters with the unpredicted – and when it includes the freedom to exploit the 
serendipitous encounter without asking permission to do so first. This interaction 
between the familiar and the unexpected in the cultural landscape is exactly what 
we refer to when we talk about why art and intellectual culture are important on a 
personal level. We talk about art opening time and space for reflection. We talk 
about how the serendipitous encounter and its unexpected creative fruit 
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contribute to a dynamic culture, a culture that moves and avoids becoming 
calcified and rigid. These things are what we mean when we talk about why art is 
important. They ought to be what copyright seeks to promote.  
A LOGICALLY DISCONTINUOUS COPYRIGHT LAW 
I want to close with some brief thoughts about how copyright ought to respond to the 
reality of creative practice. To begin, we need to acknowledge that copyright plays a 
relatively small role in stimulating many of the processes that I have just described and 
shown to you. That doesn’t mean that copyright is unimportant. Copyright is 
extraordinarily important. It simply serves a different set of goals than the ones that we 
have become used to thinking that it serves.  
Copyright serves roles that are primarily economic. It creates predictability in the 
organisation of cultural production, and this is important, particularly in capital 
intensive industries like film and television. It generates revenues, exports, jobs – all 
things that are good – and it enables the production of mass culture, which is so 
extraordinarily important. It’s quite fashionable among free culture advocates to pooh 
pooh mass culture and talk about how bland and banal it is. I couldn’t disagree more. 
Mass culture is a crucial ingredient in the process of circulation I described. We need 
the mass culture to enable everything else. At the same time, we need to acknowledge 
that the single-minded pursuit of economic predictability and fixity, and of the 
copyright primacy of mass culture, frustrates creative practice by situated users. We 
would be worse off if people couldn’t do things like those we have just seen and heard.  
A good copyright system needs to hold both of these goods, economic fixity and 
cultural mobility, in the balance. That means that the rules that establish rights in 
creative works need to ensure sufficient breathing room for creative practice as it 
actually occurs. The rules should ensure degrees of freedom, if you will, within which 
the serendipitous encounter can take place, and within which serendipitous 
appropriation and reuse can occur.  
This requires narrower rights, with gaps and discontinuities between them. A logically 
discontinuous copyright law – a regime characterised by incomplete rights, by logical 
gaps that permit imitation and reworking, is exactly what is required.  
This is easy to say but very hard to do for three reasons. We resist setting limits on 
rights, and this resistance is deeply embedded in the form of legal reasoning our 
culture prizes most highly. I will illustrate it with an anecdote. The other day I asked 
students in my upper level seminar to describe their law school exam taking strategy. I 
asked them to imagine that they were taking an exam in some non-copyright-related 
subject like torts or constitutional law, and they had been given a long complicated 
fact-pattern and asked whether the plaintiff would succeed with any number of 
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theories of relief. I asked, do you think you would get a better grade by arguing that the 
plaintiff could succeed or fail? They unanimously agreed that they thought they would 
get better grades by attempting to show how the plaintiff could succeed even if it 
required an expansion of the grounds recognised by the law as the basis for recovery.  
Now, to some extent, this response reflects successful internalisation of the common 
law method of flexible incrementalism that is so beloved of our Anglo-American legal 
system. To some extent, it reflects successful internalisation of the principle that you 
should seek to please your clients, by getting rights extended if necessary. But students 
also understood arguments for extension as demonstrating more skill at lawyering, 
and more true understanding of the subject matter. You really understand torts, or 
you really understand constitutional rights, or whatever, when you can explain why a 
particular rule really extends to cover situations to which it has never before been 
applied. That’s what lawyers do, and skill at doing it is a key indicator of professional 
and intellectual excellence. Within that analytical frame, it makes sense that arbitrary 
barriers to copyright expansion, for example, should fall away before the relentless 
logic of good lawyering.  
The second reason that we resist setting limits on copyright stems from a set of 
convictions that are essentially technocratic. We believe that if we try hard enough, we 
can define in an extraordinarily precise fashion the rules of a good copyright system. If 
we really use our language to the full extent of our ability, we can define rules that 
separate the economic exploiters from everyday users – the people who make the good 
technology from the people who make the bad technology, and so on. When those 
technocratic instincts are coupled with our expansionist inclinations, the result is a 
seemingly iron-clad case for broad open-ended rights with narrow precisely defined 
exceptions.  
The third reason, the icing on the cake, is what I call a naïve restitutionary impulse, the 
idea that commercial gain to anyone other than the right holder constitutes an injury 
that demands compensation, so that the right holder can be made whole. If we need to 
expand copyrights to do this, then we ought to do it. Yet there is a deep irony here. 
When we commit ourselves to a legal methodology that treats limited, discontinuous 
rights as logically disreputable, no matter what the context, we detach means from 
ends. When you have competing, equally important goods on both sides of the 
equation, as we do in copyright, it becomes impossible to balance the competing and 
equally important interests that the copyright system must serve.  
In order to have a good copyright law that is logically discontinuous in the way I just 
described, we need to invert some of those most fundamental assumptions. I think 
that this quite a tall order. 
Thank you very much. 
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INNOVATION POLICY 
 
Dr Terry Cutler 1 
 
INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR BRIAN FITZGERALD 
This session is about copyright and innovation policy. Now Dr Terry Cutler requires 
little introduction to those of you who have an interest in innovation policy and 
practice in Australia. He’s been closely involved in this area for many years.  
For the benefit of our international visitors, I would introduce Terry Cutler by 
explaining that he was the person who was entrusted by the Federal Minister for 
Innovation with the very important, I’d say crucial, job of running a review of our 
national innovation system which commenced in early 2008, just a few months after 
the Rudd Labor Government came to office in late 2007. 
The need for such a review, and the real interest in kick starting innovation in 
Australia was clearly demonstrated by the fact that really, thousands of people turned 
up in person at the public hearings that the Innovation Review convened, right around 
Australia, and the fact that more than 700 written submissions were received, many of 
them very substantive, and it was really an unprecedented number of written 
submissions received to a Review Enquiry.  
So from the perspective, as head of the Innovation Review which consulted widely 
around Australia, Terry really is in a unique position to comment on the relationship 
                                                             
1 Dr Terry Cutler chaired the Australian Government’s 2008 Review of the National Innovation 
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between intellectual property, specifically copyright, and innovation. When we look at 
the relationship between copyright and innovation over the last twenty years, it’s very 
much a story of how copyright applies, or is adapted to apply, to digital materials 
distributed through online networks.  
These issues specifically are exactly the kind of thing that Terry has been writing and 
thinking about for a long time. My first introduction to Terry was through his written 
materials in this area through reports such as Commerce and Content in the early 
1990s. So without more ado I’d like to bring Terry up to the stage. 
DR TERRY CUTLER 
Thank you, I’ll start with an apology if I croak a lot, I’ve got a bad cold. My second 
apology is for not being a lawyer, so I feel quite intimidated to be in such company 
today. 
One of the arguments I think I want to make is in fact the next conference you have 
Brian, should not be opened by an Attorney General, it should be opened by the 
Treasurer. One of the points I’d want to make today is that, to me, intellectual 
property issues, copyright and innovation is all about economic policy and needs to be 
thought of in the context of economic policy.  
I also don’t know why I thought the colour red was appropriate as a background 
today, but perhaps it was because of the incitement to think about freedom and cry 
freedom. I think one of the interesting issues when we talk about freedom is the 
wonderful phrase that Amartya Sen, the great development economist, coined when 
he talked about unfreedoms. The lack of access as a barrier to development at all levels. 
I think unfreedoms is a very useful way to think about some of the issues we’re talking 
about today.  
I want to make some really very simple observations today, but I think it’s often good 
to go back to basics. The first point I want to make is that when you think about 
innovation and innovation policy, we often think in Pollyanna-like terms that 
innovation is good, but we need to remind ourselves that it is in fact not morally 
neutral at all. If you think about some of the messes we’re in today, they were all 
caused by innovation. The global financial crisis was a dazzling example of how 
innovative financial instruments crippled an economic system. Think about 200 years 
of breakneck technology innovation that has produced the global warming problems 
we have today. So innovation is not a good or a bad thing in itself, it depends on the 
purposes to which we are directing it. So it’s about purposeful change. 
The second point is that innovation is all about the clash of vested interests. I think we 
spend too little time articulating the nature of these vested interests and what they 
involve. During the review last year, one of the interesting things we did was to say to 
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people making submissions “You can only make your submission if you actually 
declare your interest in what you are submitting about”. It was a modest attempt to 
put some of these issues on the table.  
At the core of the problem here, when we talk about innovation and change, it is about 
the problems of incumbency of established interests, and the often weak voice of 
people trying to introduce something new, the insurgents if you like. So it is 
fundamentally about conflict and vested interest, and I think we need to be far more 
up front about what’s involved here.  
Now this is not only vested interest in the marketplace, we also have vested 
institutional interests. One of my disappointments, I suppose, with the Government’s 
response to our Innovation Review, is the institutional push back we’ve seen from our 
proposals to create a new focus for innovation within central Government, and 
particularly our proposal for a National Innovation Council at the centre of 
Government.  
We’ve put a lot of emphasis on innovation within the public sector itself, and here 
you’re really talking about public sector reform. Also about rediscovering the 
centrality of public interest in the innovation debate. And here our focus today I think 
is about recognising that so many of the great challenges that our society faces are 
global challenges like climate change, ageing populations, peak oil, food security, can 
only be resolved through massive investment in innovation. 
The third point I want to make is that when we talk about the innovation agenda, I 
think we’re often in danger of ignoring half the picture. During the Innovation Review 
I was often asked what do we mean when we talk about a national innovation system. 
My simplest explanation of an innovation system is to say it’s a bit like the money 
supply. You have stocks of currency, you have bank notes which you can have in a 
vault, but they actually have absolutely no value until they’re in circulation. It is all 
about circulation that matters, the flows as well as the stocks. Often we focus all our 
attention on investment in the stock of innovation, whether its talent pools, human 
capital facilities, or even information and data. We pay too little attention to the issues 
of flows, the networks that we talked about before. Anything from social networks, 
information flows, trusted transactions, and crucially, access. So the core of innovation 
policy is this notion of the importance of information flows, and information 
networks. 
The fourth point I wanted to make is that Australia has a particular innovation 
challenge. We often don’t face up to the hard realities that everything is going against 
Australia as a country when you look at the map. I love this NASA earthlights map, 
because it really does put us in our place. We’re right at the end of the line in the 
wrong hemisphere. In real estate terms of location, we fail. Also, though, we’re a huge 
country with a very low population density. This means we have a huge disadvantage 
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in terms of infrastructure overhead requirements that are much, much higher than in 
virtually any other country. And we’re a long way from our major markets.  
We’re also a very small economy. On any major metric we represent about 2% global 
market share. What we often neglect to think about is, “Okay, if we produce 2% of the 
world’s new knowledge and innovation in R&D, how do we best access the 98% that is 
being produced elsewhere in the world?” That is one of the greatest innovation and 
public policy challenges I think small country economies like Australia have, and one 
which is very seldom addressed.  
This is not a level playing field, and it seems one of the great challenges we still have to 
come to grips with is how do we avoid being a chronic intellectual property price 
taker, where other people set the price and the terms of access to that 98% of 
knowledge not produced here. Not a level playing field so we need to think carefully 
about what are the David and Goliath strategies that we need as a small player. Again, I 
think we spend far too little time thinking about those. But what does that mean for 
copyright policy for intellectual property rights and policy in a small country economy 
like Australia? And are our intellectual property interests best served by those defined 
by the world’s dominant intellectual property markets? 
My fifth point is that innovation thrives in a free trade environment, and we need a 
free trade of knowledge. When we talk about systems we need to distinguish between 
open and closed systems. Closed systems do not produce innovation. In fact one of my 
favourite throw away lines comes from William Blake where he describes closed 
system as stagnant pools which breed reptiles of the mind. An open system by contrast 
is where you have active feedback loops, it is about open networks. Again that concept 
of network information and how we promote that with our intellectual property 
thinking is a crucial challenge I think for all of us. 
I want to get back to the point I started with, that we need to think about intellectual 
property issues outside of narrow legal frameworks. Copyright information knowledge 
is at the core of a economic agenda and we need to think about it in the same way as 
we think about competition policy and issues around open access that we talk about in 
most other areas of competition policy, particularly with respect to utilities, whether 
it’s telecommunications, water, electricity, or I would suggest, information and 
knowledge.  
Now information flows, therefore, I see as being at the heart of any innovation system. 
That means that information access is a central issue underpinning freedoms to 
innovate. There are three areas that I think we need to look at here. First of all the issue 
about freedom to access prior art and knowledge. We all know that knowledge builds 
on knowledge, it’s a cumulative process. Unless we can build and preserve and have 
access to that accumulated knowledge efficiently, including economically efficiently, 
we’re shooting ourselves in the foot. 
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A secondary issue that is important about this freedom to access prior art and 
knowledge is around the role of publicly funded content, and access to public sector 
information. I think we’ve talked about that at conferences like this for many years 
now, and it’s time we actually did something about it.  
The second aspect of information flows and information access is around search and 
navigation. It is about finding relevant information for the problem solving that you’re 
addressing. So issues around format, discoverability. If you like, global positioning 
systems for information and knowledge are absolutely crucial. I don’t think we pay 
enough attention to the issues of search and navigation within our innovation 
frameworks.  
Finally, innovation only delivers economic and social benefit when its diffused and put 
to use. So diffusion and the ability of end users to pick up, absorb, and adapt, and use 
knowledge and ideas is absolutely fundamental to any innovation policy framework. So 
the issues of usability and remix therefore become central issues for us to think about. 
So I’ve suggested that innovation and IP law are not morally neutral. Innovation is about 
the conflict of vested interests and we need to identify and look at those interests. It is 
about change versus incumbency. We need to really put a focus on the importance of 
information flows, information networks and access as crucial issues in any innovation 
agenda. We need to rise to the 2% challenge that everyone in Australia faces, of how we 
access the 98% generated and held elsewhere. How do we avoid being an IP price taker? 
We need to recognise the importance of open systems and feedback loops.  
So my bottom line is that when the circulation stops, when the circulation of 
information stops, innovation dies. So information policy therefore needs to be at the 
centre of any national innovation strategy, which is why in our review last year, we called 
for a far more active focus on a national information policy framework and strategies. It 
seems to me that one of the challenges here is that no-one in Government is really taking 
ownership or responsibility for the sort of issues I’ve been outlining. It’s like an 
orphaned policy area. It’s a challenge because it’s an area where we do need a whole of 
Government framework and way of thinking about this. A national information policy is 
something that affects every aspect of Government, as does innovation itself.  
It strikes me, as I was thinking about this, that it’s ironic that in a digital economy, 
information policies should be a central policy priority. I think we’ve gone backwards 
over the last decade or so. I was recalling that in the mid 1990s, when we were 
confronting the emergence of the internet, and trying to think about the policy 
implications and what sort of policy frameworks we should develop around the 
internet, we had far more coherent responses and approaches than we do today. 
Perhaps it’s because I’ve got a vested interest, but I remember the Government of the 
day set up an Information Policy Advisory Council, which I chaired, to address the 
frameworks for internet regulation, or to make sure in fact that we didn’t 
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inappropriately constrain the development of the online world with inappropriate 
regulation.  
We established the national office for the information economy as a whole of 
Government executive agencies, to make sure that a coherent approach to information 
policy was developed and implemented. Now I think it’s a great pity that we’ve let that 
policy focus lapse. I don’t think we’re going to have the right economic or 
development framework around information policy, the right context within which to 
think about copyright and intellectual property issues until we recapture that centrality 
of having a national information strategy. 
Thank you.  
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
QUESTION:  
Dr Cutler I congratulate you on your presentation, and I always ask myself that very 
question. Why aren’t more economists at these sorts of enquiries and meetings? That’s 
really the question I have for you. This is a field which is rich for economists and 
research, and yet we have such paucity of empirical data on the very things that you 
were discussing today. The value of these information flows, not just in terms of 
copyright, but in terms of patent law. Can you explain to me why economists have 
essentially left this area well alone, and allowed lawyers, unfortunately, to dominate? 
TERRY CUTLER 
A very good, and provocative, and brave question in this environment. The short 
answer is I don’t know the answer to your question, because it really puzzles me. I 
think it’s partly a lack of public policy leadership generally. We can all assume some 
blame for not being more active in making this a more mainstream agenda.  
On the other hand, I look back and think you can change over time. Remember a time 
when trade practise were seen to be a narrow preserve of Attorney General’s and 
lawyers, rather than being seen as a central element of economic management, and the 
shift of the responsibility for the Trade Practices Act to Treasury. That’s exactly the 
sort of shift I think we need to see today. If I had one wish it would be that we could 
shift copyright and patent law out of Attorney Generals and put it smack bang into 
Treasury. That would be the recommendation I’d love to see coming forward from this 
conference. 
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QUESTION:  
Hi, thank you very much Terry. I don’t think you quite meant to say take patent law 
out of Attorney General’s because it doesn’t reside there, but it gives me the segue, as 
the Americans say, to my question, which was why Treasury, rather than say the IP 
Australia, which is where patents, plant breeder’s rights, designs and trademarks 
currently reside. I agree with you absolutely that I don’t think Attorney General’s 
Department has covered itself in glory over the last 100 years, and certainly the last 15, 
and 10, and 5 years on copyright policy, I don’t think it has. But Treasury versus say an 
innovation department, why Treasury not the Department of Innovation? 
TERRY CUTLER 
I think because I really want these issues to be looked at in the context of competition 
policy, and because I think the core issues to me go to issues of access. I think the same 
principles we apply to access frameworks in other areas of competition policy could 
very usefully be applied to intellectual property issues. 
QUESTION:  
Terry, Oliver Freeman. I’d just like to add something here. I welcome the emphasis of 
what you’ve been saying of course, I’m just wondering whether you’re going far 
enough. It seems to me we have a big issue with economists at the moment. They are 
rather on the nose in terms of what’s happened in the last 12 months, and I’m not sure 
that I would like our future to be delivered from lawyers to economists. 
TERRY CUTLER 
There is a difference between economists and financial engineers. 
QUESTION:  
Okay, but I want to add two things. There seem to be two other planks that we’re 
missing here. The first is all about a world in which some of us feel we’ve reached a 
stage of enoughism. That is a sense that we are depleting the resources of our planet in 
an unregulated and stupid kind of way, and that the whole issue around sustainability 
– and I’m not taking a narrow ecological view of sustainability – I’m talking about 
strategic alignment between the way we live our lives, and what the life we want to live 
has to offer us back. So there’s a whole issue about sustainability. 
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The other issue, which of course is already implicit in the title of this conference, is to 
do with social equity. It seems to me I don’t want to go into bat with the economists 
with our social equity and sustainability in the same frame, thank you. 
TERRY CUTLER 
Both really terrific points. When I think about open systems I think about open 
societies. So I think innovation is inherently around a democratic instinct, and that’s 
very important. Your first point is also incredibly important, and I probably didn’t 
emphasise it enough. You’re quite right. The great challenge for our age is around 
sustainability. When you think about how we’re going to resolve those challenges, we 
need massively different approaches to the way we do science, the way we collaborate, 
the way we share knowledge. I think that needs to become a mainstream part of the 
agenda at discussions like this. So I totally agree with you. 
QUESTION:  
Thanks very much, Tim Hollow, I’m an advisor to the Australian Greens and thank 
you for that wonderful presentation. One of the things that I picked up on what your 
point about the incredible need for public interest research and innovation. I guess I’d 
ask if you’ve got any policy prescriptions for how one rediscovers that. Obviously we 
have a situation, as you yourself have discovered in your career, you noted that even 
within the public sector you get these stagnant pools breeding reptiles of the mind, and 
you get Government directed research and innovation which actually constricts where 
we’re going, which through public policy, directs innovation into areas where it might 
not be best placed. So do you have any prescriptions for how you might actually get 
around that? 
TERRY CUTLER 
In our report last year we spent quite a bit of space talking about promoting 
innovation in the public sector. Part of it is through the promotion of experimentation 
and freeing up scope for bottom up pilot activity and so forth. There’s been a lot of 
work done, particularly in recent years in the UK, that I think gives us role models. 
One of the crucial things is actually to give people permission to innovate. One idea 
being pushed very much in the UK is the notion of having almost an Innovation 
Ombudsman who can unplug all the nay sayers and blockers, and have an override for 
innovative proposals. Essentially, it’s a leadership issue at the end of the day, like all 
these things are. 
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RELATIONSHIP AND COMMUNALITY: AN 
INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE 
AND EXPRESSION 
 
Maroochy Barambah1  
 
PROFESSOR ANNE FITZGERALD  
We’re going to talk about indigenous peoples and law, and this session is going to be 
chaired by Dr Terry Cutler. I don’t think Terry needs any further introduction to you, 
and I’m sure this is going to be a fascinating session.  
Maroochy Barambah and Ade Kukoyi have been known to me and Brian for many 
years. In fact I actually first met Maroochy in New York when she was studying opera 
singing there. The film in which she starred, Black River, had actually just won the 
Paris Opera Film of the Year Award. The commentator for this session will be 
Professor Susy Frankel from New Zealand, who’s been very much involved with 
indigenous IP issues in New Zealand. 
Terry, over to you. 
DR TERRY CUTLER 
Thank you Anne. 
It gives me huge pleasure to chair this session. At the beginning of our conference we 
had a very moving welcome to country. Then we tend to proceed to marginalise, or 
make very unwelcome, any discussion that isn’t within an Anglo-Saxon, or a 
Commonwealth Club framework. I think one of the great gaps in public policy 
discussion in Australia is our neglect of this whole area of traditional knowledge and 
the role of indigenous people in intellectual property discussions. This is even worse I 
                                                             
1 Maroochy Barambah is an Australian Aboriginal mezzo-soprano singer and songwoman and 
law-woman of the Turrbal-Dippil people from the Brisbane region. She performed in the 
acclaimed Australian Metropolitan Opera production Black River in 1989. 
156 
think as we sit in a region where this is a very real issue. So this session is I think very 
important in putting a neglected area on the agenda.  
Let me just briefly tell you a story about a discussion I had recently that really brought 
the importance of this home to me. It was with a fabulous Indian scientist who, a few 
years ago, saw that an American drug company was trying to patent some of the 
components of turmeric, a traditional herbal remedy in India. So he challenged the 
patent, and he did so on the basis of digging out all these old Sanskrit scripts that 
referred to traditional healing, and established through those scripts the prior art that 
had existed. Now of course when we get to areas of oral tradition, and when we get to 
areas like music, performance, that is so much harder.  
I’m really delighted to welcome Maroochy and Ade who are going to talk about what 
they’ve been doing. So can you please welcome them.2 
MAROOCHY BARAMBAH 
Let me begin by paying my respects to the Ngunnawal people and the ancestral spirits 
of this land for letting us be here in their country. I thank Brian Fitzgerald and his 
colleagues for their tremendous effort in organising this conference, and inviting me 
to share some of my knowledge and experience in this jurisdiction with all of you.  
I am the Songwoman and the Law-woman of the Turrbal people – the original people 
of Brisbane. I will share with you later about my role. For the benefit of our delegates 
I’ll just tell you a bit about my country. I was going to show you where it is on a map, 
but we had some problems trying to locate one. Nonetheless, I’ll talk about it now. Our 
ancestral homeland extends from Elimbah Creek/Beerburrum Creek in the north, to 
the Logan River in the south; from the Pullenvale catchment in the west, and 
Woogaroo Creek in the south-west; to the Moreton Bay in the east. Within the Turrbal 
tribe were smaller family groups which are often referred to as “clans”. Today, rather 
than use the term “clans”, Aboriginal Australians use “mobs”. Some of you may have 
heard of this term.  
Within the Turrbal country, for example, we had the Daki Yakka mob which occupied 
the Brisbane City to the Pine River in the north; the Dalaipi mob which occupied the 
North Pine/Caboolture areas; the Mulrobin mob which occupied the southside of the 
Brisbane River / Coorpooroo areas; the Yerongpan mob which occupied the 
Yerongpilly / south-west Brisbane area; the Chepara mob which occupied the area 
                                                             
2 Maroochy Barumbah presented with Ade Kukoyi, founding president of the Australia-Nigeria 
Business Council, and native title lawyer assisting the Turrbal people. Ade answered questions 
after Maroochy’s speech. 
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south to Logan; and the Ningy Ningy mob which occupied the Redcliffe/Deception Bay 
and the Toorbul Point areas. That is our ancestral homeland. 
In approaching this topic, I felt I should begin by sharing with you some of the 
fundamental principles of the Turrbal system of traditional laws and customs. It is 
only within this context that our traditional knowledge, expression and what I refer to 
as “land-people relationship” can best be understood.  
Our laws are unwritten – they are kept in songs, stories, dances, paintings … etc. and 
passed down from one generation to the next. 
 In my view, a great deal of misconception continues to exist in this area, the more so 
among contemporary writers such as anthropologists, and then there are the 
historians and others, who are merely curious about Australian Aborigines. Let me say 
up-front, and with all due respect to the delegates here today, that, unless you live for a 
considerable period of time in our community, you will not fully appreciate, as well as 
comprehend, the true workings of our traditional laws and customs. There is an 
incomparable gap between what I call “living it” and “merely observing or examining/ 
analysing it”.  
TURRBAL TRADITIONAL LAWS AND CUSTOMS 
Certain elements constitute our system of traditional laws and customs, such as: 
Bloodline Connection to Country; Invitation to Enter Country; Permission to Enter 
Country; Who can Speak for Country; Kinship system; Marriage; Totemic identity; 
Proprietary issues. In essence what we have is a very complex layering of numerous 
elements, processes and inter-relationships that are kinship-based and totemic-related. 
What does this mean I hear you say?  
In short, our system of customary law is underpinned by religious practices, beliefs 
and values which are pre-determined by one’s totemic identity at birth. It is completely 
different from the Anglo-Australian legal system and pointless somewhat for anyone 
to try to make comparison. Obviously, I cannot possibly share all you need to know in 
my allotted time. My intention is to focus mainly on some key aspects. Before 
discussing our kinship system, let me turn my attention first to my role as a 
Songwoman. 
SONGWOMAN’S ROLE 
As a Songwoman and a Law-woman, it is my responsibility to educate, inform and 
enlighten other members of our community in customary law matters. I also have the 
responsibility to protect as well as enforce our laws and customs. Under Turrbal 
traditional laws and customs, our laws are kept in songs, stories and dances. Those 
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songs, stories and dances have come down through generations – dreaming stories 
that we still hold, that have been handed down to us.  
I was born on a reserve because the Queensland Government had an Act called 
Aborigines Protection Act 1897 (“APA”). Under the APA, the Queensland authorities 
went around the State rounding up people deemed to be of Aboriginal descent, and 
dumped them unceremoniously onto Reserves at the turn of the twentieth century. 
This policy continued up until the 1967 Referendum. There were three main 
Government reserves, namely: Palm Island, Woorabinda and Cherbourg. I was born 
on Cherbourg Reserve. In essence, several people were taken away from their country 
as far away as Cape York to Cherbourg.  
However, some still managed to retain their stories. Ironically, the same 1897 APA 
that was meant to remove Aborigines from their ancestral homeland to Cherbourg 
and elsewhere was also instrumental and contributory to the Turrbal, Gubbi Gubbi 
and Wakka Wakka Peoples’ continued physical connection to country. Unlike what 
happened with the Stolen Generation –where people of mixed race were taken away 
from their parents and ties severed completely from country, our cultural network and 
activities flourished on the Cherbourg Reserve.  
In the case of the APA, it was mainly full bloods and half caste that were removed and 
taken to the reserves. If you had less than 50% Aboriginal blood in you, you didn’t 
qualify for protection under the APA – this was the Assimilation policy of the day. So, 
today there are some people of Aboriginal descent who are going around now trying to 
reconnect with their Aboriginal ancestry, but they’ve lost that connection. Some I 
suppose will never make that connection, but there are others who will, or whose old 
people may reconnect with them spiritually and be able to point them in the right 
direction – this is very much a personal journey for such people in life. As a 
Songwoman, I have been privileged to assist some individuals over the years in their 
search to reconnect.  
I myself was taken to Melbourne – some 2,000 miles away from Cherbourg. However, 
I maintained my contact and connection with my Elders and family.  
It is not uncommon today to find Aboriginal people wanting to go back to that place 
where their old people came from – it’s a spiritual calling. Yeah, that’s something that 
I’ve experienced myself, and I’ve seen it with some other people. I also know that there 
are lots of other people still searching. That’s just a little side story of land-people 
relationship. That old connection with Aboriginal laws and customs, with the songs 
and dances, people have to get permission to do this, you have to talk to certain elders. 
We have certain protocols within our society, even though we’re a city-based, 
traditional owner group.  
On the question of permission to enter country, just a couple of days ago, I was filling 
up petrol in my car at a petrol station. A gentleman came up to me, shook my hand 
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and asked me: “What are you doing now”? I replied: “I’m working with my mum on 
her native title claim because we are the original people from Brisbane”. He then asked 
me “Oh, can I stay in your country”? “Can I stay here”? He was Aboriginal. Initially, it 
didn’t dawn on me exactly what he meant by “can I stay in your country”.  
Upon clarification, I realised that he was seeking permission from me as a Turrbal 
Songwoman to live in my country. So things are gradually changing, I believe, for the 
better. We now receive this type of request from people in Brisbane all the time – “Can 
I stay in your country?” I don’t think that would have happened that much pre-Mabo. 
These days, I perform many traditional Welcome to Country ceremonies in Brisbane 
to give permission to visitors entering our ancestral homeland in Brisbane. 
I now turn my attention to other important aspects of our laws and customs. 
KINSHIP SYSTEM  
Our kinship system comprises the Turrbal and the Dippil people. The people who 
comprise the Dippil are commonly referred to today as the Gubbi Gubbi (Gabi Gabi or 
Kabi Kabi) and the Wakka Wakka. The Gubbi Gubbi People are from the Wide Bay 
area and the Sunshine Coast area of Queensland; whilst the Wakka Wakka People are 
from the Burnett River area. The Turrbal, Gubbi Gubbi and Wakka Wakka Peoples 
belong to the same kinship, and historically marriage was common among these three 
different tribes.  
A strong cultural network also exists within this kinship – for example, during 
Kurbingai3 ceremony at Redcliffe. Within these groups are smaller groups. “Hard 
yakka” got its name from our group. “Yakka” means to work, to work hard. I suppose 
the name came into English when Brisbane was a penal settlement, Moreton Bay, and 
as we say in Queensland, old Murri/Goori probably saw the convicts chipping away 
there, trying to break the stones to make the roads and things like that. So it was, that 
one of the very early words that the broader, non-Aboriginal people of Australia, got 
to know, from around the Brisbane area, was “yakka”.  
That was one of our words that had become very much a part of the Australian 
vernacular these days. It’s also become a brand name of a successful clothing line. So, 
maybe we should be looking at something there in copyright terms. No, just joking. 
Daki Yakka was the name of my great, great, great, great grandfather. His name 
gradually became anglicised to the “Duke of York”, and if you look in history books of 
early Queensland in particular, and maps of Aboriginal tribes, you’ll see the reference 
to the Duke of York tribe. Daki Yakka was the head man of the Brisbane tribe, and 
                                                             
3 See C.C Petrie, Tom Petrie’s Reminiscences of Early Queensland, UQP, 1904, pp. 37–38 
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back in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s he was called the Chief of the Brisbane tribe. I’m 
his direct descendant.  
DREAMING TRACKS 
Dreaming Tracks and Dreaming Sites are an integral part of our connection to country 
(the land-people relationship). Embedded within the Dreaming Tracks and Dreaming 
Places is our belief system which regulates what we ought to do and not do. Under our 
laws and customs for example, places such as Fisherman Island (Yangan), Mt Coot-tha 
(Kuta) and Spring Hill (Taggan) – remain culturally significant to us irrespective of 
any structure/s or development which may be erected upon them. At this point in 
time, I do not know if you are aware that the Port of Brisbane situated at Fisherman 
Island is on the list of assets earmarked for sale by the Bligh Government in 
Queensland. The Turrbal People are opposed to this proposed sale because Fisherman 
Island is a healing site4. Further, such an act contravenes our traditional laws and 
customs.  
So, our Dreaming Tracks are very important; the kinship system is also very 
important. Our cultural network is most important. Historically, in southern 
Queensland, there’s a place called the Bunya Mountains where most of the tribes 
travelled to for the triennial Bunya Festivals. During this time, message sticks were 
sent by the host tribe to other neighbouring tribes, and thus were allowed to cross their 
tribal boundaries in order to be able to travel to the Bunya Mountains.  
TOTEMIC IDENTITY 
Maroochy means the “red nose one” in Turrbal language. It refers to the black swan 
which is my totem. By this, I have the responsibility of taking care of sites along the 
Brisbane River dreaming track to Maroochy River on the Sunshine Coast. 
Consequently, I frequently visit Dowse Lagoon at Sandgate (north of Brisbane) where 
black swans abound aplenty. Under our traditional laws and customs, black swans are 
my spirit sisters and brothers.  
Let me conclude my presentation by saying that I am hopeful that more non-
Aboriginal Australians will get to learn about our laws and customs. In doing so, they 
get to understand it, and in the process get to show more respect for our beliefs and 
value system. We don’t expect non-Aboriginals to fully comprehend every aspect of 
our traditional laws and customs. Personally, I am of the view that we are at a stage 
                                                             
4 See C.C Petrie, Tom Petrie’s Reminiscences of Early Queensland, UQP, 1904, pp. 65–66. 
Traditional knowledge possessed by the appropriate Turrbal People corroborates Petrie’s 
accounts. 
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where the Anglo-Australian law and our traditional laws and customs are trying to co-
exist. Whether the two systems meet in the middle or not remains to be seen. We are 
all trying to figure out where the pendulum should sit. Perhaps time will tell. That 
would go on, I think for some time yet. 
Thank you all for listening. 
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CROWN COPYRIGHT   
 
Anne Fitzgerald 1 
 
 
Copyright protects much of the creative, cultural, educational, scientific and 
informational material generated by federal, State/Territory and local governments 
and their constituent departments and agencies.  Governments at all levels develop, 
manage and distribute a vast array of materials in the form of documents, reports, 
websites, datasets and databases on CD or DVD and files that can be downloaded from 
a website.  
Under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) , with few exceptions government copyright is 
treated the same as copyright owned by non-parties insofar as the range of protected 
materials and the exclusive proprietary rights attaching to them are concerned. 
However, the rationale for recognizing copyright in public sector materials and vesting 
ownership of copyright in governments is fundamentally different to the main 
rationales underpinning copyright generally. The central justification for recognizing 
Crown copyright is to ensure that government documents and materials created for 
public administrative purposes are disseminated in an accurate and reliable form. 
Consequently, the exclusive rights held by governments as copyright owners must be 
exercised in a manner consistent with the rationale for conferring copyright ownership 
on them. Since Crown copyright exists primarily to ensure that documents and 
materials produced for use in the conduct of government are circulated in an accurate 
and reliable form, governments should exercise their exclusive rights to ensure that 
their copyright materials are made available for access and reuse, in accordance with 
any laws and policies relating to access to public sector materials.  While copyright law 
                                                             
1 Anne Fitzgerald LLB (Hons) (Tas) LLM (London) LLM, JSD (Columbia University) is a 
Professor in Law Research at Queensland University Law School where she is involved in 
research on several projects including access to public sector information. Anne was a member of 
Australia’s two principal federal government-appointed standing advisory committees on 
intellectual property: the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property which advised IP Australia 
from 1996 to 1999 and the Copyright Law Review Committee’s Expert Advisory Group (1995 to 
1998). She participated in the CLRC’s major review (“the simplification reference”) of the 
Copyright Act. 
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vests copyright owners with extensive bundles of exclusive rights which can be 
exercised to prevent others making use of the copyright material, in the case of Crown 
copyright materials these rights should rarely be asserted by government to deviate 
from the general rule that Crown copyright materials will be available for “full and free 
reproduction” by the community at large.   
GOVERNMENT COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
Ownership of copyright by government agencies is dealt with in Part VII of the 
Copyright Act 1968  (Cth) (the “Crown copyright” provisions).2  While the power to 
legislate in relation to copyright is a concurrent power under s 51 (xviii) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, s 109 provides that “when a law of a State is inconsistent 
with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be invalid”.   Since the Commonwealth has enacted a 
comprehensive legislative framework governing copyright, any State legislation 
dealing with subsistence, ownership or infringement of copyright or limits to its scope 
would be invalid by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution.    
The principal provisions on which government copyright is based are ss 176 – 179 of 
the Copyright Act 1968.   Sections 176 and 178 provide that the government owns 
copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound recordings and films 
“made by, or under the direction or control of the Commonwealth or a State”. Section 
177 further provides that the government owns copyright in a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work that is first published in Australia “by, or under the direction 
or control of, the Commonwealth or a State”.3  The operation of ss 176– 178 can be 
displaced by an agreement between the government and the person who created the 
copyright material that copyright is to belong to that person or some other party 
specified in the agreement.4   The effect of these provisions is that governments own 
copyright in a vast range of materials in hard copy and digital form, including 
legislation, judgments, parliamentary materials, reports of government-commissioned 
                                                             
2 See generally, A Fitzgerald, B Fitzgerald and N Hooper (2010) Enabling open access to public sector 
information with Creative Commons Licences: the Australian Experience, in Access to Public Sector 
Information:  Law, Technology & Policy,  Sydney University Press, eprints.qut.edu.au/29773/; A 
Fitzgerald and K Pappalardo, (2009) “Report to the Government 2.0 Taskforce: Project 4 – Copyright 
Law and Intellectual Property”, eprints.qut.edu.au/29416/. 
3 Sections 176–178 are subject to any agreement between the Crown and the maker of the work 
or subject matter under which it is agreed that copyright is to belong to the author or maker or 
some other specified person (s 179). 
4 Copyright Act 1968, s 179. 
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review bodies, art works, computer programs, digital databases, photos and 
audiovisual works.5   
These materials come into existence in different ways.  A large amount of material is 
created within government, through the efforts of government employees and other 
persons who are not employed by government but produce copyright materials while 
working as volunteers (for example, interns, students on work experience placements 
and members of emergency services teams6).  However, a significant part of the 
materials held by government is produced externally, by recipients of government 
funding (such as research institutes) and persons who make submissions to inquiries 
and online consultations. Governments commonly commission independent 
contractors to produce materials and enter into arrangements to fund work in 
universities and research institutes that results in output in the form of reports, 
academic publications and data.  An important category of material is prepared by 
non-government parties and lodged with government pursuant to a statutory or 
regulatory direction to provide information or a report (for example, environmental 
impact assessments and information about water use, greenhouse gas emissions and 
results of mineral or petroleum exploration activities).7   
RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENTS AS COPYRIGHT OWNERS 
As the Copyright Act 1968 does not generally differentiate between the rights of 
government as copyright owner and the rights of private parties who own copyright, 
governments enjoy the same range of exclusive rights in their copyright materials as 
private sector copyright owners.8 One of the few points of difference between the 
rights of government and private sector copyright owners is that the duration of 
                                                             
5 For a listing of the various kinds of copyright materials produced by or for governments, see 
Copyright Law Review Committee, Crown Copyright, 2005 at pp 10-11. 
6 For example, emergency services volunteers typically vastly outnumber departmental employees 
(by as much as a factor of 10) and produce risk management plans, incident reports, news 
updates and other copyright materials. 
7 There are numerous examples of documents of this kind, including mining and petroleum 
exploration reports, flood studies, soil surveys, traffic analysis reports, noise studies, cultural 
heritage assessments, environmental impact statements, licence applications (eg for liquor 
licences, certified traders, etc). 
8Section 182 specifically states that, apart from the provisions in Part VII of the Copyright Act 
1968 (in ss 176-181) relating to the subsistence, duration and ownership of copyright, the 
provisions of Part III and Part IV of the Act apply. 
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copyright for materials within the scope of ss 176 – 178 is 50 years from the end of the 
calendar year in which the copyright item is first published or is made.9    
The primary rights of copyright are the rights to: 
 reproduce; 
 publish;  
 publicly perform; 
 make an adaptation; and 
 communicate the copyright work to the public in electronic form (eg on a 
website or as a digital file).10 
Other rights of copyright owners are the rights to ensure that electronic rights 
management information (ERMI) is not removed or altered and to prevent the 
circumvention of technological protection measures (TPM) they apply to their 
copyright materials to control access to or copying of it. ERMI is electronic 
information (including numbers or codes representing such information) which is 
either attached to or embodied in the copyright material, or appears in connection 
with a communication or the making available of the copyright material.11 It typically 
includes information identifying the copyright work, its author or copyright owner or 
indicating the terms and conditions on which the material can be used, or that the use 
of the material is subject to terms or conditions of use.  It is an infringement of the 
copyright owner’s rights to remove or alter ERMI relating to a copyright work or other 
subject matter without the permission of the copyright owner or exclusive licensee, if 
the person doing the act knows or ought reasonably to have known that the removal 
or alteration would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of copyright.12 
In certain circumstances the removal or altering ERMI relating to a copyright work 
may be a criminal offence under the Copyright Act.13 The anti-circumvention 
provisions enable copyright owners to protect their materials by applying technical 
measures that control access to or copying of the work. It is an infringement to 
knowingly deal in devices designed to circumvent TPMs14 and, where the TPM 
                                                             
9 Copyright Act 1968, ss 180, 181. 
10 Copyright Act 1968, ss 31, 85-88. 
11 The main provisions dealing with ERMI are set out in Division 2A, Subdivision B of the 
Copyright Act 1968. Section 116D sets out the legal remedies (including an injunction or 
damages) available for the removal of and interference with ERMI.  
12 Copyright Act 1968, ss 116B-116D. 
13 Copyright Act 1968, ss 132AQ-132AS. 
14 Copyright Act 1968, s 116AO(1). 
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controls access to a copyright work, it is an infringement to knowingly circumvent the 
TPM.15 
As well as the rights described above, individual authors of copyright works can 
exercise moral rights, which are personal to the author and cannot be transferred. 
Although government does not, itself, have moral rights, it may own copyright in 
materials in respect of which individual authors can continue to exercise their moral 
rights. This situation may arise where government obtains an assignment of copyright 
in materials that have been produced by an individual author who has not agreed to 
waive the exercise of their moral rights.  As moral rights cannot be assigned, if the 
author has not agreed to waive them, they will continue to be exercisable by the 
author. The moral rights that can be exercised by individual authors are the rights:    
 of attribution, that is to be attributed (accredited) as the author of the work, 
where reasonable;  
 to object to false attribution, that is to prevent someone else being wrongly 
identified as the author of the work; and  
 of integrity, that is to prevent derogatory treatment of the work that would 
prejudice the author’s reputation.16 
RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
Although the rights exercisable by governments as copyright owners under the 
provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are for most purposes identical to those of 
private parties, there are fundamental differences between government and private 
copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not generally differentiate between 
public and private sector parties either with respect to the scope of materials in which 
copyright subsists or the exclusive rights that can be exercised in respect of them.  
However, it would be a mistake to assume that government copyright is exactly the 
same as copyright in non-government materials.  Although statutory recognition of 
government copyright ownership was introduced into Australian copyright law in 
1912 when the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) was adopted in Australia (No. 20 of 1912), the 
rationale for copyright in government materials is quite different from the reasons 
why copyright in recognized in materials produced by individual authors and private 
sector organizations. 
 An obvious point of difference is that, since many government materials (eg reports, 
legislation, handbooks) are created in the ordinary course of activities by parliament, 
the courts and government agencies, the traditional justification of copyright as 
                                                             
15 Copyright Act 1968, s 116AN(1). 
16 Copyright Act 1968, Part IX, ss 189-195AZR. 
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providing an incentive to produce and disseminate new information is much less 
relevant than for works produced by publishers with the expectation of a commercial 
return.17  In fact, discussion of government copyright is strikingly lacking in the usual 
rationales for recognition of copyright generally such as encouragement of innovation 
or enterprise for commercial benefit; reward of creative effort; maximizing 
commercial return through sale or licensing; and securing some advantage through 
the exercise of the exclusive rights. 
As observed by the Copyright Law Review (CLRC) in its Crown Copyright report 
(2005), works such as legislation and judgments “will be produced regardless of 
financial incentives, and therefore the traditional justification for copyright ownership 
does not apply”.  Similarly the Prices Surveillance Authority in its report, Inquiry into 
the Publications Pricing Policy of the Australian Government Publishing Service (1992), 
observed that the traditional rationale behind copyright law does not apply to material 
produced by the government itself: 
There appears to be less justification for the existence of Crown copyright 
than copyright in general ... The information being copyrighted has been 
developed not by private individuals but by tax payer funded sources. 
Copyright monopoly rights are not necessary to ensure incentive for 
adequate developments of such information. It is information produced 
using public money to facilitate government. Such information should be 
freely available.18  
Government copyright has its origins in the Crown prerogative.19 The scope of the 
Crown prerogatives is uncertain, and they may change over time.  It is generally 
accepted that the prerogatives are not lost by disuse but must be expressly removed by 
statute.20  The Crown prerogative in the nature of copyright arose from the Crown’s 
role in “ensur[ing] the integrity and authenticity of official government 
publications”.21  As Monotti explains, from the late 18th century:  
                                                             
17 Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC), Crown Copyright, 2005, para 4.23 at p38:  
www.clrc.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/RWPBB79ED8E4858F514CA25735100827559 .  
18 Prices Surveillance Authority, Inquiry into the Publications Pricing Policy of the Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Report No. 47, 19 December 1992, at p 91.  
19 For discussion of the Crown prerogative, see CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, Chapter 6. See also 
J Gilchrist, Crown Copyright: An Analysis of rights vesting in the Crown under statute and 
common law and their interrelationship, LLM thesis, Monash University,  1983; H V Evatt, The 
Royal Prerogative, Law Book Co, 1987 (publication of H V Evatt’s doctoral thesis, Certain aspects 
of the Royal Prerogative: a study in constitutional law, 1924). 
20 See CLRC, Crown Copyright, Chapter 6, at pp 90–91. 
21 CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, para 4.66 at p 53. 
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a consistent theme emerged, namely that the sovereign has a duty, based on 
the grounds of public utility and necessity, to superintend and ensure 
authentic and accurate publication of matters of national and public 
concern relating to the government, state and the Church of England. That 
duty carries with it a corresponding prerogative which is not specifically 
defined in any of the cases, but clearly extends to publishing and printing 
that material.22   
This understanding of the prerogative accords with the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales in Attorney-General (NSW) v Butterworth & Co (Australia) 
Ltd23, where Long Innes CJ stated that the Crown prerogative stems from the historic 
duty of the monarch “to superintend the publication of acts of the legislature and acts 
of state of that description, carrying with it a corresponding prerogative”.24  Over the 
years, the scope of the prerogative was cut back, such that, as explained in Copyright 
Agency Limited v State of New South Wales: 25 
[b]y 1911 the Crown only claimed the exclusive right to publish the 
following works:  the authorised version of the Bible (The Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge v Richardson (1802) 6 Ves 689; (1802) 31 ER 1260); 
Acts of Parliament (Basket v Cambridge University (1758) 1 W Bl 105; 
(1758) 96 ER 59); proclamations (Grierson v Jackson (1794) Ridg. L. & S. 
304); law books (Roper v Streater (1672) Skin 234; discussed in (1672) 90 ER 
107); Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303; (1769) 98 ER 201); almanacs 
(Gurney v Longman (1806) 13 Ves 493; (1806) 33 ER 379); and what were 
compendiously described as government publications. 
The Crown prerogative is preserved under s 8A of the Copyright Act 196826 and its 
operation is not otherwise affected by the Act.  
These insights into the nature of the Crown prerogative with respect to official 
documents resonate with a theme that permeates the commentary on statutory Crown 
copyright in Australia and other jurisdictions:  continued recognition of government 
copyright is justified by the “need to ensure the integrity and authenticity of official 
                                                             
22 See A Monotti, Nature and Basis of Crown Copyright in Official Publications [1992] 9 EIPR 305, 
at pp 306-307.  Note though that, in Australia, the Crown prerogative was never considered to 
apply to religious works, as there is no established state religion: CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005 at 
para 6.07, p 88. 
23 (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 195.  
24 Ibid, p. 229. 
25 [2007] FCAFC 80 per Finkelstein J at para 179.  
26 Section 8A was inserted into the Act by the Copyright Amendment Act 1980.  Previously, Crown 
prerogative was preserved by s 8(2) of the Copyright Act 1968. 
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government publications”.27   The need to ensure the reproduction and distribution of 
government materials in an accurate and reliable form is a constant concern in 
discussions about the existence and exercise of government copyright.  Familiar 
phrases recur: the need to ensure the authentic and accurate publication of documents, 
to be able to rely on the veracity and accuracy of government materials and to indicate 
the status and authority of government materials. 
Academic commentators28 and many submissions to the CLRC’s review of Crown 
copyright supported the view that the integrity and authenticity of government 
copyright materials can be ensured by distribution under copyright licensing 
conditions which enable infringement actions to be brought for misuse or 
misrepresentation of the material.29 For example, the Victorian Government’s 
submission stated that: 
[t]he State must ensure the continued integrity and authenticity of official 
government publications so that the public can be aware of the status of 
each publication. Continuing to maintain Crown copyright is essential to 
achieving [this] outcome.30 
The justification for Crown copyright as providing a safeguard for the “integrity and 
authenticity” of official works has consistently been raised in the United Kingdom 
(even if no further rights existed in such works).31  In 1996, Gordon Robbie (then) 
Head of Copyright in Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), explained: 
[C]opyright is … a means by which copyright holders can ensure that their 
material is used properly and responsibly by third parties. This is of 
particular importance where that material is authoritative, and where the 
general public, in one way or the other, are placing reliance on its veracity 
                                                             
27 See Copyright Law Review Committee, Crown Copyright, 2005 para 4.66 at p 53, available at 
www.clrc.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/RWPBB79ED8E4858F514CA25735100827559 . 
28 See J Gilchrist, The role of government as proprietor and disseminator of information, (1996) vol. 
7, no. 1, Australian Journal of Corporate Law pp 62-79, at p 79. On this point, see also J 
Bannister, Open Access to Legal Sources in Australasia: Current Debate on Crown Copyright and 
the Case of the Anthropomorphic Postbox (1996) 3 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 
(JILT), available at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_3/bannister/. Bannister is 
commenting on Baillieu and Poggioli (of and on behalf of the Liberal Party of Australia, Victorian 
Division) v Australian Electoral Commission and Commonwealth of Australia [1996] FCA 1202.  
29 See CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, footnote 93, para 4.66 at p 53. 
30 See CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, para 4.68, at p 53, referring to Submission 64 at p 1.  
31 See S Picciotto,'Towards Open Access to British Official Documents', 1996 (2) Journal of 
Information Law and Technology (JILT), available at 
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_2/picciotto/.  
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and accuracy. The Copyright Unit [of HMSO] does come across cases of 
abuse and is able to pursue and prevent them.32 
The 1999 UK White Paper, The future management of Crown copyright, referred, 
without explanation, to the need to “preserve the integrity and official status of 
government material”.33 It noted that there was a general perception among the public 
that Crown copyright “operates as a brand or kitemark of quality indicating the status 
and authority of much of the material produced by government”. 34 The justification of 
government copyright “as a means of retaining quality control over PSI and the way it 
is used” was raised more recently in the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading’s 2006 
report, The Commercial Use of Public Information (CUPI), which found that improved 
availability of public sector information for commercial reuse was not incompatible 
with the continued recognition of Crown copyright.35 The CUPI report made 
recommendations on improving the commercial use of PSI without abolishing Crown 
copyright and stated that: 
[i]n fact, the existence of Crown copyright is a key part of the control 
mechanisms which we want to build on to ensure that [public sector 
information holders] act in a fair and transparent manner.36 
A similar approach to the justification for government copyright was taken in a study 
commissioned from KPMG by the Canadian Government in 2001.  The report 
recommended that digital geospatial data should be licensed to users at no cost for use 
and redistribution, and that copyright and licensing should continue to be used to 
protect the quality of geospatial data originating from government agencies, rather 
than to prevent use.37 
                                                             
32 G Robbie, Crown Copyright - Bête Noire or White Knight?, 1996 (2) The Journal of Information 
Law and Technology (JILT), available at 
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_2/special/robbie/.   
33 United Kingdom government, Minister for the Cabinet Office, The future management of 
Crown copyright, Cm 4300, HMSO, 1999 at para 5.1.  See also C Tullo, Crown copyright: the way 
forward – access to public sector information, The Law Librarian, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1998, 200–3, at 
p200. 
34 Ibid, para 5.1. 
35 United Kingdom government, Office of Fair Trading, The Commercial Use of Public 
Information, December 2006, at para 4.74, available at 
www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/publications/reports/consumer-protection/oft861. 
November 2009) . 
36 Ibid, para 4.76. 
37 KPMG Consulting, Executive Summary: Geospatial Data Policy Study - Project Report, 2001, 
recommendation 5 at p 25, available at 
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EXERCISE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS BY GOVERNMENTS 
Although the same set of exclusive rights applies to the same materials, it was not 
intended that those rights would be exercised by governments in the same way as non-
government copyright owners exercise their exclusive rights. Just as the rationale for 
government copyright ownership differs from that for private sector copyright, there is 
clear evidence that it was intended that government rights would be exercised 
primarily to ensure the distribution of government publications in a reliable form.  
Research by Ben Atkinson and John Gilchrist has uncovered historical documents in 
the Federal Government’s archives, which strongly indicate that the concept of Crown 
copyright in United Kingdom and Australian law was, at least from the time it was 
first codified in statutory form, inextricably linked with what would now be termed 
“open content” licensing practices. At the time the first Crown copyright provisions 
were enacted in the United Kingdom and Australia, it was explained that the Crown’s 
rights would be exercised to permit the “full and free reproduction” and widespread 
dissemination of the great bulk of government copyright materials. 38   
A United Kingdom Treasury Minute of 191239 described the practice to be followed to 
give effect to s 18 of the United Kingdom Copyright Act 1911.40 The 1911 Copyright 
Act (UK) was adopted in Australia in 1912  (No 20 of 1912) and s 18 of that Act (the 
precursor to the current Crown copyright provisions in ss 176–179 of the Copyright 
Act) provided that: 
Without prejudice to any rights or privileges of the Crown, where any work 
has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, been prepared 
or published by or under the direction or control of His Majesty or any 
Government department, the copyright in the work shall, subject to any 
agreement with the author, belong to His Majesty, and in such case shall 
continue for a period of fifty years from the date of the first publication of 
the work. [emphasis added] 
                                                                                                                                                    
www.geoconnections.org/programsCommittees/proCom_policy/keyDocs/KPMG/KPMG_E.pdf .  
An earlier report produced for Industry Canada in 1995 by the Information Highway Advisory 
Council, The challenge of the information highway had recommended the retention of Crown 
copyright. See also A A Keyes and C Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the 
Law, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Ottawa, 1977, at p 225.  
38 See B Atkinson, The True History of Copyright: The Australian Experience 1905–2005, Sydney 
University Press, 2007 at p 277; B Fitzgerald, A Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law: 
Technology, Law, and Policy, Lawbook Co/Thomson, Sydney, 2007 at pp 267-268.  
39 Dated 28 June 1912. 
40 1 & 2 Geo 5, Ch 46. 
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An earlier Treasury Minute presented to the House of Commons on 31 August 188741 
had identified seven classes of government publications in which the Crown claimed 
copyright: (1) reports of select committees of Parliament and of Royal Commissions; 
(2) papers required by statute to be laid before Parliament; (3) papers laid before 
Parliament by command; (4) Acts of Parliament; (5) official books; (6) literary and 
quasi-literary works; and (7) charts and ordnance maps. As noted by Finkelstein J in 
Copyright Agency Limited v New South Wales [2007] FCAFC 80 (at para 177):  
According to the Minute, Crown copyright would not be enforced in the 
first five classes but copyright in the last two would be strictly enforced. The 
Minute is reproduced in L.C.F. Oldfield, The Law of Copyright (1912) at 
111–113.  
Publications in the first five categories described in the Minute, such as reports of 
Select Committees or Royal Commissions and Acts of Parliament, were regarded as 
having been produced for the “use and information of the public and it [was] desirable 
that the knowledge of their contents should be diffused as widely as possible”. A 
“general rule permitting full and free reproduction” of such works was to apply and, 
while the rights of the Crown would continue, no steps would ordinarily be taken to 
enforce the Crown’s copyright. For works falling into the latter two categories – “often 
produced [by government] at considerable cost”42 – the government objected to their 
reproduction, “by private enterprise for the benefit of individual publishers”43 and 
made it clear that unauthorised reproduction would incur liability as if “the copyright 
had been in private hands”.44 
In December 1913, a copy of the 1912 UK Treasury Minute was brought to the notice 
of the Commonwealth Government by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to 
provide information on UK practice regarding Crown copyright.  In January 1914, 
Robert Garran, Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, 
wrote to the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, attaching a Minute on 
Crown Copyright and requesting that the Prime Minister communicate with the 
respective State Premiers on the subject. Copies of the United Kingdom Treasury 
                                                             
41 No 335 of 1887. This earlier Treasury Minute was referred to in the 1912 Treasury Minute. 
42 See G Robbie, Crown Copyright - Bête Noire or White Knight?, (1996) 2 Journal of Information Law 
and Technology (JILT) www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_2/special/robbie.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. Robbie quotes from a Treasury notice published in the London Gazette of 23 November 
1886: “Printers and Publishers are reminded that anyone reprinting without due authority matter 
which has appeared in any Government publication renders himself liable to the same penalties 
as those he might under like circumstances have incurred had the copyright been in private 
hands.” 
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Minute of 1912 were circulated by the Prime Minister to the States, attached to a letter 
dated 27 January 1914, informing them that the Commonwealth Government 
intended to follow the practice adopted in the United Kingdom. 
From the historical background to the Crown copyright provisions – which survive to 
the current day in much the same form as in 1912 – it is clear that they were enacted 
with the expectation that they would rarely be exercised to restrain reproduction and 
copying of government materials.   Although there is no clear statement of the 
circumstances in which governments may rely on their exclusive rights to restrain the 
unauthorised reproduction and distribution of their copyright materials, such 
instances would be limited.  
However, appreciation of the fact that Crown copyright is intended to encourage 
rather than deter the distribution and reuse of government materials seems to have 
diminished with the passage of time. The UK’s Power of Information Taskforce found 
that Crown copyright was often misunderstood by creators and reusers of data: 
When the public sector publishes information people should understand 
that it is intended for re-use … Crown copyright, despite its historic name, 
is designed to encourage re-use in the majority of cases.45 
Consequently, the Power of Information Taskforce Report (February 2009) 
recommended that steps should be taken to improve understanding of the permissive 
aspects of Crown copyright.46  
CAL v NSW 
The operation of the Crown copyright provisions in ss 176 – 179 of the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) was considered directly for the first time by the Full Federal Court in 
Copyright Agency Ltd v New South Wales (2007) 240 ALR 249; [2007] FCAFC 80, a 
case involving survey plans produced by surveyors and lodged with the Land and 
Property Information division of the State Department of Lands. Survey plans are 
protected under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) as artistic works.47 The New South 
Wales Government argued that it would not be liable to make payments to the 
Copyright Agency Ltd (CAL) (acting on behalf of surveyors) under the statutory 
licence in ss 183 and 183A of the Act if the survey plans were made or first published 
"by, or under the direction or control of" the State, as it would be the copyright owner 
                                                             
45 Ibid, p25. 
46 R Allan, Power of Information Taskforce Report, February 2009, recommendation 12 at p 7, 
available at poit.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/poit/category/final-introduction/.  
47 Copyright Act 1968, s 10(1) defines “artistic work” as including “a painting, sculpture, drawing, 
engraving or photograph, whether the work is of artistic quality or not”. 
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by virtue of ss 176 and 177 of the Copyright Act. The Full Court held that the survey 
plans could not be regarded as having been made or first published "by, or under the 
direction or control of the State" and the State did not therefore acquire copyright 
ownership through the operation of s 176 or 177 of the Copyright Act. 
In delivering the principal judgment, Emmett J (with whom Lindgren and Finkelstein 
JJ agreed) considered (at [122]) that the reference to works made "by" the Crown was 
concerned with "those circumstances where a servant or agent of the Crown brings the 
work into existence for and on behalf of the Crown". The reference to works made 
under the "direction" or "control" of the Crown was concerned with situations "where 
the person making the work is subject to the direction or control of the Crown as to 
how the work is to be made" which, in the context of copyright law "may mean how 
the work is to be expressed in a material form". Taking into account standard 
dictionary definitions of "direction" and "control",48 Emmett J stated that the reference 
in ss 176 and 177 to a work being made under the direction or control of the Crown 
(as opposed to being made by the Crown) "must involve the concept of the Crown 
bringing about the making of the work" but did not "extend to the Crown laying down 
how a work is to be made, if a citizen chooses to make a work, without having any 
obligation to do so". His Honour continued (at [126]): 
The question is whether the Crown is in a position to determine whether or 
not a work will be made, rather than simply determining that, if it is to be 
made at all, it will be made in a particular way or in accordance with 
particular specifications. The phrase "under the direction or control" does 
not include a factual situation where the Crown is able, de facto, to exercise 
direction or control because an approval or licence that is sought would not 
be forthcoming unless the Crown’s requirements for such approval or 
licence are satisfied. The phrase may not extend much, if at all, beyond 
commission, employment and analogous situations. It may merely 
concentrate ownership in the Crown to avoid the need to identify particular 
authors, employees or contracting parties.  
Finkelstein J also addressed the question of what works can be considered to be made 
under the direction or control of the Crown, stating (at [186]): 
There is probably a degree of overlap in the case of works made "under the 
direction of" or "under the control of" the Crown. Broadly speaking, 
however, where the Crown has power to require a work to come into 
existence, the work is made under the "direction" of the Crown. If the 
Crown has dominion over the execution of the work then it is made under 
                                                             
48 Copyright Agency Ltd v New South Wales (2007) 240 ALR 249; [2007] FCAFC 80 at [123], [124] per 
Emmett J. 
175 
its "control". The assumption that underlies each concept (direction and 
control) is the existence of a relationship between the Crown and the author 
that authorises the Crown to give the direction or exercise the control as the 
case may be. That authority may be found in statute, including regulations 
made under a statute, contract or elsewhere. But, whatever its source may 
be, the authority must exist. 
Since the survey plans were prepared on the initiative of the surveyor (or their client), 
rather than under the compulsion of the State, they could not be considered to be 
produced "by, or under the direction or control of" the State. This conclusion was 
reached notwithstanding that the State had issued very detailed instructions about the 
form the plans were required to take in order to be accepted for registration. The State 
had argued that it had directed and controlled the making of the survey plans within 
the meaning of s 176 by virtue of the fact that the plans were produced to satisfy the 
legal requirements for the creation of interests in land and the public record of rights 
and interests in land; it issued detailed requirements (in legislation, instructions and 
directions) about the information required to be included in survey plans and how it 
was to be expressed; and that survey plans could only be regarded as finished upon 
being acceptance for registration by the State, following examination and amendment 
where necessary. In rejecting these arguments, Emmett J explained (at [137], [138], 
[141]):  
There can be no doubt that, before a Survey Plan can be registered and so 
become a registered plan and effect the framework for the existence of a title 
to land in New South Wales, very stringent requirements and prerequisites 
laid down by the State and its instrumentalities must be met with respect to 
the Survey Plan. In a sense, the State, by the provisions to which reference 
has been made above, directs and controls the preparation of any Survey 
Plan that is to be registered under any of the provisions so described.  
However, there is nothing in the statutory and regulatory framework that 
compels any surveyor to prepare a Survey Plan that complies with the 
requirements of that framework. Of course, it is a condition precedent to the 
registration of a Survey Plan that it does comply precisely with those 
requirements. Nevertheless, a Survey Plan that is intended to become a 
registered plan is not prepared by reason of any compulsion from the State. 
A Survey Plan is prepared by a surveyor to satisfy the contractual obligation 
of the surveyor to his client.  
... 
A person who prescribes the criteria for the registration of a Survey Plan 
does not direct or control the making of the plan. By laying down 
conditions for the grant of some privilege in respect of a work created by a 
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citizen, the State does not control or direct the making of that work. It is of 
no consequence to the State whether or not a plan that satisfies its 
requirements is lodged for registration. Section 176 is concerned with 
direction or control of the making of a work where the State has some 
reason or purpose for having the work made. A surveyor’s practice is not 
controlled or directed by the State. Section 176 is directed to the activities 
and conduct of a person who is in some way answerable to the State. 
Neither the surveyor nor their client (usually the owner of the land to which the survey 
plan relates) could have been compelled by the State to prepare, or to arrange the 
preparation of, a survey plan. Further, at any time before the registration of a survey 
plan, the owner of the land could have discontinued the application for subdivision or 
the surveyor could have declined to continue preparation of the survey plan. 
Finkelstein J agreed (at [191]) that s 176 does not apply to works "brought into 
existence by the voluntary act of the author", notwithstanding that the work takes "a 
form dictated by the Crown if the work is to be used for a particular purpose".  
On the question of whether the State acquired copyright as the first publisher of the 
survey plans, the court held (at [148] per Emmett J) that the plans were in fact first 
published when the surveyor provided the completed plan to the land owner for 
signature. Although the State made survey plans available to public in hard copy and 
electronic form immediately following their registration – and these acts involved 
publication of the plans by the State – this was not the first instance of publication 
which would be required for the State to acquire ownership under s 177: at [145], 
[146]. 
The finding that copyright did not vest in the State through the operation of s 176 or 
177 of the Copyright Act meant that copyright in survey plans was owned by another 
party, which would usually be the surveyor who produced the plan or the land owner 
who commissioned the production of the plan.  In the appeal to the High Court, 
Copyright Agency Limited v New South Wales (2008) 233 CLR 279; [2008] HCA 35, the 
Full Federal Court’s finding on copyright ownership was not challenged by New South 
Wales and this issue was not considered by the High Court.   
Although the nature and operation of Crown copyright was not fully explored by 
either the Full Federal Court or the High Court in CAL v NSW, the case highlighted 
the fact that it must be considered in the context of the role, powers and functions of 
government.  In considering the extent of the materials in which Crown copyright 
exists, the words “by”, “direction” and “control” must be construed in light of the 
actions of governments – what they do, direct or control – that result in the creation of 
materials within the categories of protected works and other subject matter.  Rather 
than limiting the meaning of “by”, “direction” and “control” to their literal or 
dictionary meanings, the words must be read in a constitutional context so as to 
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ascertain what materials can be considered to have been produced as a result of 
government actions falling under these headings.        
COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW CROWN COPYRIGHT INQUIRY – A 
MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
In December 2003, the Attorney-General gave a reference to the CLRC to examine the 
law relating to government ownership of copyright material.49 An “important 
impetus”50 for the reference to the CLRC was the recommendation of the Review of 
Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (the Ergas 
Committee) in its 2000 report that s 176 of the Copyright Act 1968 be amended to 
ensure that the government is not given preferential treatment with respect to 
copyright, as compared with other parties.51 
The CLRC's Crown Copyright report (2005)52 recommended major changes to 
government copyright ownership. A key recommendation was that the special Crown 
copyright provisions in ss 176–179 of the Copyright Act 1968 should be repealed53 
because they “are not clearly drafted and it is difficult to envisage situations where they 
would be relied upon today”, “the ambit of the ownership provisions is uncertain” and 
it is unjustifiable "for government to have a privileged position compared with other 
copyright owners”.54 The CLRC also recommended that copyright be removed entirely 
from a wide range of materials produced by the judicial, legislative and executive arms 
of government, including Bills, statutes, regulations, judgments and court orders, 
official records of parliamentary debates, reports of Parliament, and reports of 
commissions of inquiry.55  
Unfortunately, the main focus of the CLRC’s inquiry and report was narrowed down 
to the issue of copyright ownership.  Adopting a limited perspective meant that the 
CLRC avoided the core issue of the fundamental rationale for the introduction of 
statutory recognition of government copyright and how it was intended to operate.  
Rather than working from the premise that the best way to improve access to and 
                                                             
49 For information on the Crown Copyright reference, see website, n 694. The CLRC released an 
Issues Paper in February 2004, a Discussion Paper in July 2004 and received almost 80 written 
submissions, many of which are available on the CLRC website.  
50 CLRC, n 694, p xix. 
51 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (September 2000) p 114: 
www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/ipcr/finalreport.pdf. 
52 CLRC, n 694.  
53 CLRC, n 694, Recommendation 1, p xxii and [9.09]. 
54 CLRC, n 694, p xxi. 
55 CLRC, n 694, Recommendation 4, p xxvi and [9.38].  
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reuse of government materials would be to shift ownership of copyright from the 
government to the private sector,56 or remove copyright from many materials 
altogether,57 a preferable approach would have been to examine the rationale for 
government copyright and how it should be managed to achieve that outcome.58  
CONCLUSION  
In the absence of provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that expressly limit or 
provide guidance on the exercise of copyright by government, it is necessary to have 
regard to the clear intention underlying the introduction of statutory recognition of 
Crown copyright. Government copyright exists primarily as a mechanism by which 
governments can ensure that documents and materials related to public and 
governmental functions are circulated in an accurate and reliable form.  The fact that 
governments can, by relying on their exclusive rights as copyright owners, restrict 
access to, and copying and distribution of, copyright materials does not mean that they 
should do so without clear justification and authority.59 Copyright is not, in itself, the 
driver of policy and practice in relation to copying, distribution and use of 
government materials and must be exercised in accordance with established 
government policies relating to the use of public sector materials.   
Government ownership of copyright does not, in itself, justify entering into a 
commercial arrangement to obtain a financial return if doing so would restrict the 
                                                             
56 For materials produced or first published under the direction or control of the government, and in 
the absence of a contract addressing the issue of ownership, this would be the result of 
implementation of the CLRC’s recommendation that the provisions relating to subsistence and 
ownership of Crown copyright in ss 176–179 of the Copyright Act 1968 should be repealed: see 
CLRC, n 694, Recommendation 1, p xxii and [9.09].  
57 For materials including Bills and Acts, judgments, records of parliamentary debates, and reports of 
inquiries, this would be the outcome of implementation of the CLRC’s recommendation that 
copyright in such materials should be abolished and they should be in the public domain: see CLRC, 
n 649, Recommendation 4, p xxvi and [9.38].  
58 See further, B Fitzgerald, Submission to CLRC on Crown Copyright (Submission 17): 
www.clrc.gov.au/agd/WWW/clrHome.nsf/Page/Present_Inquiries_Crown_copyright_Submissio
ns_2004_Sub_No_17_-_Professor_Brian_Fitzgerald; AEShareNet Ltd, Submission to the Crown 
Copyright Law Review (Submission 28): 
www.clrc.gov.au/agd/WWW/clrHome.nsf/Page/Present_Inquiries_Crown_copyright_Submissio
ns_2004_Sub_No_28_-_AEshareNet_Limited. 
59 Note that in carrying out its inquiry into Crown copyright, the Copyright Law Review 
Committee’s Terms of Reference required it to consider “the extent and appropriateness of 
reliance by government on copyright to control access to and/or use of, information”: CLRC, 
Crown Copyright, 2005 at p xii. 
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“full and free reproduction” of public sector materials.  While there are circumstances 
where copyright materials are developed at government expense and it is necessary to 
recover the costs of development in part or in full, any decision to impose charges for 
access or use should be in accordance with established policy or regulatory 
provisions.60  Nor should copyright, as a standard practice, be relied upon by 
governments for secondary purposes not directly related to the rationale for Crown 
copyright (such restricting access to government documents containing confidential 
or otherwise sensitive information. Crown copyright should, as general rule, be 
exercised to foster the dissemination of government materials in an accurate and 
reliable form rather than be used as authority for the imposition of restrictions 
designed to limit their availability and use. 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 For example, there may be circumstances where only the government possesses the expertise or 
resources required to produce a copyright work which is not required for purposes of public 
administration but is required by the general public.  Unless the government is able to recoup the 
costs involved in producing the work it may not have the incentive or authority to expend public 
monies to do so. 
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15 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
 
Professor Graham Greenleaf 1 
 
 
As only an occasional visitor to copyright law, I am rather awed by the company that 
Professor Fitzgerald has put me in today. He asked me to talk about how we should 
move ahead with the public’s side in copyright. What I’m looking at is some aspects of 
what institutional arrangements we might need to protect, as Professor Fitzgerald put 
it, Australia’s public domain in the future.  
The question I will start with, is “What rights do the public have to use works or other 
forms of creativity”. I think we have to identify four categories of rights.  
First is the uses of works which are outside the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, 
including those that fall short of being a substantial part of the work, and other matters 
like that. Second is uses of works where there is no copyright owner. In Australia that 
primarily means works in which copyright has expired. This is because our Copyright 
Act doesn’t exclude from copyright protection things that are often excluded in other 
laws like Government documents and legislation. Thirdly, and the part on which 
copyright practitioners concentrate, are the many different types of statutory rights 
that are given to members of the public to use works in different ways. These may be 
fair dealing exemptions or under Statutory Licences or other situations where there is 
a copyright owner but the uses that are allowed would otherwise be part of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Finally, we need to also recognise those de 
facto uses of the owner’s exclusive rights which, as a matter of practice, go 
unchallenged. This is what I’ve described in other contexts as sometimes constituting 
                                                             
1 Professor Graham Greenleaf, AM, is Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales’s 
Faculty of Law, and International Scholar, Kyung-Hee Law School, South Korea. He is co-
director, and co-founder of the Australasian Legal Information Institute, the internationally 
renowned legal information portal that makes publicly available in electronic form its 
comprehensive, and continually updated, holdings of Australian law. AustLII is, by far, the most 
utilised source of online legal information in Australia. Professor Greenleaf is one of most 
penetrating analysts in Australia of the policy of information regulation and a recognised expert 
in the law governing information technology. 
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“a commons by friendly appropriation” or some US scholars have referred to as 
“tolerated use”.  
Of course there has been a great deal of discussion about the theoretical aspects of all 
this, particularly from American academics such as Professors Boyle, Lessig, Cohen 
and Benkler to name but a few. They debate whether we should collectively refer to 
this bundle of rights that the public have as “the public domain” in a more extended 
usage, or perhaps simply use the expression “the commons” to describe all these 
things. I’m not going to do either, because I think those usages are ambiguous in their 
scope. I understand the motivation for wanting to use them: to try to appropriate some 
of the rhetorical value of the terms “public domain” or “commons” to describe this 
whole area. I do that myself, but I’ll stick to the more prosaic expression, “public rights 
in copyright” to encompass all of one to four, that whole range of rights. 
A slightly more technical definition is that that “public rights” are all those aspects of 
copyright law and practice that provide the ability of the public to use works without 
obtaining a licence on terms that are set and changeable (even if only at the end of the 
licence term) by the copyright owner. The corollary is that private or proprietary rights 
are the rights that owners of copyright in a work can effectively exercise to refuse to 
allow another person to use their work except on terms set or changeable by them. 
There’s a lot of value in recognising the commonality in these four categories.  
 There is another distinction that we need to make before leaving any theoretical 
discussion and that is that the origins of the public rights that I am talking about are 
found in both global and national matters. I think it’s reasonable to talk about global 
public rights, those elements of public rights that are common to most jurisdictions, 
for two main reasons. First, the formal elements of the global public domain are 
essentially the constraints that are placed on what public rights can exist because of the 
near universal adoption of the Berne Convention and TRIPs. We have heard the 
details from other speakers this morning. These constraints include the fact that no 
registration formalities can be required. In the USA when re-registration of copyrights 
was required 90% of works were not re-registered after the initial statutory term 
expired. Our public domain would be vast in comparison to what it is now if re-
registration was allowed by Berne to be required (even though initial registration was 
still not required). Berne’s minimum term for copyrights is another reason: would we 
seriously think that the term of copyright for software would have been set at the life of 
the author plus 50 years if nations around the world had been given a free hand? Of 
course there are other constraints like the “three step test”, too complex to address 
here.  
Berne is by and large on the negative side. On the far more positive side of the global 
equation are the informal elements, arising mainly from the global effects of some 
aspects of the Internet. Of particular importance is viral licensing and the way in 
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which it has created certain content specific commons such as open source software 
and the commons of text (found most notably in Wikipedia). Also, search engines 
have created a commons for searching text which would otherwise involve 
infringements of exclusive rights in many jurisdictions in the world. These are matters 
that Australian policy alone can’t change much, as Adrian Sterling was noting earlier 
in relation to the formal constraints. 
We then have a long list of national influences which affect, in our particular case, 
Australia’s public rights in copyright. I won’t go through all of those there, but as you 
can see (from the list below) there are many aspects which have a significant effect on 
what public rights we have. None of them are unique to this country. Some of them 
are unusual, like our long history of legal deposit requirements. In combination, 
Australian law is relatively inhospitable to the creation of public rights. 
NATIONAL ELEMENTS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA’S COPYRIGHT 
PUBLIC RIGHTS 
 Lack of any constitutional limits on copyright (probably!) 
 The long history of legal deposit requirements 
 Crown copyright in legal/administrative documents 
 No significant other limits on the scope of copyright subject-matter 
 Protection of compilations perhaps even beyond the EU 
 Narrow, specific, fair dealing exceptions: inflexibility 
 Limited implied licences, broad authorisation doctrines 
 More extensive compulsory licences than many other countries 
 Highest international level of copyright duration, but no retrospectivity 
 Moral rights, but only co-extensive with economic rights 
 The need to accommodate indigenous rights 
What do we need to do to try to more effectively protect this whole range of public 
rights? First, those who are interested in some of these aspects of copyright law need to 
recognise that they have a common interest in all these aspects of public rights. If there 
is a common thread, perhaps it’s the recognition that all forms of creativity must draw 
on and rely upon previous creations, ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’, as it’s often 
referred to. Once we recognise that common interest other things follow.  
Second, we need to better articulate a set of principles on which the protection of 
public rights in copyright are based. Copyright laws clearly articulate many of the 
interests of authors and other creators simply by listing the exclusive rights of the 
different types of copyright owners in convenient sections in the Copyright Act, and 
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then having various other things flow on from that, like enforcement provisions. 
Public rights are rarely so clearly and neatly articulated.  
They are usually implied. They’re the things that Professor Larry Lessig talked about 
earlier today such as the fact that you don’t have to have any exceptions in order to 
read a book or to lend a book to someone else. You can’t find that public right clearly 
stated in the Copyright Act but it’s essential to understanding what we’re talking 
about. Alternatively, if they are written down, they’re scattered all over the place, often 
in immensely complex legislative provisions. Those of us who are interested in this 
side of the fence need to try to articulate in an understandable fashion the set of rights 
that we are interested in defending.  
In the interests of provoking discussion, I have made an initial attempt to set out 
10 Principles for public rights in copyright (titles below, and detailed in the 
Appendix). After listening to both Professor Lessig and Adrian Sterling I suspect that 
I’m probably too conservative. The principles need to be general and kept separate 
from any short term strategic goals. 
10 PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIAN 
COPYRIGHT 
1. Balance 
2. Limits on exclusive rights 
3. Minimum term  
4. Preservation of Australian publications 
5. Fair & flexible exceptions 
6. Fair compulsory licences 
7. Support for voluntary licensing 
8. Protection from technology & contracts 
9. Proportionality in enforcement 
10. Free/open access to publicly-funded content 
First we need to articulate the types of balance in copyright law that we need. 
Copyright law should be protecting our national interests and not the interests of 
other countries (unlike the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement). There’s a place 
marker in the first principle for the interests of Indigenous people, but I don’t know 
how to expand that and I’m interested in hearing the rest of the Conference on that 
question. Picking up from the Adelphi Charter, there’s a principle that the proponents 
of any expansion of the scope of copyright protection should have the onus of proving 
the need for expansion.  
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In relation to national interest, I’ve missed something which Terry Cutler has 
prompted me to think should be added. In our role as the 2% copyright exporter 98% 
importer, we need to expressly recognise that Australia should contribute its share to 
the global pool of information that’s available to be exercised with public rights by 
anyone in the world. This is our part of the global bargain from which we will benefit 
as an importing country.  
Some of the other principles are fairly obvious: the need for limits on exclusive rights; 
the attempt to minimise as far as possible the duration of copyright and not to extend 
it any further; and the need to preserve works so that they can be later re-used in other 
creative works. This is to say, we need to preserve the content of Australian 
publications so that at the end of their copyright term others can use them. A strategic 
goal that follows is to ensure that that the current review of legal deposit extends it to 
digital and audio visual works.2  
We need to obtain fair and flexible exceptions to copyright law that can adjust with 
changes in technology. In contrast, our existing law with its specified fair dealings does 
not allow such flexibility at present.  
We need to ensure that compulsory licences and collecting societies operate in ways 
which give appropriate protection against potential anti-competitive conduct. Specific 
goals may include ensuring that collecting societies do not impede their members’ use 
of voluntary licences and do not collect fees in relation to content on the Internet 
which is supposed to be available for free. But that, in a sense, is the negative side. We 
shouldn’t forget the positive side of compulsory licensing.  
As Professor Lessig points out, most notably in Free Culture, much of the 
entertainment industries of the 20th Century in the USA have been based around the 
conversion from what once was called “piracy” into something that’s become a 
statutory licence and has produced revenue and benefits for both producers and 
consumers. Compulsory licences constitute a lot of the most important content of our 
public rights. As people interested in that side of the copyright picture, we should be 
actively trying to make those compulsory licences work better to give a better result to 
everyone, both the copyright owners and the users of the collectively licensed 
materials.  
Another principle is that we should actively provide support for voluntary licensing. 
Creative Commons licences, open source licences and the other licences of the last 
10 years or more, have given us enormous benefits and expanded the scope of public 
rights. We should be looking at what our copyright law needs to do to actively support 
those voluntary licences. One example in Australia may be that we need an 
amendment to the Copyright Act to clarify the means by which public domain 
                                                             
2 Commonwealth Review of Legal Deposit 2008. 
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dedications can be made, because that’s not at all clear under our law. And, while there 
are no obvious impediments to the enforceability in Australia of say, Creative 
Commons licences or the GPL,3 we should be looking at whether we need to 
strengthen our copyright law proactively to make sure we don’t get a nasty surprise 
15 years down the track. 
I will skip over other obvious things like proportionality in enforcement and the “no 
brainer” of getting around Crown Copyright in Australia and opening content up in 
relation to both public sector information and the outputs of academic research in this 
country. 
The last thing I wish to say is that public rights need a peak body in Australia. There 
are a lot of reasons why the public rights side is disorganised in comparison with 
copyright owners and authors who are very well organised. We need to establish a 
public rights peak body that represents all of the new types of interests and 
organisations who have an interest in the various types of public rights that I’d 
sketched out. One question that we in Australia need to ask is whether we already have 
the nucleus of such a public body in the Australian Digital Alliance. ADA does 
exceptionally good work, has a set of principles that are narrower than what I’ve 
sketched although containing many of the elements, and has a membership that is far 
narrower than the group of organisations that are relevant to all the issues I have 
canvassed in my “10 Principles”. There needs to be a conversation within and without 
ADA as to whether it should become a more general public rights body for Australia.  
The conclusion of my Centre’s submission to the Cutler Inquiry was that the third 
thing we needed was a thorough-going law reform review of the Copyright Act with its 
principal focus being the public rights side of copyright. A public rights focus is 
needed, rather than the little scattered bits of public rights reform always being an 
afterthought to some other law reform inquiry, usually one conducted by the Attorney 
General’s Department. My suggestion is that the Australian Law Reform Commission 
would be the best body to do a research-based analysis on what we need with public 
rights in the Copyright Act, not one that’s merely driven by submissions from the 
most well organised organisations in this field. 
Finally, public rights need a good public image and perhaps a mascot. So I suggest, for 
the benefit of all the Australians in the room, that the best candidate is Norman 
Lindsay’s Magic Pudding, an icon of Australian literature, created in 1918. Lindsay 
didn’t die until 1969. Philip Pullman says, “It’s the funniest children’s book ever 
written” and it’s on Wikipedia so it must be true. The hero for those of you who don’t 
know, is Albert, the “Cut and Come Again Puddin’”.  
                                                             
3 GNU General Public Licence, a free software licence written by Richard Stallman for the GNU 
Project, identified with the free software movement. 
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We’ve heard a lot about cakes today, and now I’m offering a puddin’ as our mascot – 
the little guy on the right. Lindsay says, “There’s nothing this puddin’ enjoys more 
than offering slices of himself to strangers, the more you eats the more you gets, Cut 
and Come Again is his name and Cut and Come Again is his nature”. He’s the 
inexhaustible self replenishing resource, by analogy, similar to our public domain, on 
which further creativity can be built. He’s non-rivalrous and inexhaustible. So I 
commend to you Albert as our potential mascot for public rights.  
He also represents the difficulties faced by the public domain because although he’s a 
national icon who’s now approaching his Centenary, being born in 1918, his literary 
form will not be in the public domain until the year 2039 when young Albert is the 
grand old age of 120. So we should ask, “Is that the sort of public domain we want, or 
can we do better?”  
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ADAM SMITH 2.0: EMERGENT PUBLIC GOODS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE RHETORIC 
OF REMIX 
 
Nicholas Gruen1 
 
I 
In a landmark article proposing a “politics of intellectual property”, James Boyle 
mentions two contrasting principles of intellectual property (IP). With IP being a 
public good, property rights can help bring IP into existence by reducing free riding on 
others’ efforts.2 Yet Boyle points to another legal tradition (1997, p. 97). Privatising 
knowledge restricts free speech. As Boyle points out:  
[C]ourts are traditionally much less sensitive to First Amendment, free 
speech and other “free flow of information arguments” when the context is 
viewed as private rather than public, or property rather than censorship. 
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court will refuse to allow the state to ban 
flag burning, but it is quite happy to create a property right in a general 
word such as “Olympic”, and allow the word to be appropriated by a private 
party which then selectively refuses public use of the word. Backed by this 
state-sponsored "homestead law for the English language," the United States 
Olympic Committee (USOC) has decreed that the handicapped may have 
their "Special Olympics," but that gay activists may not hold a "Gay 
Olympics." The Court saw the USOC's decision not as state censorship, but 
                                                             
1 Dr Nicholas Gruen is CEO of Lateral Economics, expert economics commentator. He advised 
the federal government on economic reform policy, was economic policy adviser to two federal 
government ministers, a former Associate Commissioner to the Productivity Commission and 
Chair of the Government 2.0 Taskforce. He is a recognised expert in tariff reform, competition 
policy, innovation policy, and intellectual property regulation policy. He is a regular contributor 
to leading newspapers, and has published in national and international academic journals.  
2 With others simply watching and waiting for IP to be created so that they can free ride on his 
efforts, the IP might never come into existence. 
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as a mere exercise of its private property rights. (Emboldened, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist applied the same argument to the American flag.) 
Boyle proposes a new politics of IP. Admiring the way in which environmentalism 
imputed to environmental causes far greater ethical urgency than is conveyed in a cost 
benefit analysis, he seeks a similar politics of IP, one which engages us more deeply 
than mere accounting or economics. 
In this paper I suggest that paradoxically enough, economics can offer some help in 
this quest, or at least economics as its founder hoped it might become. Like Darwin, 
Adam Smith was a plodder and a perfectionist, pondering things for many years, 
seeking ways to minimise any offence they might cause, before setting out his views in 
print. Smith’s first major book was The Theory of Moral Sentiments published exactly 
250 years ago. It contained Smith’s most fundamental thoughts about human beings 
and the society which they create, and which of course creates them. 
In this paper I argue that way back at the beginning of economics, Smith pioneered an 
approach to the creation of public goods which has gone largely ignored. This is very 
relevant to the philosophy of IP. Even more, Smith saw human development whether 
it was cultural or economic, as at bottom an expression of human sociality. And as 
Web 2.0 burgeons before us, Smith’s thinking helps us see it in it’s most promising, it’s 
most glorious light: As a scaling up of human sociality itself. 
Against a backdrop in which certain Christian teachings had demonised self-interest, 
Smith sought to revive aspects of ancient traditions in which the pursuit of true 
enlightened self-interest is bound up with the quest for virtue. 
Along with other Enlightenment figures, Smith was in awe of the power and economy 
of Newton’s system of celestial mechanics involving as it did, “an immense chain of 
the most important and sublime truths . . . connected together by one capital fact, of 
the reality of which we have daily experience”.3 Emulating Newton, Smith’s economics 
was built from a single principle – in this case human beings’ tendency to “truck barter 
and exchange”. And his meta theory of society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments was 
built upon the single principle of sympathy. Today the word “sympathy” typically 
                                                             
3 Smith, A, 1795, ‘The principles which lead and direct philosophical enquiries; illustrated by 
the history of astronomy’, in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980. See also Smith’s observation in his lectures on rhetoric that the Newtonian system was 
“vastly more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than the other. It gives us a pleasure to 
see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable all deduced from some 
principle (commonly a well-known one) and all united in one chain, far superior to what we feel 
from the unconnected method…” (Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle’s Lettres, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980; in lecture 24). (Cf. TMS, VII. ii. 2. 14). 
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denotes some sentimental well-wishing towards another. Smith’s use of the word 
sometimes suggests this. But more fundamentally Smith argues that sympathy is our 
engine of social epistemology. As the second paragraph of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments explains: 
[Having] no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no 
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the 
rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us 
of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own 
person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of 
what are his sensations. 
Imaginative sympathy gives us the tools to understand what others are thinking. Just 
as Shakespeare observed that all the world was a stage, Smith introduced a similar idea 
to social science (or moral philosophy, as he called it). Reflecting on our own 
observation of others, we realise that others observe us, and form opinions about us, 
just as we do about them. And from the cradle to the grave, we are hard wired to care 
deeply what others think of us.  
II 
Homo economicus – the pure, calculating egoist optimising his profit or ‘utility’ 
without regard for others’ views or conduct (except where they’re useful to his ends) is 
nowhere to be seen in Smith. With one possible exception. A newborn baby is a kind 
of inchoate homo economicus, a blob of infantile egoism – infans economicus if you 
like. But beyond this, the process that we now call socialisation progressively deepens 
and transforms us.  
As Smith makes clear, socialisation begins from infancy. Indeed, even if it were 
“possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place” 
there is no exposure to society without socialisation.  
he could no more think of his own character … than of the beauty or 
deformity of his own face … Bring him into society, and he is immediately 
provided with the mirror which he wanted before … all his own passions 
will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe that 
mankind approve of some of them, and are disgusted by others. He will be 
elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other. His desires and 
aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now often become the causes of new 
desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows: they will now, 
therefore, interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive 
consideration. 
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So much for homo economicus.  
Our craving of approval, our dread of disapproval, and our ability to understand 
others by imagining ourselves in their shoes, draws us into a lifelong dialectical social 
drama in which we’re all actors and spectators, not just of others’ actions, but 
ultimately of our own. We keep an eye on our own conduct contemplating what others 
might think of us. As we mature (and Smith knew that some mature more than 
others!) this internal questioning takes on its own moral force. We ultimately crave the 
love and approbation of those we most respect. And conscience emerges for Smith as a 
fictive impartial spectator which becomes the yardstick of our actions, and leads us 
towards virtue. For Smith, the whole of human society – its psychology, its sociology 
its economics, it’s social customs and mores and perhaps even its religion – is built on 
these simple foundations. 
Despite the enthusiasm with which it was met in Smith’s time, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments gradually slid into relative obscurity. Smith’s foundational moral 
philosophy of society generated no school of followers, let alone a discipline as The 
Wealth of Nations did. Yet, ironically, remarkably, as the division of intellectual labour 
is splintering the study of man more and more, modern neuroscience is confirming 
Smith’s theory. Just as modern genetics provided the missing biological underpinnings 
for Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, so modern neurology is discovering that 
animals with brains like ours – monkeys and primates – are hard-wired for sympathy. 
In the 1990s, Italian neurophysiologists placed electrodes in monkeys’ brains to study 
how they co-ordinated their hands and mouths to eat. Having located the small region 
that fired when an animal lifted food to its mouth, they found that the same region 
fired – only less strongly – when one monkey simply watched another lift food to its 
mouth. An extensive network of so-called “mirror neurons” was discovered, which fire 
and enable monkeys to recreate within their own brains what’s going on in the brains 
of their fellows. Critically, mirror neurons don’t respond in a mechanical way to given 
physical movements but only when the observer interprets such movements as having 
been made with a given intention – for instance, eating. 
Just as Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments had argued that we all share vicariously in 
the gamut of each others’ emotions, from elation, through to horror and disgust, so 
recent experiments show that brain regions which activate when we experience pain, 
disgust, happiness and other emotions, also activate when we observe others having 
similar experiences.  
III 
Before proceeding, we pause to note the intensely rhetorical nature of Smith’s theory. 
For we can misunderstand its emphases if we ignore its pervasive normative tone. 
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Smith’s first lectureship was in rhetoric, and his scientific contributions are subsumed 
within the contemporary eighteenth century rhetorical tradition encompassing the 
threefold task of delighting, instructing and persuading the reader to identify with 
virtue.4 The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ theory of virtue is itself delivered in a 
rhetorical package which engages in that quintessentially rhetorical practice of praising 
virtue and blaming vice.  
Almost invariably in the Moral Sentiments, whenever Smith praises virtue or points to 
our desire for approval, he mentions its shadow side – vice and our abhorrence of 
being thought unworthy by our fellows. Indeed a modern reader of Smith is likely to 
find him quite long winded and indeed – in the modern (pejorative) sense, rhetorical. 
Smith’s books were like this because although they are also other things, Smith wrote 
them largely, perhaps principally, as invitations to his readers to virtue.  
It’s not appreciated how much even The Wealth of Nations, likewise conforms to this 
rhetorical tradition. To recap, let’s note the rhetorical resonances in what might be the 
most passionate passage in all of Smith’s writing. It is about the African slave trade.  
Every savage undergoes a sort of Spartan discipline, and by the necessity of 
his situation is inured to every sort of hardship … Fortune never exerted 
more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she subjected those 
nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to wretches who 
possess the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, nor of 
those which they go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly 
expose them to the contempt of the vanquished. 
IV 
Although Smith can be rightly seen as an apostle of self-interest, one might also 
portray his contribution as delineating those public goods which are preconditions for 
self-interest to be socially constructive. Here, in a famous passage, Smith explains how 
the self-seeking individual in a market turns the exchange of private goods towards the 
common good.  
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it. . . . . [H]e intends only his own 
security; and by directing [his] industry [and capital] in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
                                                             
4 Which is part of the reason for my arguing that “Adam Smith is to Markets as Jane Austen is to 
Marriage” (Gruen, 2006).  
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which was no part of his intention. He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.  
So far Smith’s has illustrated nothing more than the optimisation of the production 
and exchange of private goods, not the emergence of a public good. Though it was not 
clearly defined in Smith’s time, in modern economics public goods are characterised 
by non-rivalry and non-excludability. A wireless broadcast is non-rival because, unlike 
toasters or cars or fridges, if one house enjoys the broadcast it does nothing to prevent 
others from enjoying it. At least unencrypted, the broadcast is also non-excludable. 
Anyone can tune in. If someone must fund the broadcast, we may have a problem, 
because the potential for free riding undermines the ability to charge for the broadcast 
as we do for fridges and toasters.5 
But look a little closer and there are public goods that are both the precondition and 
consequence of the invisible hand of the market. The precedent, as Smith explains at 
length, and with great force, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, is a peaceful law-
abiding citizenry, and the rule of law, or what Smith called commutative justice – 
respect for property.  
Looking around we see other public goods in Smith. The emergence of currency is an 
emergent property of markets as they evolve, although, as in the case of public mores, 
the state may lend its authority to reinforce community norms. And the thing which 
most fundamentally distinguishes us from the animals is an emergent public good. 
Adam Smith wrote a treatise on the emergence of language in which he spelled out 
precisely this quality of language as an emergent product of individuals seeking only 
their own private ends. A rule of grammar would “establish itself insensibly, and by 
slow degrees” as a consequence of the human “love of analogy and similarity of sound” 
as people “would endeavour to make their mutual wants intelligible to each other”.6  
                                                             
5 There are a range of combinations of rivalry and non-excludability such that the quadrant 
defined by those two terms produces the four categories of public goods, private goods, common 
pools and club goods as follows.  
 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rivalrous 
Private 
good 
Common 
pool good 
Non-rivalrous 
Club good 
Toll good 
Public good 
 
6 Smith, Adam, 1762. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 
oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=202&layout=ht
mlaccessed on 24th May 2009.  
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Thus, as Otteson has spelled out, Smith’s “market model” in which public goods are 
the emergent and unintended product of private endeavours to meet private needs, 
applies not just to the way markets serve the common good and produce public goods, 
but also to the way language, currency and social mores emerge – all of which are 
foundations of a market order. We might summarise by saying that the public goods 
of language and widely shared social mores, and a currency, are the preconditions for 
the emergence of a sophisticated market order, which itself is the precondition for the 
emergence of the public good of market prices and liquidity.  
V 
And here’s the thing. Since Smith, economics has always taken the central problem of 
public goods to be the difficulty of funding them, given the presence of free-riders. But 
by virtue of their very nature as emergent properties of self-seeking humans, within 
society no-one has had to pass round the hat to bring emergent public goods into 
existence. They’re no more or less than the accretions of life itself! 
Smith’s Newtonian schema allows Smith to explain how social mores which underpin 
the ascent to increasing opulence in the economy and virtue amongst the people all 
emerge from a single source – human sympathy between free people. Neither the 
crown nor its government intrudes in any way although at some stage in the tradition 
of British Common Law (Smith also lectured in Jurisprudence) the state may publicly 
legitimate and re-enforce what are already private conceptions of justice.  
And now Web 2.0 brings us a panoply of new emergent public goods: the 
epiphenomena of those seeking private benefits for themselves. Though it predates the 
coining of the expression Web 2.0, open source software is paradigmatic. Although 
sometimes driven by loftier motives, the motive for a great deal of open source 
software coding is the private interest of a user in solving their own problems by fixing 
bugs or adding features. Once coded the producer has an interest in having their code 
incorporated into the project and so donates it. One can tell similar stories about the 
other ‘Public Goods 2.0’ like blogging, Flickr and Wikipedia – though of course there 
are richer motives in play as well. It is to those we now turn. 
VI 
Smith’s intensely, inextricably social, picture of the way we are constituted finds its 
way into his economics. Despite his desire to construct his economics around the 
single principle of our innate tendency to “truck barter and exchange”, in lectures 
delivered before The Wealth of Nations, Smith permitted himself the thought that 
there was something even more fundamental, human sociality and (note Smith the 
rhetorician!) the desire to persuade. Here is Smith’s ‘oratorical’ theory of a bargain.  
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If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which this 
disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the naturall inclination every 
one has to persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have 
so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to 
persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest.  
Of all economists, Smith would have understood the foundational proposition of what 
might be taken as an early Web 2.0 credo, “the cluetrain manifesto” – “Markets are 
conversations”. And, although no doubt Smith would have been amazed at some of 
the more amazing things about Web 2.0 – like Wikipedia for instance – he might have 
been one of the least amazed. For so much of the engine behind Web 2.0 is the same as 
the engine Smith saw behind society – the dialectic of human sociality.  
In this regard note Odlyzko’s (2001) documentation of the how much larger a share of 
the economy is driven by our desire for interaction between two specific parties, 
compared with broadcasting or publishing from one source to many. Speaking of the 
US economy Odlyzko observes:  
What is striking is how highly valued [two way] communications is. . . . Our 
postal system alone collects almost as much money as our entire movie 
industry, even though the latter benefits from large foreign sales. For all the 
publicity it attracts, entertainment is simply not all that large, because 
people are not willing to pay very much for it. . . . [C]ommunications is 
huge, and represents the collective decisions of millions of people about 
what they want. It is also growing relative to the rest of the economy in a 
process that goes back centuries. As a fraction of the US economy, it has 
grown more than 15-fold over the last 150 years. The key point . . . is that 
most of this spending is on connectivity, the standard point-to-point 
communications, and not for broadcast media that distribute “content.” 
Odlyzko documents how pundits and market players have repeatedly overestimated 
our preparedness to pay for content, while underestimating our desire for inter-
connectedness, from the underestimation of the value of Bell’s telephone for social 
communication, to the ARPANET’s engineers’ surprise at the popularity of e-mail to 
the under-appreciation of the value of mobile phones, and scepticism that SMSs were 
anything more than a toy gimmick. 
Smith doesn’t write about the power of propaganda or anything much emitted from a 
single source, however powerful. He writes about human beings creating their own 
world through their communication, their interest in what each other are thinking – in 
his terminology their sympathy – and their interaction. And he writes about the 
strength of their social desires, from the desire to communicate to their desire to fit in 
and be well regarded by each other. Those forces are now the dominant force behind 
the burgeoning of social networks, and many other phenomena of Web 2.0, right now. 
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VII 
Smith also gives us a more compelling portrait of the psychology of motivation and 
achievement. For homo economicus the attraction of power, fame or wealth is simple 
greed for more. Smith is a better psychologist. “[T]o what purpose is all the toil and 
bustle of this world?” Smith asks about the human drive towards avarice and 
ambition? Smith concludes “It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which 
interests us.” 
Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer 
can supply them. . . . To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of 
with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which 
we can propose to derive from it.  
This rings true for me, and perhaps more importantly for Warren Buffett recently 
quoted in uncannily Smithian terms (Lewis, 2009):  
Basically, when you get to my age you'll really measure your success in life 
by how many of the people you want to have love you actually do love you. I 
know people who have a lot of money, and they get testimonial dinners and 
they get hospital wings named after them. But the truth is that nobody in 
the world loves them. 
This striving for fame, glory, the respect of peers is an important, though not 
necessarily primary motive behind much coding of open source software and it surely 
lies behind a great deal of the voluntary work that is done on blogs, and any number of 
other Web 2.0 phenomena. Smith comments at some length on the intensity of our 
desire to discover something of ourselves in others, and our desire to reciprocate both 
the favours we are done, and the slights.7 
What most of all charms us in our benefactor, is the concord between his 
sentiments and our own, with regard to what interests us so nearly as the 
worth of our own character, and the esteem that is due to us. We are 
delighted to find a person who values us as we value ourselves, and 
distinguishes us from the rest of mankind, with an attention not unlike that 
with which we distinguish ourselves. To maintain in him these agreeable 
and flattering sentiments, is one of the chief ends proposed by the returns 
we are disposed to make to him.8 
And Smith understood that there are all sorts of quirky, all-too-human motivations 
arising from our social instincts. They’re powering Web 2.0 also. As Nicholson Baker 
                                                             
7 Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, Chapter VI.  
8 Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II, Section III, Chapter I. 
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wrote recently (2008), the initial sources, such as the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
and other public domain publications, which provided a “seed” for many entries, and 
altruism, don't fully explain Wikipedia’s success.  
The real reason it grew so fast was noticed by co-founder Jimmy "Jimbo" 
Wales in its first year of life. "The main thing about Wikipedia is that it is 
fun and addictive," Wales wrote. Addictive, yes. All big Internet successes – 
e-mail, chat, Facebook, Gawker, Second Life, YouTube, Daily Kos, World of 
Warcraft –have a more or less addictive component – they hook you 
because they are solitary ways to be social: you keep checking in, peeking in, 
as you would to some noisy party going on downstairs in a house while 
you're trying to sleep. 
In a treatise on the history of astronomy remarkably prescient of Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Smith explained the motivation behind scientific 
progress as driven by the mental discomfort of things not quite “adding up”. The mind 
seeks to relieve the “chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult 
of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions of the 
universe, to that tone of tranquillity and composure, which is both most agreeable in 
itself, and most suitable to its nature.” And indeed it’s the stub, the niggling error, 
outrageous claim, the irritating infelicity that keeps some up at night 
VIII 
So where does this leave us in considering copyright in the world of Web 2.0 and 
remix. In fact Smith accepted copyright, at least for the fourteen years protection it 
spanned in his day, “as an encouragement to the labours of learned men”. 
And this is perhaps as well adapted to the real value of the work as any 
other, for if the book be a valuable one the demand for it in that time will 
probably be a considerable addition to his fortune. But if it is of no value the 
advantage he can reap from it will be very small. These two privileges 
therefore, as they can do no harm and may do some good, are not to be 
altogether condemned. But there are few so harmless”.9  
Given Smith’s scepticism about publicly sanctioned monopolies, one can’t imagine 
him looking on the IP expansionism of our own time with either pleasure or surprise. 
My guess is that Smith would have continued to approve of copyright where it 
underpins production that would not otherwise take place, but not beyond that point.  
                                                             
9 Lectures On Jurisprudence, 
oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=202&layout=ht
ml, accessed on 24th May 2009. 
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My one practical suggestion combines my admiration for Smith and one of my own 
country’s policy successes. We reined in the monster of protectionism that Smith 
warned against by insisting that any change to protection be preceded by an 
independent study analysing its net economic effects. Given the way in which IP 
protection has been ramped up in circumstances that make it highly dubious that it 
will lead to more production 10 I have for some time argued that we should agitate to 
enshrine the principle in international negotiations that no increase in IP be 
negotiated ahead of an independent study demonstrating its net global economic 
benefits.  
Further the more I see of the politics of IP, the more I see international agreements 
operating simply as constraints on what national governments can do. They can 
indeed be constraints, and to some extent that is their point. But it’s remarkable how 
often it seems to be forgotten that we negotiate international agreements. Given this, 
every time I hear someone tell me that sensible reform isn’t possible under this or that 
international agreement, whether it be multilateral like TRIPS, or bilateral like the 
Australia US Free Trade Agreement, I’d like to hear them add words to the effect that 
we should bring up the problem at the very next international meeting where these 
agreements are discussed.  
But I began this paper suggesting that Smith might help us meet James Boyle’s 
challenge of going beyond contemporary economic concerns in conceptualising the 
issues at stake in intellectual property. To recap, Boyle wants something broader, more 
“human” than the simple totting up of costs and benefits typical of contemporary 
economics. Remarkably enough, Smith offers several promising leads.  
 He shows us something that is usually impossible to find in most economics 
textbooks. There is a substantial class of pure public goods which are 
‘emergent’. Thrown off spontaneously by social and intellectual interaction 
they require no funding or outside intervention.  
 Web 2.0 is now scaling up this miracle, generating a kaleidoscopic array of 
new global public goods funded from nothing more than the restless sociality 
of our species not least our desire for the esteem of our fellows. As Smith put 
it, our striving for wealth, or fame or glory isn’t for the thing itself but for 
what it brought – an “easy empire over the affections of mankind”. For the 
most part, a collaborative web can be funded without any monopoly in the 
content produced. 
If this underscores the economic reason for avoiding excessive IP protection, it also 
hints at that “human” aspect that James Boyle is after. For as we extend IP we are 
                                                             
10 This is most obviously the case where IP terms have been increased retrospectively where they 
can quite obviously have no effect in bringing forward additional production. 
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discovering areas in which our human instincts recoil. It may or may not entail more 
economic benefits than costs to allow the patenting of human genes – though 
somehow I doubt it. But it had better be economically worthwhile, because economic 
considerations aside, it seems kind of creepy. If I ask whether should I be free to use 
Tim O’Reilly’s term “Web 2.0” as I like – and as I have, without payment and indeed, 
until now even without acknowledgement – economics says “yes”. That’s because the 
only case for providing monopolistic protection is to bring forth IP. And yet we have 
the expression delivered to the world, safe and sound without it. 
 But there’s another, more “human” answer. Commonsense – if I might be permitted 
to invoke such an abused term – says “yes” too. We humans like communicating and 
interacting amongst each other. Our communication today is built on our own, and 
others’, past communications. And it’s easy to see harm coming from outside 
interference in that process and from commercialising it. At least as applied to the 
intimacies of daily life, it’s kind of creepy. Smith surely reinforces that commonsense. 
Certainly for his time, but even today, a remarkable characteristic of Smith is his faith 
in human culture’s capacity to build itself in a healthy way from the ground up, from 
the smallest interactions between the most ordinary people and his concomitant 
scepticism of what could be gained from any heavy handed interventions in that 
process. 
In this regard, we should heed the lesson from the last thing Smith ever wrote for 
publication. The revolutionaries of France and America had warmed to Smith’s 
confidence that people could be the authors of their own culture, and his faith in the 
way the small details of human life and human culture, when left to their own devices, 
within the rule of law ultimately build better lives. But like his friend Edmund Burke, 
Smith looked on the events of 1789 in France with great anxiety. As a result, the next 
year, the year of his death, he added a section to the final edition of his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, which thus became both the first and last book he published.  
Anxious like Burke about the way in which those in power could overreach themselves 
he penned a section against “the man of system”.  
The man of system. . . is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of 
his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest 
deviation from any part of it. . . . He seems to imagine that he can arrange 
the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand 
arranges the different pieces upon a chess–board. He does not consider that 
the pieces upon the chess–board have no other principle of motion besides 
that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess–
board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its 
own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to 
impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same 
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direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, 
and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or 
different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times 
in the highest degree of disorder.11 
Finally, I can’t finish without observing that Smith might have wanted to add one 
more thing. Amid the unruly mix of motives that have always powered the emergent 
phenomena of social life, and now power the emergent public goods of Web 2.0, we 
catch glimpses of our better selves. And we come to see ourselves as others see us – 
and encounter others doing the same. Something tells the blogger, the Wikipedian, the 
coder of the next distribution of Wordpress or Linux, that their quest for that “easy 
empire over the affections of mankind”, is just a foretaste of our destiny, which can 
only be found on our halting journey towards that more distant and difficult ultimate 
destination – virtue itself. 
 
Editorial note: quotations from Adam Smith and Edmund Burke are unexpurgated 
and contain anomalous 18th century spellings.  
 
 
                                                             
11 TMS, Part IV, Chapter 2, Section ii.  
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17 
CURRENT ISSUES: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Professor Adrian Sterling 1 
 
PART I: GENERAL 
A  Introductory 
This year 2009 marks the 55th anniversary of my commencement of work in the field 
of international copyright law, for it was in 1954 that I first took part as a delegate at 
an international copyright meeting, namely the Berne Union Permanent Committee 
meeting in Lugano in June/July of that year, at which I was fortunate to meet the great 
copyright experts of that era: Marcel Plaisant, Rapporteur of the 1948 Berne 
Convention Revision Conference, Valerio de Sanctis, Eugen Ulmer, François Hepp, 
architect of the Universal Copyright Convention, Alphonse Tournier, co-founder of 
BIEM,2 Georges Straschnov, Jacques Secretan, the then Director of the Berne Bureau, 
and his successors, George Bodenhausen and Arpad Bogsch.  
How gracious these great men were to me, an unknown lawyer making his first 
appearance among them, and how important that is, encouragement to the young. 
Since then I have had the years representing a copyright interest (till 1974), of practice 
at the Bar and (since 1992) of teaching copyright at postgraduate level. You will be 
relieved to hear that I do not propose to regale you with anecdotes of the past, but 
rather to consider, as regards copyright, where I think we are going or should be going. 
                                                             
1 LL.B. (Sydney, 1948); Bar of New South Wales (1949); Bar of England and Wales (1953). 
Professorial Fellow, Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute, Queen Mary, University of 
London, Visiting Professor, King’s College, University of London. This paper is based on an address 
given to the British Literary and Artistic Copyright Association, London, on 12 March 2009, and to 
the Copyright Society of Australia on 3 June 2009. © Text and Appendixes J.A.L. Sterling 2009. 
2 Bureau International des Societies Gerants Les Droits D’Enregistrement et de Reproduction 
Mecanique 
201 
As you will see from the list of headings of this address, I am somewhat like the 
dramatist trying to contain a mighty battle within confining walls, but may I suggest 
that you let the challenges “on your imaginary forces work”.3 
During the 55 years which I have mentioned, there have been extraordinary 
developments on the technological level, which have brought into debate the whole 
question of how, and whether, traditional copyright concepts can cope with the new 
environment, in particular as regards digital recording and transmission processes, 
satellite communication and the internet. Looking at the present situation, we see 
national, international and regional attempts to deal with these developments, but 
these attempts have not succeeded as regards all the legal aspects involved (for instance 
in the application of the internet making-available right introduced by the WIPO 
Treaties 1996), or with the challenges to the exclusive right system posed by the 
opening of the floodgates of communication through the massive and increasing 
amounts of protected material available throughout the world on the internet. So what 
I seek to do here is to summarise the challenges as I see them, and suggest some 
approaches to be adopted to meet them. I do emphasise that my suggestions are for 
discussion and by no means submitted as the final, or only, answers. 
I use the term “old era” to describe not so much a chronological stage, but what might 
be called the analogue age, and “new era” to describe the digital age, suggesting 1996 as 
marking the point when international law made its first attempt to deal with the 
internet challenges, in the WIPO Treaties.  
B Old era approaches 
1 DISCRIMINATORY PROTECTION 
(a)  At the international level4 
The Berne Convention in its present version (1971) in general makes copyright 
protection depend on nationality of the author or place of publication (Article 3(1)), 
with certain additional territorial-based rules as regards cinematographic and 
architectural works (Article 4).5 Thus, as far as the Convention is concerned, an 
                                                             
3 Shakespeare, Henry V, Prologue. 
4 References herein to international instruments are to Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic works 1886–1971; Universal Copyright Convention; Rome Convention for 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, 1961; WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 1994 (TRIPS); World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 1996 (“WCT”), WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, 1996 (“WPPT”). Australia is a Contracting Party to all these instruments. 
5 See also the nationality and territorial criteria of the Universal Copyright Convention 1972 (Art. II), 
the Rome Convention 1961 (Arts 2 – 6) and the Phonograms Convention 1971 (Art.2). Note also the 
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author’s work which does not fulfil the Convention criteria is unprotected. It was said 
in justification of this discrimination that these rules would encourage membership of 
the Convention, but this argument no longer has any validity, if it ever had any: 
(i) there are now over 160 countries bound to comply with the 
substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, and only 11 not so 
bound (not being Berne, TRIPS or WIPO Copyright Treaty 
members).6 
 (ii) Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides 
that “everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author”. Discriminating against 
authors on grounds of nationality or other grounds breaches this 
principle, and, it may be suggested, conflicts with natural justice, for 
why should a human being who is a national of one country be 
protected, but not a human being who is a national of another 
country? 
(iii) From the practical point of view, discriminatory protection adds to 
costs of recognition and administration of rights, to the detriment of 
owners of rights in protected material, and to the financial liability of 
users. 
(b) At the national level 
With few exceptions, national copyright laws are on a discriminatory basis. Two 
reasons may be ascribed for this: firstly, the principle that a national law in general 
only deals with the actions of its subjects, or actions taking place in its territory, and 
secondly, because discriminatory protection is imposed by international or regional 
instruments. It is submitted that neither of these grounds provides sufficient 
justification for discrimination against authors or owners of related rights. 
(c)  At the regional level7 
                                                                                                                                                    
national treatment provisions of TRIPS (Art.2), the NAFTA Agreement (Art. 1703), and the 
Cartagena Agreement (Art.2). 
6 Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, San Marino, São Tomé e Principe, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Turkmenistan. 
7 References herein to regional instruments are to the North America Free Trade Association 
Agreement (Canada, Mexico, USA), USA Free Trade Agreements (including US-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, 2004), Cartagena Agreement (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, (Venezuela)) and 
European Union legislation (including seven European Community “Copyright Directives”). 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (after the Canberra Conference), the European 
Community is subsumed into the European Union. 
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The EC Copyright Directives contain discriminatory provisions (i.e. on bases related 
to European Community membership), e.g. the Database Directive, 1996 (Art.11) and 
the Artist’s Resale Right Directive, 2001 (Art.7). 
2 BORDERED REGULATION 
National laws and rules concerning assessment of infringement, and national practices 
as regards licensing are based in general on territorial considerations. In general, 
infringement is assessed according to the law of the country where the alleged 
infringing act takes place, and licensing for use of protected material is generally on a 
territorial basis. By means of reciprocal agreements, collecting societies may grant 
licences for use in several territories, but, as far as I am aware, no single collecting 
society at present grants licences permitting internet communication and 
downloading of all the material in its repertoire anywhere in the world (see II D 3 
below). 
3 EARTH BOUND DISCIPLINE 
No international or regional instrument at present deals specifically with the question 
of infringement of copyright in Space (or, for that matter, in extraterritorial areas on 
Earth). See C.3 below. 
C New era approaches 
1 NON-DISCRIMINATORY PROTECTION 
It is submitted that all authors, performers, phonogram producers and broadcasters 
should be granted protection by copyright or related rights and that the present 
discriminatory rules in this respect should be abolished. The necessary amendments 
should be made to the abovementioned international instruments, and to national 
laws and the EC Copyright Directives and other regional legislation. 
2 BORDERED AND BORDERLESS REGULATION 
It is submitted that present practices as to bordered regulation should in general be 
retained, but that new procedures for use of protected material in the borderless 
environment created by the internet should be adopted, where effective procedures are 
not at present available. The precedent for this approach has been foreshadowed by 
the internet making-available right granted by Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright and 
Treaty, and Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(replicated and expanded as to beneficiaries in Article 3 of the EC Information Society 
Directive). These instruments refer to the authors’ right of communication to the 
public (as established in the Berne Convention) but add the vital specification, 
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“including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that 
members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them”, in other words, on the internet. Using this approach, rules for the 
internet should: 
(i) clarify that the persons who make available online are the persons 
responsible for the websites carrying accessible material and those 
involved in effecting the relevant transmissions, with authorising or 
contributory acts of uploaders and link providers (see Part II.B. 2(a) 
below); 
(ii) clarify that making available online takes place at the location of the 
initial transmission of the accessed signal, and at all points of 
reception of such signal (see II B. 2(b) below); 
(iii) clarify the reach of limitations and exceptions and rules regarding 
private copying, peer-to-peer communication and upload to social 
networking sites; and 
(iv) distinguish between the transmission signal and the transmission 
content manifested by the signal, and indicating what rights there 
should respectively be in the signal and the manifestation. 
The application of these rules should lead to recognition of borderless rights with 
bordered and borderless application, exercise and enforcement of rights. 
3 LICENSING 
In conjunction with the rules mentioned under (i)-(iv) above, systems or procedures 
allowing global licensing of material on the internet should be available, while 
preserving present practices as to licensing on a territorial basis. See II.F. Solution 6 
below. 
4 ENFORCEMENT 
Particular rules as to enforcement of the internet making available right should be 
developed, permitting internationally enforceable orders in relation to unauthorised 
use of protected material. 
5 COSMIC DISCIPLINE 
The new era requires the formulation of rules concerning the creation of and 
regulation of the use of protected material in extraterritorial areas, including Space.8  
                                                             
8 For proposals in this area see J.A.L. Sterling “Space Copyright Law: the new dimension” 54 Jour. 
Copr. Soc’y 348 (2007), on line at www.qmipri.org/research.html.  
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D The debate on principles 
1  THE JUSTIFICATION FOR COPYRIGHT 
Among the arguments justifying copyright may be mentioned: 
 Encouragement of creativity 
 Recognition of human and moral rights 
 Economic benefits 
 Protection of investment 
 Public interest in creation and dissemination of knowledge and the arts.9 
In my submission, the main justification for copyright is that it protects and promotes 
the creative products of the human mind, and is based on the principles of respect and 
reward for the creator; such justification implies the necessity to ensure public access 
to protected material on fair and practical terms. 
In the 300 years of copyright history to date, there has been much discussion on the 
justification for copyright, but in recent years arguments for abolition or restriction of 
the right have been advanced with increasing vigour. What has caused this? At present 
we can only surmise, but two factors seem to be prominent in the debate, namely the 
technical advances that have made protected material widely accessible in easily 
copyable forms, and the expectation of users to have such material at their disposal 
anywhere, anytime.  
These two factors have led on the one hand to new means of creativity and on the 
other to massive use of protected material in ways not authorised by the rightowner, in 
particular unauthorised file sharing and other forms of unauthorised copying. Thus 
the lines of the pro- and anti- copyright battle are drawn, and it is, I suggest, 
appropriate to examine the arguments advanced, not by polemic exaggeration, but by 
logical and objective analysis of the facts before us. 
2  THE RIGHTOWNER AND THE DISSEMINATOR 
(a)  The author and the content provider 
A tendency has grown up in recent years to delete the individual author from overall 
assessments in the field of copyright law. Authorship is regarded by some as a 
romantic idea, with the authors disappearing in a general mêlée of “content providers” 
in a sort of supermarket of entertainment and information. The fact that the individual 
author is the originator, the fons et origo of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works should never be forgotten, nor should John Milton’s great statement in 
                                                             
9 For fuller listing of justifications for copyright see J.A.L. Sterling World Copyright Law (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2008) (“WCL”) paras 2.27–2.42: for contrary arguments see para.2.43. 
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Aereopagitica: “a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit”. We should, at 
all costs, recognise, preserve and protect that spirit. 
 (b)  Rightowner/disseminator partnership  
Works, performances and productions lie hidden from humanity unless they are 
disseminated. Conversely, without such material, disseminators (publishers, 
producers, broadcasters, website operators) would have nothing to disseminate. At the 
same time, disseminators are usually rightowners, e.g. performers in their 
performances, producers in their sound recordings and films, broadcasters in their 
broadcasts and publishers in their publications. The rights and interests of rightowners 
and disseminators are thus inextricably entwined. Consequently, I submit that the 
future of copyright depends for its success on the effective collaboration and mutual 
recognition of the respective interests of these parties. 
3 COMBINING REGULATION AND FREEDOM 
In the new era, there is a call for greater freedom for the use of disseminated material, 
so that new creativity based on pre-existing material will flourish. This fact must be 
recognised, but such recognition must be linked to the preservation of the rights of 
those who produce protected material. 
E  Current issues 
1  GENERAL 
In Annex I some of the current issues in the field of copyright are listed under three 
separate headings, to which reference should be made.  
As to Section 1, the issues listed may be divided into those relating to legal issues 
(points (1)-(4)) (diversities in systems and private international law), while the issues 
under points (5)-(7) (balancing interests of rightowners and the public, discriminatory 
protection, developing countries) may be regarded as political issues. The use of 
protected material in Space (point 8) could be regarded as involving both legal and 
political issues. 
2 PARTICULAR, OTHER THAN TECHNOLOGICAL AND  INTERNET 
As to Section 2, the issues listed under points (1) and (2) concern definitions with 
important practical implications: the definition of joint authorship (at present often 
different in different countries) having repercussions both on exercise of rights and 
term of protection, and the definition of place of broadcast (place of transmission, 
place of reception, or both) affecting questions of licensing and infringement. Issues 
under points (3) and (4) concern diversities in the definition of authorship of 
cinematographic works: is an author of a cinematographic work under the law of one 
207 
country entitled to claim protection in another country with difference authorship 
criteria, and is an employee who is initial owner in one country, entitled to claim 
protection in a country where, according to the general provisions of the local law, the 
employer is the initial owner?  
Point (5) concerns scope and content of moral rights, a subject on which there are 
fundamentally different approaches in national laws (e.g. those of the United States 
and France). Points (6)-(9) relate to questions of protection of databases, audiovisual 
performances and broadcasts, all the subject of study in WIPO with a view to 
formulating new international instruments. Protection of traditional works (point 7) is 
an ongoing issue likely to become of increasing importance as the commercial value of 
such works increases. Terms of protection for performers and record producers (point 
10) are the subject of widespread discussion and the introduction of EU proposals for 
extension of terms.  
The issue as to whether there should be a right to make transformative use of pre-
existing material lies at the heart of the debate on the function and purpose of 
copyright, and is particularly relevant in the context of material made available online 
(see II below). 
Issues in rights management and licensing, including those relating to orphan works 
and other orphan material (points (12) (13)) raise problems in the fields of definition 
and of administration, and come to the forefront in relation to online libraries (see 3 
below). Decoder cards (point 14) are mentioned as an issue raising, as regards trans-
border use, questions of licensing and competition law.10 On the horizon, we have the 
problems which will undoubtedly arise in relation to cloud computing. 
3  TECHNOLOGICAL AND INTERNET 
The issues listed in Section 3 deal in points (1)-(4) with general challenges resulting 
from the borderless nature of the modern communication environment, issues which 
arise in general because copyright has traditionally been formulated as a system of 
territorially based rights, whereas online communication is in principle borderless, but 
with possibility of territorial limitation. 
Specific issues in the online field are listed in points (5)-(10), including the widely 
discussed issues of the licensing of the use of protected material in library digitisations 
for online availability11, and of liability of internet service providers in point (10). 
                                                             
10 In relation to the European Union, see the UK case Murphy v Media Production Services Ltd.[2007] 
EWHC 391 (Admin.). 
11 See Part II E.1 below. As at 1 January 2010, the Google Book Settlement awaits final approval by 
the New York District Court (18 February 2010) and if so approved will, undoubtedly mark a 
milestone in the history of copyright.  
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Format shifting (point (11)) raises fundamental points as to whether purchasers may, 
for private purposes, do what they wish with purchased copies. Another fundamental 
issue arises under point (12), namely whether private copying exemptions allow or 
should allow circumvention of technological protection measures. 
4  PRIORITIES 
It is submitted that the issues concerning developing countries, transformative use, 
rights management and licensing, orphan works and other orphan material, peer-to-
peer file sharing, user-generated content and liability of internet service providers 
should be regarded as of top priority for the finding of rapid and practical solutions if 
copyright is to be effectively recognised in the new era. 
F  Current aims 
1  UNIVERSAL AVAILABILITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE 
Proposals for the creation of online digital libraries as part of projects to place all 
material in the field of knowledge and the arts at the disposal of the public raise 
questions of the practical means of licensing of protected material for such uses (see E. 
1. above). 
2  Regulated use of all material available online 
Hand in hand with the aim of the universal online availability of the contents of 
libraries, and similar projects, go the desire and requirement of the public to have 
access to such facilities online by unfettered means. Should such access be free, or 
subject to payment?  
PART II: ONLINE AVAILABILITY OF PROTECTED    
 MATERIAL  
A  General 
Making protected material available online involves the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public, and possibly other rights. It may be 
said that everyone using the internet makes copies and communicates. The 
alternatives for the administration of the exclusive rights are: 
1  TOLERANCE OF INFRINGEMENT 
A right that is not exercised becomes outmoded and liable to repeal – so tolerance of 
infringement threatens the continuance of copyright as a comprehensive means of 
protecting creativity and its associated activities and investment. 
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2  REGULATION OF USE 
Regulation of use of protected material online represents an area of copyright and 
related rights in which many challenges remain to be confronted and resolved, as 
outlined in B. – E. below. 
B Relevant rights 
1 INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL  LEGISLATION 
Clarity in the scope and content of the reproduction, public communication and 
distribution rights is essential for ordered regulation of copyright and related rights. 
National, international and regional legislation contains provisions in this regard but 
leaves many gaps, of which the following problems are examples. 
2  SOME PROBLEMS 
(a)  Who makes available online? 
There should be clarity in defining the liability (whether primary, or on the basis of 
authorisation or contributory infringement) of those involved in making protected 
material available online, including program providers, file uploaders, hosts, file 
storers, central index providers, link providers, telecommunicators and accessors 
(clarifications not provided by the WIPO Treaties).12  
(b)  Where does making available online take place? 
The WIPO Treaties 1996 do not make clear where it is that the making available 
online takes place. It is suggested that it should be accepted that the points where 
making available online takes place include the point of initial transmission and all 
points of reception of the transmitted material.13 
(c)  Meaning of “publication” 
It is submitted that making available online could be held to constitute publication in 
terms of Article 3(3) of the Berne Convention (1971 version). This may depend on 
whether it is accepted that making available online constitutes distribution of copies, 
see below. 
(d)  Is distribution of copies involved? 
                                                             
12 For detailed listing of potential infringements by those involved in unauthorised making available 
online, see WCL para 13A.01. 
13 For discussion on points (a) and (b), and related issues, with reference to relevant cases in Canada, 
Germany, USA and other countries see WCL paras 9.29–9.44. 
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The question has arisen in a number of cases in the United States as to whether 
making available online constitutes distribution of copies.14 One of the points of 
contention is whether the mere placing of material on site for online accessibility 
constitutes distribution of copies. It is, however, accepted in some decisions that where 
there is downloading, there is a distribution of copies. 
The implications of the decision as to whether, and if so in what circumstances, online 
distribution of copies constitutes publication of the material involved will affect the 
administration of rights, both as to ascertaining subsistence of protection (if a 
distribution constitutes first publication) and as to exercise of the exclusive right to 
distribute copies, as distinct from the right to communicate to the public: furthermore, 
definition of the place of distribution (e.g. place of site, place of download or both) will 
need clarification. 
C  Limitations and exceptions 
Legislation in the United States and the European Union provides certain “safe 
harbours” for internet service providers (“ISPs”), e.g., release from liability for 
infringement caused by, or possibly through, specific acts of hosting, or caching, or 
mere conduit, where certain conditions are fulfilled.15 There seems to be a general 
misconception that in some way these provisions provide a general release from 
liability, but it must be emphasised that release is only obtainable on fulfilment of the 
respective conditions, and in the case of the requirement of takedown notices, there 
can be infringing acts unless and until the valid notice is given and acted upon. 
The difficulties in international regulation by specific limitations or exceptions are 
manifold. The factors militating against obligatory international rules in this area are: 
(i)  the need to adopt provisions which conform to the three step test.16 
(ii)  the need to revise the relevant international instruments (Berne 
Convention? WIPO Treaties?). 
(iii) The Great Divide between the United States “fair use” exception on 
the one hand and on the other hand the more limited “fair dealing” 
                                                             
14 See WCL para.9.05. 
15 For details, see WCL paras 13.42–13.47. 
16Berne Convention, Art.9(2); TRIPS Agreement, Art.13; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art.10(2); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art.16. For the complexities involved in the interpretation 
and application of the three step test, see the French Mulholland case quoted in F. Solution 2 below, 
ProLitteris v AargauerZeitung AG et al, Swiss Supreme Court, 27 June 2007, (2008) 39 IIC 990, and C. 
Geiger “Rethinking copyright limitations in the Information Society – the Swiss Supreme Court leads 
the way” (2008) 39 IIC 942. 
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approach of the UK and other more restrictive approaches of the 
civil law system, as in France. 
In this connection, the area of transformative use is of particular importance. In 
addition to traditional means of modifying protected material, online manifestations 
of such material can be digitally altered in ways not previously available, e.g. by 
addition to, or deletion from, digital images, and “remix” and “mashups”, in particular 
of audio and visual recordings.  
Internet users, young and old, carry out these transforming processes, and the 
question arises as to whether such activities require the permission of the relevant 
rightowner, or whether they fall under some exception or limitation such as private 
copying or parody. The difficulties in answering this question in any particular case 
are manifold – firstly, because the rules on private copying and permitted 
transformation differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, (see (iii) above), and secondly, 
because judgment in determining whether a permitted limit is exceeded is by its nature 
subjective, since there are no specific measuring rules for calculating infringement. 
These aspects have in particular received the attention of Professor Lawrence Lessig, 
who is concerned with “criminalising” of children (and others) as a result of sanctions 
imposed under the criminal provisions of copyright law concerning infringement; 
furthermore, Lessig considers that what he calls “amateur creativity” can be stifled by 
the exercise of exclusive rights concerning copying and transformative use. 
Lessig is by no means an abolitionist; he does not “support people using technology to 
violate other people’s rights”, and believes that it is appropriate “to create mechanisms 
to make it simple for copyright owners to collect revenues for work made available”, 
and that “we ought to be enabling an amateur and regulating the commercial”17, and 
considers that “Congress needs to decriminalise file sharing, either by authorising at 
least non-commercial file-sharing, with taxes to cover a reasonable royalty to the 
artists whose work is shared, or by authorising a simple blanket licensing procedure, 
whereby users could, for a low fee, buy the right to freely file share”.18 
Certainly one can argue that art is built on transformative use, and that to stifle such 
use is to stifle art. But that does not mean that such use should be unfettered or 
uncontrolled, or allowed to bring harm to the creator’s economic or moral interests. 
Here, then, in the context of the internet, is the crux of the problem. On the one hand 
we can envisage laws and court decisions being sympathetic to children, and others, 
who, in the privacy of their homes remix and mashup the works of others. But what of 
                                                             
17 As reported in an interview published in Managing Intellectual Property March 2009, 26–30. I am 
grateful to Malcolm Langley for reference to this interview. 
18 Lawrence Lessig “Remix: making art and commerce thrive in the hybrid economy (Penguin 2008) at 
271 
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the communication of such transformations to other persons? Let us consider, first of 
all, the situation in the analogue world, and assume that Leonardo da Vinci is still 
alive, and that without authorisation someone publishes in a book a transformation of 
the painting of Mona Lisa, showing the addition of a long red beard to the lady’s face.  
In most countries, the rightowners in the painting will have remedies where the 
publication is commercial, but even here the “fair use” defence in the United States 
may run in that country, but not in other countries. Then what about non-commercial 
use – supposing the user simply makes copies of the transformation and distributes 
them to all his/her friends, or to all the world? Even if “non-commercial” 
transformative use is to be permitted, what is “commercial use”?19 And even if the use 
is non-commercial, what about the author’s moral rights? If you insult me, you cannot 
escape liability merely by saying that you did not make money out of your insult. 
In the internet context, the same problem arises. One can envisage a blanket licensing 
system in which (by, or on the analogy of, a Creative Commons licence) the author 
permits transformative use of the protected material for non-commercial purposes. 
Even leaving aside the definition of commercial, what is to be done when the 
transformative use damages the integrity of the work? Surely the author (and the 
performer) must be able to reserve exercise of the moral rights.20 
In sum, it is suggested that there is a clear distinction to be made between: 
(1)  copying and transformation of protected material by a private individual for 
that individual’s private purposes: such copying should, it is submitted, be 
permissible without specific authorisation by the rightowners, provided that 
the material copied or transformed has come into the possession or control of 
the copier legitimately; 
(2)  communication of protected material to persons outside the private and 
domestic circle of the communicator, whether, in the internet context, this is 
by way of file-sharing, or upload to a social networking site, or otherwise: 
here it is suggested that, in the global context, licensing is necessary for 
legitimation. Such licensing can validate communication of the 
untransformed material, or of the transformed material, but in either case, the 
licence should, it is submitted, be subject to the exercise of the moral rights 
concerned. The global licence is necessary because limitations and exceptions 
applying under specific national laws do not have international application 
and validity. Preliminary consent case by case does not seem to be a practical 
                                                             
19 On the difficulty on drawing the line between “commercial” and “non-commercial” see Paul 
Sugden “How long is a piece of string? The meaning of “commercial scale” in copyright piracy” 
[2009] EIPR 202 
20 Such reservation may be covered in the proposed global licensing system: see F. Solution 6 below. 
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option. For a proposal which would enable such licensing to take place on a 
global scale, see F Solution 6 below, and Annex II. 
D  Cross-border licensing 
1  THE NEED TO CO-ORDINATE CONTROL, LICENSING  AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
Control of use of protected material should embrace the ability to prohibit or license 
particular uses. Cross-border licensing should embrace a system which will effectively 
authorise the use of the protected item concerned for making available online for 
access anywhere in the world. Enforcement should embrace the ability to pursue and 
obtain remedies for infringement wherever it occurs. Rights cannot be effectively 
exercised unless each of these elements is available to the rightowner, or the 
rightowner’s representative, permitting co-ordinated recognition of rights. 
2  THE BLESSING OF OBTAINABILITY AND THE  NEGATIVE EFFECT 
OF UNOBTAINABILITY 
In today’s world, uploading and downloading of protected and unprotected material 
are activities as easily undertaken as breathing in and out. Since such actions may 
include the associated actions of transforming material which is accessed, as 
abovementioned, users will expect facilities allowing instantaneous licensing of the 
intended use, subject to conditions which are accepted as maintainable in the interests 
of rightowners and the public. If the desired licences are obtainable on equitable terms, 
the exercise of copyright will be accepted by the public. If such licences are 
unobtainable, public opinion or influential sections of public opinion may rise against 
the recognition of copyright itself. 
3  MANDATED RIGHTS 
(a)  Split rights, split ownership, split territorial reach 
One of the factors militating against the effective recognition of copyright and related 
rights in the internet context is that the initial rights comprised in copyright (for 
instance the reproduction and public communication rights) can be split as to 
exercise, one person or body administering one right, another person or body another 
right. Ownership of rights may also be split between different territories.  
(b)  Split collecting society mandates 
Collecting societies historically administer rights for their respective territories and 
conclude reciprocal licences for the exploitation of their repertoires in other 
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territories. The terms of such reciprocal agreements give problems,21 but even when 
these are overcome, there remains the point that there are rights which are not 
mandated to a collecting society or societies for all territories.  
(c)  Compulsory collective exercise? 
Article 9(1) of the EC Satellite and Cable Retransmission Directive (93/83/EEC) 
provides that Member States shall ensure that the right of copyright owners, and 
holders of related rights, to grant or refuse authorisation to a cable operator for a cable 
transmission, may be exercised only through a collecting society. The question arises 
whether a compendious solution to the problem of internet licensing could be 
achieved by a similar provision that the internet licensing right could only be exercised 
through a collecting society. However, internationally agreed legislation would be 
necessary for the effective institution of such a provision, and it is difficult to envisage 
the achievement of such legislation within the foreseeable future. 
4  UNMANDATED RIGHTS 
(a)  Identifiable non-member material 
Non-member material may be defined as material in respect of which the relevant 
rights are not administered by the collecting society concerned.  
A collecting society can (in default of special legislation) only legitimately authorise 
use of material covered by its mandates or those of societies with which it has the 
necessary reciprocal agreements. Non-member material can be licensed by the 
rightowner concerned, but legitimate licensing of such material by a collecting society 
needs legislation, see (b) below. 
(b)  Extended collective licensing 
Undoubtedly the ability of collecting societies to license the use of material in which 
the relevant rights are owned by non-members (the “extended collective licensing 
system”, as applied in Scandinavia) would facilitate the administration of the right of 
making available online.22 Such a system may (as in Scandinavia) be used to license the 
use of orphan material (see (c) below). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
21 For description of some of these problems, and cases before the European Commission in this 
connection, see WCL para.26.21. 
22 For description of the extended collective licensing system, with references to commentaries 
thereon (including the Scandinavian systems), see WCL para.12.24, and Annex III (3). 
215 
(c)  Orphan material 
The problem of licensing material where the rightowner is unidentifiable or 
untraceable has been the subject of extensive studies.23 But no regional or international 
solution of this problem has yet been reached. 
I make so bold as to present at this Conference a legislative proposal concerning the 
licensing of orphan works and other orphan material under provisions of amendments 
to the Australian Copyright Act 1968: see Annex III. 
5 IDENTIFICATION: THE SINE QUA NON 
What is being copied and communicated must be identified, otherwise the use of 
protected material cannot be properly regulated. How will protected material be 
identified? I submit that for effective global exercise of the internet right there must be 
some form of notification of all items of protected material, to an administering body 
or administering bodies, with linked databases permitting access for rights 
administration purposes.  
All material protected by copyright or related rights can be recorded digitally. So I 
submit that if I want to protect my creation, performance, recording, broadcast or 
database in the digital world effectively, I must notify its details to the relevant 
administering body. Ideally, the notification will include a copy of the item concerned. 
With computerised facilities, I can make the notification by a touch on a key or a pad.  
Collecting societies already have extensive and sophisticated databases covering their 
respective repertoires. It is understood that YouTube also has in its Content 
Identification and Management System an extensive means of searching and recording 
data concerning protected material, as provided by rightowners.24 The availability of a 
global database of interlinked information concerning all notified protected material is 
not beyond the bounds of possibility; indeed, it is a development we could see within a 
relatively short period. 
Notification must be distinguished from compulsory registration as a condition of 
copyright subsistence, such formality being forbidden by Article 3(2) of the Berne 
Convention. 
                                                             
23 See WCL paras 12.32–12.37 for general description of the problems involved in orphan material 
and my proposal for a solution in UK law, online at www.qmipri.org/research.htm. As to the USA, 
see the US Copyright Office Report on Orphan Works, January 2006, and Bills presented to 
Congress, S2913, HR 5889. In the UK, the Digital Economy Bill 2009 contained a provision 
empowering the Secretary of State to authorise extended collective licensing schemes concerning use 
of orphan works (cl.43) (cf Annex III), but this provision was the subject of debate and was dropped 
from the Digital Economy Act 2010. 
24 See www.youtube.com/t/contentid.  
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6  EXERCISE OF RIGHT 
(a)  Prohibition: With respect to prohibition of use of protected material, we have 
to take into account the concerns expressed by Professor Lessig; and other 
writers. Lessig accepts the value of copyright in encouraging and sustaining 
creativity, but as abovementioned his concerns include: 
(i)  the challenge of the effective exercise of the exclusive rights of 
copyright in the modern communication environment, and 
(ii)  the criminalising of those (particularly children) who copy or 
communicate without authorisation.25 
I believe these concerns must be taken into account in the exercise of 
copyright in the new era. 
Consequently, we need first to establish those conditions in which the 
exercise of the prohibition right will be justified in the digital (copying) and 
online (communication) environment. 
Here the three step test, now law throughout countries bound by the TRIPS 
Agreement, including the USA and all countries of the European Union, 
must be taken into account. 
(b)  Legitimated use 
(i)  Potential infringements: where material is hosted online, 
unauthorised use of such material involves infringement (or 
authorising of or contributing to infringement) by the uploader, the 
host, the link provider and the accessor (and by the storer, where the 
material is stored for use by the host), and possibly, where 
knowledge of infringement subsists, by the program provider. A 
multiplicity of separate rights will be infringed by unauthorised use, 
e.g. in the case of sound recordings, those of the author, the 
performers and the sound recording producer, and in the case of 
films, depending on the applicable national law, of the director, 
performers, producer and others.26 
Accordingly, permissions covering a multitude of rights and, at 
present, from a multitude of rightowners must be obtained to ensure 
global legitimacy of use. 
                                                             
25See C above. 
26 For a detailed description of the potential infringements involved in unauthorised file sharing and 
file hosting, see WCL para. 13A.01. 
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(ii)  Particular areas: in the context of the internet, two areas need 
particular consideration in formulating rules for legitimated use:  
(i)  peer-to-peer file sharing of films and sound recordings; 
(ii)  upload of protected material to social networking sites such 
as YouTube, and public communication following such 
upload. 
The questions involved include: 
(a)  Legitimation of the initial act of sharing, or uploading to 
site. 
(b) Legitimation of hosting, onward transmission and storage 
facilities. 
(c) Legitimation of accessor downloading and subsequent use 
(e.g. further use of material on a social networking site such 
as Facebook). 
(iii)  Individual and collective licensing: two forms of licensing are 
available: 
(a)  individual licensing: that is, licensing by the rightowner (or 
rightowner’s representative) without the intervention of a 
collecting society as where, for instance, a rightowner: 
(i)  provides sites with the facility of legitimated 
download (as in the case of iTunes): whether such 
facilities will eradicate unauthorised peer-to-peer 
file sharing remains to be seen, but such an 
outcome at present seems unlikely; 
(ii)  licenses the social networking site directly, e.g. 
where the rightowner has a contract with the site 
operator permitting online use of specific material 
on specific conditions: such contracts will only 
cover the particular networking site concerned; 
(b)  licensing by collecting societies: here one of the problems 
will be the territorial scope of the licence. 
(c)  Peer-to-peer file sharing 
I believe that it will be generally accepted that an overall exception for peer-
to-peer file sharing will not conform to the three step test – it is not a special 
case, it affects the normal exploitation of the material and it is prejudicial to 
the rights of the author, since it deprives him or her of the right to determine 
the conditions of copying and communicating the work. 
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So how will peer-to-peer file sharing be regulated? I submit that this can be 
comprehensively achieved by a system of permission rather than prohibition, 
see F. Solution 6. below. 
(d)  YouTube and similar facilities 
YouTube and similar social networking sites allow upload of material for 
making available online. Without the necessary authorisations, such activities 
involve, where protected material is concerned, infringement of copyright or 
related rights by the uploader, the host, and the accessor, and possibly other 
persons (see above). 
The status of all material which it is proposed to use on the internet must be 
identified before such use, if infringement of rights or other unlawful acts are 
to be avoided. 
The preliminary establishment of status of the material concerned in this 
context, in a rapid and comprehensive manner, is thus essential for the 
effective control of the use of protected material on the internet. 
Systems are already in use for the identification of the subsistence and scope 
of rights, but there can be gaps in these systems, for instance as regards 
geographical extent and orphan material, see below. However, we may 
proceed by considering material of which the protection status is established. 
Protected material uploaded to social networking sites may be described as 
“user-generated” and may consist of various categories of material, including 
(i)  “User solo material”: the production of the uploader alone: in this 
case the uploader may, if the production consists of such material 
alone, and subject to legislative limitations or exceptions, and any 
conditions imposed by the website operator, determine the 
conditions of copying and communication, for instance by a 
Creative Commons or similar licence, or by notification to an 
administering body; 
(ii)  “Identified third party non-transformed material”: protected 
material not created, performed, produced etc. by the uploader. To 
forbid all such uploading without providing legitimation, or offering 
of the possibility of such legitimation, in my view adopts an attitude 
which does not take into account the realities of the present 
situation. 
(iii) “Identified third party transformed material”: While third parties 
may authorise in advance the uploading of non-transformed 
material in which they own rights, the licensing of upload of 
transformed material presents particular problems in two areas, 
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namely the exercise of limitations and exceptions, and the 
application of moral rights. A limitation or exception which is 
applicable in one country may not free an upload from infringement 
in another country: for instance, an uploading of substantial extracts 
of a protected work may be permissible in the US within the “fair 
use” provisions of the US Copyright Act, but not under French law, 
so that download in France would infringe.  
As regards moral rights, it is unlikely that authors would wish to give 
preliminary permission for transformations which infringe the 
integrity right, and, indeed, in some countries such permissions 
would be invalid because of the unwaivability of moral rights. It 
seems, therefore, that to achieve legitimation in this area the choices 
are 
(a) a system of preliminary reference to the author or 
performer of all transforming uploads of the work or 
performance concerned, for decision as to whether moral 
rights are infringed, and, if so, the necessary takedown (a 
system which hardly seems practical) 27, or  
(b)  an internationally accepted exception covering 
transformative use on social networking sites (a provision 
which is unlikely to obtain universal acceptance), or 
(c)  a system of licensing under which (i) the rightowner 
permits transformative use, subject to the exercise of moral 
rights in the material concerned, and (ii) the site owner 
permits upload subject to possible claims for infringement 
of rights, the uploader to be responsible in this respect. 
(iv)  “Non-identified third-party material”: For the site operator 
legitimately to license the uploading of orphan material, some form 
of universally applicable extended collective licensing would need to 
be available. National systems for dealing with orphan material may 
be different. Possibly a solution would be for the site operator to 
allow upload on the basis of indemnity by the uploader against 
subsequent claims, and other conditions. 
                                                             
27 Note that, in addition to the moral rights granted to the author by Art.6bis of the Berne 
Convention, Art.5 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty grants the performer certain 
moral rights of attribution and integrity regarding live aural performances and performances fixed in 
phonograms. 
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(v)  “Incidentally included material”: It seems possible to envisage a 
situation where incidental use of protected material in uploads could 
be covered in the licensing provisions. 
Legitimated use may be achieved by direct licensing by the rightowner or rightowner’s 
representative concerned, or through agreements concluded between collecting 
societies and the networking site concerned. However, as indicated above, such 
agreements will not at present necessarily give global cover for access to the online 
material throughout the world. 
 E  Present studies and procedures 
1  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Among the extensive series of legislative reports, proposals and studies issued by the 
European Commission are those concerning management of copyright and related 
rights, and digital libraries.28 
Here, I would only mention that, in my view, proposals for the establishment of 
European Union-wide licences for the online use of protected material do not meet the 
practical requirements of rightowners, disseminators and users, namely licences which 
cover global accessibility on the internet. It is of limited use to the prospective licensee 
seeking geographically unrestricted licences to be offered an EU-wide licence which 
does not cover access in any country outside the EU. 
 2  UNITED KINGDOM 
Extensive studies and reviews of copyright law, including aspects of such law in the 
context of online use of protected material have been carried out in the UK: these 
include the Gowers Review on Intellectual Property, issued by the Intellectual Property 
Office, 2006, the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) 
Consultation on legislative options to address illicit peer-to-peer file sharing, July 
2008, the Intellectual Property Office “Rights Agency and P2P”, 2008, the BERR 
Interim Report “Digital Britain”, January 2009 and “Copyright in the digital world: 
what role for a Digital Rights Agency?”, March 2009. The proposals in and issues 
raised by these documents are under continuing study and here I would only mention 
                                                             
28 For studies concerning the copyright problems involved, see European Commission 
Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for 
legitimate online music services, 18 October 2005 and summary “Monitoring of the 2005 Music 
Online Recommendation”, 7 February 2008; “i2010: Digital Libraries High Level Expert Group-
Copyright Sub-Group Final Report on Digital Preservation, Orphan Works, and Out-of-Print 
Works” 4 July 2008, and related documents. For listing covering material issued 2004–2008, see 
WCL para.26.07. 
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the following passages with which, with respect, I entirely concur, and which are in 
line with the proposals which I make in this address: 
… In the new digital world, the ability to share content legally becomes ever 
more important and necessary. Traditional mechanisms to identify rights-
holders and acquire legal consent to share often need radical updating to 
meet the near-instant demands of this new world. There is a clear and 
unambiguous distinction between the legal and illegal sharing of content 
which we must urgently address. But we need to do so in a way that 
recognises that when there is very widespread behaviour and social 
acceptability of such behaviour that is at odds with the rules, then the rules, 
the business models that the rules have underpinned and the behaviour itself 
may all need to change … Our aim, in the rapidly changing digital world is a 
framework that is effective and enforceable, both nationally and across 
borders. But it must be one which also allows for innovation in platforms, 
devices and applications that make use of content and that respond to 
consumers’ desire to access content in the time and manner they want, 
allowing them to use it how they want, and at a price they are willing to pay.” 
(BERR Interim Report “Digital Britain”, January 2009, published by The 
Stationery Office, para.3.2) 
The proposal for a UK Digital Rights Agency is not in conflict with the global licensing 
agency proposal made in F. Solution 6 below: rather it could complement the 
operation of the global entity. See also the proposals in the Digital Economy Bill (first 
reading in the House of Lords, 19 November 2009, cf. C4.(c) above. 
3  ACAP  
Automated Content Access Protocol (ACAP) is “a non-proprietary protocol, 
developed by publishers, which is designed to ensure that anyone who publishes 
content on the web, and who wants to ensure that web crawlers used by search 
engines, and other online aggregators, can read and understand the terms and 
conditions of access and re-use [is able to do so]”.29 Undoubtedly this and similar 
systems may contribute to means of control of the use of protected material on the 
internet, within the context of a global licensing system as proposed hereunder: see F. 
Solution 6. 
                                                             
29 Quotation from ACAP website at www.the-acap.org, where details of the ACAP system and 
procedures are available. 
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F  Possible solutions 
By way of example I take peer-to-peer file sharing and social networking sites and 
consider six possible solutions (there may be others): 
Solution 1: Continue as at present  
(a)  Regarding peer-to-peer file sharing: two streams of activities by rightowners 
as regards unauthorised peer-to-peer file sharing are at present discernable: 
(i) licensing of download of specific items from specific sites (e.g. iTunes), 
and (ii) bringing of legal actions against unauthorised file-sharers, hosts and 
downloaders. 
As to licensed sites it is understood that at present these sites only offer 
download of protected material on a territorial basis. Since present solutions 
do not legitimate global download, the internet’s fundamental feature of 
global access is therefore not satisfied, such satisfaction being, it is submitted, 
essential for a solution that will be in the interests both of rightholders and 
the public.  
As to the bringing of actions for unauthorised file sharing activities, this is in 
the global sense ineffective, as witness the fact that, with new technology such 
as BitTorrent, the problem grows, and does not decrease. Furthermore, legal 
actions against non-commercial users can create a bad press for copyright, 
one that prejudices the continuance of copyright as we know it. In this 
connection, it must be doubted whether the “graduated response” system of 
enforcement in the French HADOPI legislation (2009), also being considered 
in the UK, will effectively eradicate unauthorised file sharing. Cf., in the UK, a 
somewhat similar procedure instituted by the Digital Economy Act 2010.  
(b)  Regarding social networking sites: As above indicated, it appears that the 
present systems of individual and collective licensing do not give 
comprehensive global cover, either because, in the case of individual licensing 
they relate to limited repertoires, or, in the case of collective licensing because 
they are territorially limited, or limited as to the rights covered by the licence.  
Solution 2: Introduce limitations and exceptions. Limitations and exceptions are the 
minefield of copyright. Try to extend limitations regarding private copying, and the 
French will rise in arms and cry “There is no right of private copying”, as the Cour de 
Cassation has declared.30 Try to cut down limitations and exceptions, by arguing, for 
                                                             
30 Perquin et al v Films Alain Sarde (“Mulholland Drive” case) TGI Paris, 3 Ch. April 30, 2004, (2004) 
202 R.I.D.A. 323; CA Paris, 4 Ch B. April 22, 2005, (2006) 207 R.I.D.A. 374, (2006) 37 I.I.C. 112; Cass 
civ. February 28, (2006) 209 R.I.D.A. 323, (2006) 37 I.I.C. 760; CA Paris, April 4, 2007, (2007) 213 
R.I.D.A. 379 (sub nom. Association UFC Que Choisir v Société Universal Pictures Video France). 
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instance, that the US fair use system contravenes the three step test31, and the United 
States will storm out of the room. Far better to leave the international rules basically as 
they are, and work within them. 
Solution 3: Require sites which host protected material to monitor and filter out 
infringing material. Even if it were possible to introduce effective monitoring and 
filtering (which is contested), such actions will not, by themselves, regulate 
unauthorised file sharing, since in the now prevalent BitTorrent system there is no 
hosting website, no central list of copyable files – but everyone shares by individual 
exchange of constituent parts brought together through a myriad of transmissions of 
file segments to the accessor at the end of the process. By all means, as seems to be the 
present accent in legislative proposals, introduce provisions legitimating ISP activity, 
safe harbours and so forth – but without the other side of the medal, namely licensing, 
the eradication of unauthorised material from the internet gives only half the requisite. 
Solution 4: Abolish the right to control making available on the internet. To achieve 
abolition of the right, the WIPO Treaties would have to be amended to delete basic 
provisions of the instruments (in WCT Article 8, in WPPT Articles 10, 14), national 
laws granting the right would have to be repealed as would the relevant provisions of 
the EC Information Society Directive (Article 3). Solution 4 is not a serious contestant, 
unless rightowners fail to provide practical licensing systems: in the case of such 
failure, the maintenance of the right itself would indeed be under threat. 
Solution 5: Introduce a levy system. It may be that a levy system can provide part, but 
possibly not the whole of the solution. First and foremost we have to consider its 
international acceptability, and the modalities of its application.  
Solution 6: Provide global licensing of protected material. I believe that it is axiomatic 
that the solution to the internet challenges, including unauthorised file sharing and the 
making available online of user-generated content on social networking sites, requires 
a global solution, not one based on territorial division of rights. The advent of the 
internet requires changes in copyright licensing procedures to reflect the borderless 
nature of internet transmission, which permits instantaneous access to online material 
throughout the world. 
The right to make available online needs to be regarded as universal in character, with 
corresponding licensing facilities covering both reproduction and communication to 
the public.32 
                                                             
31 Cf. Berne Convention, Art.9(2); TRIPS Agreement, Art.13; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art.10(1); 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art.16(2). 
32 Cf. the French Case Perathoner and others v Paumier and others, TGI Paris, 3 Ch, May 23, 2001: 
(2002) 191 R.I.D.A. 308; [2003] E.C.D.R. 76 (unauthorised digital communication on the internet 
infringes both reproduction and public communication rights). 
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This why I have proposed the GILA System for global internet licensing under which 
rightowners or their representatives will entrust (either directly or through a collecting 
society) a central body with the global administration of their rights in the context of 
internet use (existing practices regarding broadcasts, hard copy publication etc being 
maintained).33  
In brief, the GILA licence covering global use of protected material on the internet 
would, with “tailor made” conditions, be available to file-sharers, hosts, storers, social 
networking site operators and uploaders, broadcasters, the press, and others wishing 
to upload to or use protected material on the internet. 
The advantages of this system are: 
1 No need for legislation introducing limitations or exceptions. 
2  Legitimated use of protected material, meeting the concerns expressed by 
Professor Lessig and others concerning “criminalisation” resulting from 
unauthorised file sharing, and avoidance of disputes concerning infringing 
uploads on social networking sites.34 
In my submission, global and territorial licensing of protected material should be on 
the basis of freedom of choice for rightholders. Thus a rightholder, or group of 
rightholders, may wish to license the material themselves, directly to hosts, networking 
sites etc. However, I believe there can be disadvantages for rightholders in so 
proceeding, since separate contracts need to be made with a multiplicity of uploaders, 
hosts or accessors, and users can be reluctant to seek licences from many sources. To 
an extent, the same applies where collecting societies can only give licences covering 
certain territories. 
It would of course be open to individual rightowners or collecting societies to remain 
outside GILA. However, it is thought that it will be attractive for the licence seeker, 
and thus of advantage to the rightowner, to have a central point to which to refer for 
the necessary licence. 
So, it may be asked, if the rights to make protected material available online are, at any 
rate to a certain extent, to be put in the hands of a central licensing agency, quis custodi 
et ipsos custodes? Who will control the controllers? Such control is in my view essential 
so that all concerned can be assured of fair and practical licence terms and that rights 
are not abused. Possibly one could consider that in case of dispute between the global 
licensing body and the applicant for a licence, the matter could be settled by the WIPO 
Arbitration and Mediation Centre, which already has extensive experience in the 
                                                             
33 See Annex II for summary of the system, and for a fuller description see J.A.L. Sterling, “The GILA 
System for Global internet Licensing” online at www.qmipri.org/research.html.  
34 See C. above. 
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internet area through its domain names Dispute Resolution Service, and in any event, 
I believe that WIPO must be involved in seeking solutions of the issues to which I have 
referred in the course of this address. 
Collecting societies should, in my respectful view, establish a global licensing system 
on the lines described, or find some other practical and comprehensive method of 
dealing with the global use of protected material on the internet. Failure to do so will 
threaten the preservation of copyright in the new era, and success should guarantee 
the maintenance of copyright in the ever-increasing domain of borderless 
communication. 
We must not be like the Venetian Professors who met every Saturday evening to 
discuss how to prevent the flooding of Venice by the rising waters, and one evening 
looked down and saw that the waters had reached their knees. 
My plea is that all those who are concerned with copyright as rightowners, 
disseminators or users should agree on the best way forward. 
III THE WAY FORWARD AND CONCLUSION 
A The way forward 
1 COMBINED APPROACH: RIGHTOWNERS, DISSEMINATORS, USERS 
My view of the future of copyright is not confined to the challenges of the internet, but 
embraces the whole area of the issues in this field. A solution to the problems posed in 
the analogue and digital areas requires, in my view, collaboration of rightowners and 
their representatives, disseminators and users. I propose the formation of a universal 
copyright research alliance to achieve this. The alliance should bring together 
rightowners, and rightowners’ representatives, disseminators (including broadcasters, 
internet service providers and search engine service administrators) and 
representatives of users of protected material.  
The object of the alliance would be to undertake research in copyright and related 
rights issues, to seek consensus on such issues, wherever possible, and to make 
representations and reports to Governments and relevant national, regional and 
international organisations, academic and professional institutions, and others, 
concerning solutions to issues which have been the subject of research by the alliance, 
including but not limited to those raised by national and transborder communication 
of protected material. Participation in the alliance would be open to the relevant 
representatives of the respective sections, and their statements and views on the issues 
under study would be available for public comment. A convenor would be necessary 
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to initiate the project, and the alliance would operate through internet 
communication.  
2 FIXING THE GOALS 
The goals to be achieved should in my submission provide solutions for the issues 
which I have described and, in regard to the specific problems raised by the internet, 
should include 
(a)  acceptance by rightowners of the principle that the internet making-
available right should as far as possible be treated as territorially 
indivisible and should be mandated accordingly; 
(b)  establishment of a central licensing agency empowered to license on 
a global scale the use on the internet of all material protected by 
copyright and related rights; 
(c)  within the ambit of global licensing of protected material for use on 
the internet, provision of conditions permitting copying and 
transformative use by individuals within the strictly private sphere, 
with necessity for the relevant licence for file sharing or any further 
transmission of any protected material whether transformed or 
untransformed. 
In general, a major goal should be the education of the public (including students at 
the primary, secondary and tertiary levels) concerning the principles of, and practical 
information concerning the operation of, copyright and related rights. 
3 PLANNING  
Those interested in the maintenance and effective recognition of copyright should in 
my view now as a matter of urgency set about planning the achievements of the goals 
mentioned above. Whether this is done through the abovementioned alliance or 
otherwise is for those concerned to decide. 
B Conclusion 
Summing up, I would say that the issues facing copyright generally are, on the one 
hand, those which might be put in the “traditional” field – issues like the definition of 
joint authorship, protection of audiovisual performers and broadcasters etc. Of these 
issues, I believe one of the most difficult is that of orphan works, since the solution will 
require internationally agreed definitions and procedures to be fully effective. 
However, the demand of satisfying the needs of the information society will, I am 
confident, lead to solutions. 
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On the other hand, the technological issues present a much greater challenge: the 
challenge is not so much, I believe, as regards enforcement – the collaboration of ISPs 
and technological tracing measures should ensure that. The negative aspect of 
enforcement is that it achieves no benefits for rightowners, or for the economy, if it is 
not matched with effective licensing procedures.  
This is why I believe that, in a sense, the future capacity of copyright, as an effective 
legal discipline, to ensure recognition of copyright and related rights, lies not so much 
in the hands of the legislators, but, as abovementioned, in collaboration between 
rightowners and their representatives, disseminators and users. The creation of a 
global system of internet licensing should, where operating in conjunction with other 
licensing procedures, ensure the continuance of copyright and related rights and the 
benefits they bring to rightowners and the public alike.  
Thus we may say that the ball is in the court of the collecting societies and 
disseminators to participate in the collaboration I have suggested. I plead with them to 
get together, and save copyright from being strangled in the tentacles of technology, or 
submerged in uncontrolled piracy, to their detriment, and the detriment of the public. 
Nature (and law) abhors a vacuum, and a present vacuum in copyright is the absence 
of global internet licensing. I hope that rightowners and collecting societies, in 
collaboration with disseminators, will fill that vacuum. 
In the old era, the approach was “Give the author exclusive rights and let the legislator 
set the exceptions”. In the new era the approach should, I submit, be “Give the author 
exclusive rights and offer the rightowner the possibility of effective exercise of those 
rights by accepting fair and practical terms applicable to the use of protected material 
in the modern communication environment”. The alternative of uncompromising 
demand of the exercise of the exclusive right in the internet context will, in my view, 
result in the continuance and increase of unauthorised use, and, in the final scenario, 
threaten abolition of the right itself. 
At the outset of the address I promised not to lapse into anecdotes. I do want to 
mention, however, that at the conclusion of the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in 
1996, at which the WIPO Treaties on copyright and related rights were adopted, Dr. 
Arpad Bogsch (Director of WIPO) and I greeted each other, for the last time, had we 
but known it. “Sterling”, he said “these Treaties are only a step in the history of 
copyright. You and I will disappear, but copyright will continue.” Well, Dr Bogsch was 
always right, so that gives us confidence. 
Finally: in Tennyson’s great poem Ulysses, the old warrior looks back on his life and 
adventures, and he does not wish to remain in the past, but, in seeking the new, “to 
strive, to seek, to find and not to yield”: these words may, I suggest, provide the fitting 
motto for the copyright lawyer in the 21st Century. 
 
228 
ANNEX I  
Current issues in international, regional and national copyright 
(The listing does not purport to be comprehensive.) 
SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUES 
(1) Diversities in national systems  
(2) Diversities in international systems 
(3) Diversities in regional systems 
(4) Private international law 
(5) Balancing the interests of rightowners and the public 
(6) Discriminatory protection 
(7) Developing countries 
(8) Use of protected material in Space 
SECTION 2: PARTICULAR ISSUES (OTHER THAN THOSE 
CONCERNING DIGITIAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
INTERNET) 
(1) Definition and term of protection of works of joint authorship  
(2) Definition of place of broadcast  
(3)  Authorship of cinematographic works  
(4) Ownership of rights in employees’ works  
(5)  Scope and content of moral rights  
(6) Protection of databases  
(7) Protection of audiovisual performances  
(8) Protection of broadcasts  
(9) Protection of traditional works 
(10) Performers’ and record producers’ terms of protection 
(11) Transformative use 
(12) Rights management and licensing 
(13) Orphan works and other orphan material 
(14)  Decoder cards 
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SECTION 3: ISSUES CONCERNING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE INTERNET 
(1) Challenges to traditional concepts 
(2)  Challenges to definition and application of rights 
(3) Challenges to exercise of rights 
(4) Challenges to enforcement of rights 
(5)  Peer-to-peer file sharing 
(6) User-generated content 
(7) Content aggregation 
(8) Virtual worlds 
(9)  Online libraries 
(10) Liability of internet service providers 
(11)  Format shifting 
(12) Technological protection measures 
(13) Cloud computing 
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ANNEX II 
Global internet Licensing: legitimating file sharing and social networking: 
proposal for a global system 
Part I: General 
1  Introductory 
Administration of licences for the reproduction, communication to the public, and 
distribution, of copies of protected material (including authors’ works, performances, 
sound and film recordings and broadcasts) is, in general, conducted on a national 
basis, with reciprocal agreements between administering societies. However, online 
communication is basically global, and a general licensing system should be available 
which enables website operators, and others, to obtain globally effective licensing for 
the online communication of protected material. 
2  Key issue 
The challenge is to establish a general licensing system which enables prospective users 
to obtain permissions covering the online availability of protected material throughout 
the world, such system to be structured so as to afford, on the one hand, a practical 
and effective means of recognising rights in protected material, and on the other hand 
giving the public an effective means of prompt obtaining of the necessary licences on 
reasonable terms. The key issue is how to achieve this in a way that will provide 
legitimation for all forms of use of protected material on the internet, including file-
sharing and social networking. 
3.  Resolution 
A central licensing agency should be established to provide global licensing of online 
use of protected material. 
4  Proposal 
It is proposed that collecting societies establish a central licensing agency (GILA) 
empowered to issue global internet licences for the uploading and transmission of 
protected material throughout the world. For description of the proposed system see 
Part II below. 
 
 
Part II: The GILA System for Global internet Licensing: summary 
A Main features of the system 
1  Establishment of a central internet licensing agency by existing collecting 
societies, the agency to administer the licensing of use of protected material 
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on demand on the internet (“the internet right”), without territorial 
restriction. 
2  The structure of the system: the rightowner or rightowner’s representative 
globally mandates a collecting society (which then accordingly mandates 
GILA) or GILA directly with the administration of the internet right for the 
material concerned. 
3  Material mandated to GILA forms part of the GILA repertoire. Every item in 
the GILA repertoire has a GILA Identification Number (GIN), permitting 
administration of rights in, and tracing of online use of, protected material. 
4  The GILA home site contains details of all items of the GILA repertoire, and 
of the various categories of available licence. 
5  The prospective user (including file sharers and user-generated content 
uploaders) applies online for the required licence. If a global licence is 
required, this is issued by GILA. If a territorial licence is required, the 
applicant is referred to the relevant rightowner or rightowner’s representative 
or collecting society, where this information is available to GILA. 
6  Royalties paid to GILA are distributed to the rightowner, rightowner’s 
representative, or collecting society concerned. 
7  Structure, administrative procedures and licence conditions conform to 
competition rules. 
B  The licence system in practice 
Licences regarding hosting, file storage, file sharing, and social networking involving 
sound recordings or films, are taken as examples. 
1  Website operator, storer, social networking site operator (e.g. YouTube) and 
internet connection suppliers (ISPs) apply to GILA for a GILA internet 
Licence and are issued with the appropriate licence, with conditions, 
including payment terms where applicable. 
2  An internet user wishing to share files or upload items to a social networking 
site applies for a GILA File Sharer or File Uploader Licence to cover specific 
recordings. The licence is issued with conditions, including payment terms 
where applicable. The File Uploader Licence may be issued through the social 
networking site operator. 
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ANNEX III 
Australian Copyright Act 1968: Orphan works and other orphan material: a 
legislative proposal 
 
Part I: General 
1  Introductory 
The modern era demands effective and practical means for obtaining licences for the 
use of all legitimately available protected material (including authors’ works, 
performances, sound and film recordings and broadcasts). However, the owners of the 
rights in protected material may be unknown or untraceable (such material 
constituting “orphan material”).  
In the Copyright Act 1968, there are a number of provisions on limitations and 
exceptions to copyright law, but these provisions do not cover all possible cases where 
use is intended to be made of orphan material.  
2  Key issue 
The key issue is how to achieve the establishment of the conditions of legitimate use of 
all categories of orphan material from the inception of such use.  
3  Resolution of the key issue 
Legitimation of online and offline use of orphan material should, it is submitted, be 
effected by legislative provisions giving the necessary coverage for intended use. It is 
submitted that eight essential conditions need to be fulfilled in order to provide 
effective and comprehensive licensing of use of orphan material, namely: 
Condition 1:  Legislative solution 
Condition 2: Conformity to existing legislative structure 
Condition 3: Conformity to international and regional instruments 
Condition 4: Recognition of economic and moral rights 
Condition 5: Provision of remuneration 
Condition 6: Comprehensive coverage of rights 
Condition 7: Operational practicability 
Condition 8: Control of licence terms 
 
In practical terms, two cases need to be distinguished: (1) cases where there is a 
collecting society which administers the right in respect of which permission is needed 
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for the use of orphan material, and (2) cases where there is no collecting society 
administering the right concerned.  
Existing national systems regarding licensing of use of orphan material include (1) the 
Scandinavian Extended Collective Licensing (ECL) system, under which national 
legislation permits accredited collecting societies to license use of non-members’ 
works on approved terms, (2) the Canadian Tribunal application system (Canadian 
Copyright Act, section 77), and (3) the compulsory licence system (covering published 
works) under article 67 of the Japanese Copyright Law.1 The proposal here made 
provides comprehensive coverage of both cases outlined above and combines the 
features of the Scandinavian and Canadian systems to provide as rapid and 
comprehensive means as possible for the licensing of the use of orphan material.2  
4 Proposal 
The national copyright law should provide that a collecting society managing the 
relevant right may license, under defined terms, the use of orphan material where the 
relevant owner is (following reasonable enquiry) unknown or untraceable. If no 
collecting society administers the right involved, the prospective user should be able to 
obtain the necessary licence through application to the respective judicial entity (e.g. 
Copyright Tribunal).  
                                                             
1 For general summary of the problems involved in licensing of orphan material and of the 
Scandinavian and Canadian systems, see J.A.L. Sterling World Copyright Law (3rd ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008 paras 12.24, 12.32–12.37. For detailed description of the systems of Scandinavia, 
Canada and Japan, and of proposals considered in Australia and elsewhere, with comprehensive 
analysis of the issues involved, see Ian MacDonald “Some thoughts on orphan works”, 24/3 
Copyright Reporter 152 (October 2006), also available online. See also M. Rimmer “Finders keepers: 
copyright law and orphan works” (online at  
www.digital.org.au/alcc/slides/OrphanworksMRimmer.ppt). For details of US proposals see the US 
Copyright Office Register’s Report on Orphan Works, January 2006, at www.copyright.gov/orphan. 
The US proposals submitted to Congress (lapsed Bills S2913, HR5889) under which claims of 
persons suing for unauthorised use of orphan material would be subject to limited damages, did not, 
it is submitted, provide solutions comprehensively recognising the interests of the rightowners and 
users, since remedies under these proposals were limited by statute in advance, and on initial use the 
user would be an infringer. No statutory system for dealing with the licensing of orphan material has 
yet been adopted in the UK: see British Copyright Council proposal at 
 www.britishcopyright.org/pdfs/policy/2009_001.pdf, and note also the lapsed proposal in clause 43 
of the Digital Economy Bill, see main text, II D 4 above. 
2 For a parallel proposal in the context of UK law, with detailed description of the operation of the 
system, see J.A.L. Sterling “Orphan works and other orphan material: proposed amendments to UK 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988: the “legitimated use” system” online at  
www.qmipri.org/research.html.  
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The amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 as proposed in Part II below concern a 
system for the legitimation of the use of orphan material, based on (a) administration 
through a collecting society, or (b) where no relevant collecting society exists, consent 
obtained through application to the Copyright Tribunal. It is submitted that this 
proposal conforms to the eight essential conditions described under 3 above, and as 
regards Condition 2, the Copyright Act 1968 provides the legislative structure for 
administration of orphan material by collecting societies (in defined cases and under 
approved rules). It is emphasised that the proposals are for a basis of discussion, and 
there may be other forms of amendment to achieve application of these two principles. 
 
Part II: Proposed amendments concerning orphan works and other orphan 
material 
 
Insert new provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 as follows:  
 
(“Protected material” means any subject matter or performance in which copyright or 
performer’s right of action exists by virtue of the Act, “declared collecting society” 
means a body declared to be a collecting society in accordance with the provisions of 
the Act, and “Copyright Tribunal” means the Copyright Tribunal of Australia.) 
Provision 1  Provision that where an owner of a right granted by the Act has not 
transferred management of such right to a declared collecting society 
and where the identity or whereabouts of such owner cannot be 
ascertained by reasonable enquiry, a declared collecting society 
which manages rights of the same category shall be deemed to be 
mandated to manage such right in accordance with a licence scheme 
approved by the Copyright Tribunal, and a use covered by a licence 
validly issued by such society under such scheme as so mandated 
shall be treated as licensed by such owner. 
Provision 2 Provision (a) that the Copyright Tribunal may, on the application of 
a person wishing to use an item of protected material, give consent 
to such use in a case where the identity or whereabouts of the person 
entitled to exercise the right to authorise such use cannot be 
ascertained by reasonable enquiry, and where no declared collecting 
society is mandated in accordance with Provision 1, in respect of 
management of rights of the category concerned, and (b) that such 
consent has effect as consent of the person entitled to exercise the 
right to authorise the use concerned. 
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Provision 3 Provision that no civil or criminal liability under the Act will result 
from issuing of, or acting in accordance with, a licence granted 
under Provision 1, or acting in accordance with consent given under 
Provision 2. 
Provision 4 Provision that a rightowner to whom Provisions 1 or 2 apply, has the 
same rights and obligations, resulting from any relevant agreement 
between the licensee and the licensing body, as have rightowners 
who have transferred management of their rights to that licensing 
body. 
Additional  
Provisions  Provisions concerning relevant functions and powers of the 
Copyright Tribunal, conditions to apply to licence schemes, claims 
by revenant rightowners and period within which such claims must 
be made etc. 
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ANNEX IV 
Asian Pacific Copyright Association (APCA) 
Proposal for formation 
Part I: Introductory 
The Pacific Region as a whole may be seen as composed of the regions to the west and 
east respectively of the International Date Line (IDL). The region to the west of the 
IDL may be called the Asian Pacific Region, including Russia, China, Korean 
peninsula, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Brunei, East Timor, Japan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea 
and Pacific island States, e.g. Fiji. The region to the east of the IDL may be called the 
Eastern Pacific Region, including Canada, United States, Mexico, Panama, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Chile, the Hawaiian and Marshall Islands, Samoa etc.  
All countries in the Pacific Region have copyright laws, and it is thus possible to 
envisage an overall association of countries of the Asian Pacific Region on the one 
hand and of the Eastern Pacific Region and the other, both coming together in a 
Pacific Region Copyright Association. That, however, is a long term prospect and 
irrespective of whether it is eventually achieved it is submitted that, as far as the Asian 
Pacific Region is concerned, the formation of the Asian Pacific Copyright Association 
(APCA), to provide a forum for the discussion and seeking of consensus on copyright 
issues in the region, will be of immediate value to the peoples of the whole area, who at 
present speak on copyright with different voices, often unaware of the views and needs 
of other countries in the region. 
From the international point of view, it is notable that the European Union consists of 
27 countries with facilities to formulate common copyright policies throughout the 
Union. With EU membership including countries such as the UK, France and 
Germany, which have influence in the copyright area, this gives the European Union a 
notable strength of negotiation in putting its views on copyright at the international 
level. There are also the provisions regarding copyright in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) embracing Canada, Mexico and the USA, and in South 
America in the Cartagena Agreement.  
In the Asian Pacific Region, there is at present no regional copyright association, yet 
the Region includes a large percentage of the world’s population, and its countries are 
bound by economic and other ties: they also have important cultural traditions and 
authors, artists and musicians of world renown. The copyright laws of the region are 
also of interest, representing or reflecting, as they do, the three main traditions of 
copyright legislation: the common law system (e.g. in Australia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore), the civil law system (e.g. in Cambodia, Russia, Vietnam), and 
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systems combining features of the common law and civil law systems, and additional 
features (e.g. China, Japan). 
Copyright law, or laws related to copyright, protect and foster the maintenance and 
protection of the rights of authors and of those engaged in the performance, 
production and dissemination of creative works, including performers, film and 
record producers and broadcasters.  
Because of modern means of communication, including satellite broadcasting and the 
internet, national copyright laws need to be assessed in the light of international and 
regional considerations, as well as national. In addition, the advent of the internet and 
the facilities it offers renders it essential to ensure that material protected by copyright 
is accessible by the public on fair and reasonable terms, and in accordance with 
systems that guarantee, on the one hand, the preservation of the interests of 
rightowners, and on the other, the recognition of the public interest in ready access to 
all available material.  
It is suggested that the nations of the Asian Pacific Region should, through their 
respective governments, academic and professional institutions, organisations 
representing authors, performers, film and sound recording producers and 
broadcasters should, in conjunction with those representing other disseminators of 
protected material (including internet service providers), and with representatives of 
the public interest and individuals interested in the maintenance of copyright, form 
the Asian Pacific Copyright Association (APCA) with the objective of promoting the 
maintenance and development of copyright and related rights in the Region. 
The Association should seek recognition by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, UNESCO, and other international 
bodies so that it can put forward the views of APCA and ensure that the needs and 
concerns of the people of the Asian Pacific Area in the field of copyright and related 
rights are taken into consideration by the international community in all discussions 
and international treaty negotiations concerning such rights. 
It is suggested that a Planning Committee be set up to forward the implementation of 
this proposal, with a view to holding a foundation meeting. As a start, prospective 
National Groups can be formed before the foundation of the Association, and two or 
more such Groups could effect such foundation. 
Part II: Suggested structure and procedure 
The following is suggested as a basis for discussion in planning the structure and 
procedure of APCA. 
A  General 
1 Constitution and objective  
2 Membership 
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3  Organs and Officers:  
a General Assembly 
b Officers 
c National Groups 
d Regional Council 
e Executive Committee 
f Secretariat  
4 Meetings 
5 Finance 
6 Areas of activity 
 
B  Planning Committee 
C Foundations and Constitution 
 
A  General 
1 Constitution and objective 
An association with the objective of promoting, through legislation, dialogue and 
education, the maintenance and development of copyright and related rights in the 
Asian and Pacific Region (i.e., that region embracing the countries and territories 
located in or bordering on the Pacific Ocean west of the International Date Line, 
including Russia, China, Korean peninsula, Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, East Timor, Japan, Philippines, Australia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Pacific island States, e.g., Fiji). 
2 Membership 
Membership of the Association to be open to any person or organisation located in the 
Asian Pacific Region, and interested in the objective of APCA. Associate membership 
to be open to interested persons or organisations located outside the area (e.g., in 
Canada, India, U.S.A.) 
3  Organs and Officers 
a  General Assembly of members of the Association. 
b  Officers: President, Vice Presidents, Secretary General: elected by 
General Assembly. 
c  National Groups consisting of members of the Association located in 
the respective countries. 
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d Regional Council consisting of the Officers and of delegates of the 
National Groups, one delegate per country. 
e Executive Committee consisting of the Officers and of persons 
appointed by the Regional Council. 
f Secretariat of the Association, headed by the Secretary General. 
4 Meetings 
Meetings of the General Assembly, the Regional Council, the Executive Committee 
and National Groups to take place in accordance with the respective rules of those 
bodies. 
5 Finance 
The funds of the Association to be constituted by membership fees, donations and 
subventions, and administered by the Secretariat. 
6 Areas of activity 
The areas of activity of the Association to include the following items, as determined 
and developed by the organs of the Association: 
a  APCA website to include Association documents and material on 
current issues, national, regional and international developments, 
etc. 
b  Establishment of common positions of countries of the Asian Pacific 
Region regarding representations on specific issues in regional and 
international conferences and initiatives on copyright and related 
rights. 
c  Research in copyright and related rights laws of the Asian Pacific 
Region including preparation of “Asian Pacific Copyright Guide” 
and other material on copyright and related rights. 
d  Participation in international discussions and negotiations 
concerning copyright and related rights. 
B  Planning Committee  
A Planning Committee to be established to initiate the steps necessary for carrying 
forward the proposal for formation of the Association, and the ways and means to 
accomplish this.  
C  Foundation and Constitution 
Two or more prospective National Groups to found and adopt the Constitution of the 
Association. 
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18 
DINNER ADDRESS 
 
Senator Kate Lundy1 
 
 
I’d like to begin tonight by illustrating the beauty of open access to intellectual 
property. I am going to borrow a thought from Lawrence Lessig, who in turn is 
borrowing from someone else. I think it contextualises my comments. 
Lawrence wrote this of the US Republican Party a couple of years ago: 
Increasingly, the party – as conservative columnist Bruce Bartlett says of 
George Bush in his book, Impostor – is “incapable of telling the difference 
between being pro-business and being for the free market. It favors specific 
competitors rather than favoring competition. What’s good for the US is 
more and more often translated into what’s good for powerful friends. Or so 
policy in America could be summarized today. Such pro-business and anti-
efficiency policies will continue to prevail until someone in our political 
system begins to articulate principles on the other side. And given the way 
money talks in capitals around the country, this is a stance only those out of 
power can afford to take.  
Now, me being me. 
All political parties have difficulty lifting their thinking above the interests of 
entrenched incumbents within markets. More so now than probably at any time since 
the Great Depression. 
The rise of organised corporate interest groups has created a tremendous imbalance in 
the volume of the voices in debates around public policy. That is not a mischief on the 
                                                             
1 Senator Kate Lundy has been the Labor Party member for the Australian Capital Territory in 
the Commonwealth Parliament since 1996 and in 2009 was a Labor Party backbencher. In 2010, 
she became Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister and Parliamentary Secretary for 
Immigration and Citizenship. She has a special interest in communications and intellectual 
property issues and is a long-term member of the Senate Environment, Communications and the 
Arts Committee. This speech and further information is at 
www.katelundy.com.au/2009/05/28/copyright-future-dinner-address/. She gave this speech on 
the evening of 27 May 2009.  
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part of the voices that are organised. They are just doing their job. But it does create a 
problem for policy makers. 
When there is a considerable imbalance in power and influence, never underestimate 
how self-fulfilling it can become. 
This is a potentially controversial thing to say, but this has been no more evident than 
in the debate about around intellectual property, and especially copyright. I don’t want 
to give the impression that the problem is a party-political one. But it is a simple fact 
that those representing the case for the expansive and expanding use of copyright to 
protect their interests have all but drowned out alternative voices representing the 
broad public interest.  
For example, routinely, pejorative terms like “pirate” have entered the vernacular to 
describe the people breaching what copyright owners claim to be their rights, even if 
no crime has been committed. This is despite the detailed and ongoing legal challenges 
from both sides about personal use. This is a reflection of the power and influence of 
these incumbent interests. 
The observation I make is that the debate is decidedly one-sided. Perhaps more so here 
in Australia that the US, where there at least appears to be a more sophisticated debate 
around the purpose and merit of IP and copyright law in relation to rights protection 
in the digital age. 
This concerns me greatly and if I can make a difference, I want it to be ensuring that 
the public debate is balanced and well-informed. I want to see that both sides in the 
copyright and IP debates have a voice, are heard in Parliament and their respective 
positions are equally understood and considered when decisions are made. 
The first step to rectifying the imbalance in the public debate is to ensure that policy 
decision making is open: open to scrutiny and open to participation. It requires, in 
fact, a new openness in our democracy. The Labor Government is acting to restore 
confidence in democratic processes by opening up the operation of government and 
public sector information and removing the frustrating ‘unknowns’ of political and 
bureaucratic decision making that lead to cynicism and apathy. 
It is a chance – maybe the last this generation will have — to give form and substance 
to the concept of, and I quote another famous American: “Government of the people, 
by the people, for the people…, (shall not perish from the earth)”. (Abraham 
Lincoln) 
A quick read of a my colleague Senator Faulkner’s Speech at the launch of 
“Information Awareness Month” will inspire you, as a dramatic change has occurred 
in the attitude of the Australian federal Government since the last election when Labor 
came to office. 
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The program for building the national broadband network provides the time frame 
and platform to reset the operating system of government. It will close the digital 
divide. Never has there been a greater genuine opportunity for positive and 
progressive change for active participation in our democratic processes.  
The NBN combine with a raft of cross-portfolio initiatives to usher in a new era of 
greater freedom of information, earlier access to archived records, open government 
initiatives, more interactive citizen and business services online and the next steps in 
the digital deluge project, Australia is well and truly on the cusp of transformational 
change in how we function as a society. It’s a chance to raise accountability through 
openness and transparency. 
HOWEVER, working against a new way of making policy are the same old militating 
factors that in the past have inhibited participation by the broadest cross section of 
interests.  
I have personal experience in just how pervasive the influence of sectional interest 
groups operating in a closed decision-making environment can be. 
No-one, not even legislators are safe! While the Australian democratic system is free of 
some of the blatant corporate donation culture that is rife the US, power and influence 
is still very real and operates in a range of ways.  
Not least of these is in the negotiation of trade agreements, where deals can be 
negotiated in virtual secrecy, and usually only legislated with the openness afforded by 
institutional parliamentary debate once signed. 
I want to share with you some observations in relation to the Australia-US Free trade 
agreement.  
In the lead up to the 2004 election, the Howard Government was in the throes of the 
final negotiations of the AUSFTA. The Labor Opposition was under the pump to 
declare a position on the proposed agreement. To help inform its view, Labor 
instigated a Senate Inquiry into the proposed agreement.  
The Senate Select Committee embarked upon a detailed exploration of the issues, 
including the ramifications on IP law in Australia, including patent law and copyright. 
It was clear from what the US was asking for that they were using FTA’s to propagate 
the recent changes in IP law, such as the so-called “Mickey Mouse” amendments, to 
extend copyright protection and the provisions of the DMCA to digital content, to 
other nations: particularly those where the content owners had a large and specific 
interest in the market. 
While I was not a sitting member on that particular Senate Committee, I took a deep 
interest in my capacity as shadow minister for information Technology and the Arts. It 
was, after all, the IP, copyright and local content provisions that directly impacted on 
these sectors in Australia, and their ability to innovate and grow into the future.  
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It seemed these provisions were unchallenged by the then Howard Government and 
they ended up being the subject of fierce contention at the Senate Inquiry. The voices 
of both sides of the debate were heard thanks to the Senate committee process. 
It is a credit to many in this room that the implications of co-opting US-style IP and 
copyright law received a comprehensive airing. The difference between the interests of 
the market, in this case a thriving innovative Australian ICT sector, and business, 
being the incumbent corporate interests, WERE clearly articulated. 
The 20-or so specific recommendations arising out of Chapter 3, which was devoted 
to intellectual property in the Senate Report, were prefaced by the following comment: 
A major concern of Labor Senators is that Australia entered into the IP obligations of 
the Agreement in a manner that cut across established processes for copyright law 
reform and which did not appear to be part of a strategic vision of intellectual 
property. 
Labor Senators were also concerned that it was difficult to get a comprehensive 
explanation from Government officials on many of the implications of the FTA on 
Australia’s IP regime 
Note that this second point starkly illustrates the lack of openness! 
The big questions were these: were the reservations and concerns about the IP 
implications enough to have the ALP opposition either oppose or force modifications 
of the Proposed FTA? And, if so, would the Senate support the approach adopted by 
the ALP? 
For my part, I spoke out about the innovation-inhibiting effects signing up to the 
AUSFTA would have on local content production, the local ICT industry, open source 
and other software development, scientific endeavour and related innovation and ICT 
procurement. 
These comments received widespread coverage and a furore erupted in the media that 
gave a voice to the many citizens who had harboured concerns, but had not found a 
way to express them: and there was renewed interest in groups who had articulated 
concerns. Airing their views meant a spotlight fell on the intellectual property aspects 
of AUSFTA.  
I can tell you now that the media interest in my comments did not endear me to the 
Leader. The AUSFTA had powerful support, on top of his concerns about being 
perceived as anti-American. But once the door was open to other voices, the balance of 
the debate shifted and the concerns with the agreement were seen as legitimate. 
After lots of political machinations, the end result was that federal Labor successfully 
moved a series of amendments that modified at least some of the worst aspects of the 
Agreement. 
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I tell this story because it’s an issue I know you are familiar with, but also as an 
example of the challenges in accessing the information necessary to make informed 
policy decision as well as showing our democracy in action. 
In my view it was the combination of the institutional scrutiny provided by the Senate 
Committee process, AND the unleashing of community opinion through the media 
once facts were at hand that led to the changes in the Agreement. 
It is a great example of how greater openness and improved participation becomes 
mutually supportive of alternative views. In this case, they were expressed first inside a 
small, informed community, then in the Parliament, and then in the broader 
community.  
Ladies and Gentlemen: we need each other. And that is how the system of democracy 
is supposed to work. 
In my opening comments I reflected on the opportunity the NBN creates to close the 
digital divide and become the enabling network on which to reset our democracy in 
firm principles of open government and freedom of information. 
It is with these aspirations in mind that we need to work together to make sure the 
public debate that informs this transformation is balanced, inclusive and informed. 
This is the approach espoused by the Rudd Labor Government before, during and 
after the 2007 election. 
The value of openness, sharing ideas, collaboration and collective innovation need to 
be re-inserted into the debates about IP. There is an opportunity for the Government 
to lead the way with public sector information and the signs are good. We all have a 
role to play to ensure this direction is supported and encouraged through widespread 
discussion and debate. 
The tension between open information and copyrighted material will once again be 
heightened as the public debate proceeds about the merits of openness for public 
sector information. 
What needs to change is the voices on the alternative side of the copyright debate need 
to be loud enough, co-ordinated enough, supported enough and endorsed enough to 
balance the currently one-sided domination of the debate. 
I commend those initiating and involved in the idea of bringing together a group 
concerned about these issues. I understand the aims and objectives to include: 
“Raising the standard of awareness of the full range of copyright issues affecting the 
various stakeholder and constituent groups, such that robust discussions on relative 
priorities and aims could be held across a wide range of organisations.” 
This development is essential and I look forward to supporting your application: well-
organised and well-resourced representation of the public interest is long overdue. 
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It is also essential because the transformational effect of open and accessible public 
sector information will inform the benefits of open access and creative commons 
information across the private sector as well. We can lead by example. 
Let’s make the most of the opportunity it represents! 
Thank you for listening. 
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19 
COPYRIGHT FREEDOM: CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
 
Professor Brian Fitzgerald 
 
 
In organising this conference it was my aim to put focus on the way in which 
copyright law might be used to incentivize both creativity and dissemination. In itself 
that is not such a revolutionary ideal. Creativity and dissemination have been the key 
components of copyright law since the Statute of Anne was first enacted in 1710.1 
Yet copyright law and the freedom to disseminate have become enemies, if not in the 
last one hundred years certainly in the last ten years. The notion of copyright 
ownership as a sovereign right to control dissemination has become a core part of 
copyright law subject to limitations, exceptions and statutory licences. But in a world 
where the networked environment is throwing up endless dissemination possibilities 
many of which are beyond the reach and comprehension of the copyright owner the 
sovereign right to control seems out of place and potentially damaging at a social and 
economic level. 
One starts to wonder whether we can decouple creation/production from 
dissemination/use and imagine a digital utopia in which anyone can lawfully 
(re)distribute anything on the proviso that adequate revenues flow back to the 
appropriate parties. The Google Book Settlement for all its flaws is leading us in this 
direction.2 Google in setting up the project challenged the control of the copyright 
owners in the name of more widespread dissemination and ultimately the settlement 
provides for a flow of revenue, a fair share of which did not exist before.  
While the Google Book Settlement is evidence that new possibilities are not too far off, 
the pace at which the established industries have embraced the new technologies is slow 
and unacceptable. In this regard it is worth noting a recent file-sharing case in the US in 
                                                             
1 The Statute of Anne (1710) was stated to be an “Act for the encouragement of learning …” See also 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, et al. v. Nation Enterprises, et al. 471 US 539 (1985). 
2 See generally: “Google Book Search Settlement Agreement” in Wikipedia 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Book_Search_Settlement_Agreement. 
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which Harvard law professor Charles Nesson somewhat controversially sought to argue 
the fair use defence.  
While rejecting the notion that peer to peer file sharing was covered by fair use, Judge 
Nancy Gertener, presiding in the case, explained that, “a defendant who used the new 
file-sharing networks in the technological interregnum before digital media could be 
purchased legally, but who later shifted to paid outlets, might … be able to rely on the 
defense.”3 This reasoning raises some interesting questions.  
To what extent are the copyright owners obligated to engage with new technologies (to 
exploit the affordances of Web 2.0) in going about their business? Is it fair for 
copyright owners to dumb down dissemination to the point of inefficiency for their 
own private (yet at times sub-optimal) gain? Followers of the sovereign right to control 
ethos will argue that the copyright owner can do what they wish – they are the ruler of 
their manor.  
Yet, as Boyle, and others, have highlighted through analogies with environmental law,4 
our legal system no longer accepts the unfettered exercise of real property rights in the 
face of negative externalities. Merely owning a factory no longer suggests a sovereign 
right to pollute the air or the waterway. To what extent can copyright owners limit or 
stifle the freedom to disseminate via digital networks by refusing to engage with it? 
One hope is that the next ten years will see a period of uninhibited collaboration 
between the key stakeholders. How can we get the publishing, recording and film 
industries to join with the whiz kids of the Internet era to provide an environment 
where creativity can be disseminated to the broadest possible audience in the most 
efficient and effective manner? And what role for copyright? 
It is hoped that market forces will draw these key actors together, but more could be 
needed. International stakeholder forums (convened by WIPO or the WTO) should be 
considered. Another approach would be to reconsider the role copyright law can play 
in incentivizing dissemination. Should copyright owners be obligated to engage more 
with new technology and if so how could copyright law accommodate such a concept?  
Nesson saw it as fitting in with the notion of an exception or a defence while others 
might see it as being raised in a discussion about the scope of the “exclusivity” of the 
                                                             
3 Memo of Justice Nancy Gertner in the case: Sony BMG Music Entertainment v Tenenbaum 
(2009) U.S. Dist Lexis 112845 (7 December 2009). pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-
bin/recentops.pl?filename=gertner/pdf/tenenbaumfairusedec7th09finalng.pdf at [8]. 
4 J. Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism For the Net?” (1997) 47 Duke 
Law Journal 87, www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/Intprop.htm Cf. M Geist, “Brazil's Approach on 
Anti-Circumvention: Penalties For Hindering Fair Dealing” 9 July 2010 
www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5180/125/. 
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owner’s right.5 On the other hand should intermediaries be obligated to work with 
owners to find solutions? If necessary this could entail restructuring secondary liability 
rules. 
In an era where information flow is seen as a key ingredient to social and economic 
life6 we need to shape a copyright law that accommodates social practices and builds 
prosperity on the back of dissemination. Taken slightly out context the words of Brett 
Cottle Head of the Australian Performing Rights Authority (APRA) are apt to describe 
the sentiment: “It's not an issue of control or permission, it's an issue of fair payment 
for use.”7  
 
                                                             
5 Competition or antitrust law also has the potential to play a role here: B. Fitzgerald, “Digital 
Property: The Ultimate Boundary?”(2001) 7 Roger Williams University Law Journal 47 
eprints.qut.edu.au/7406/1/DigitalPropertyRWUJOurnalFinalFeb2002.pdf , as might taxation law.  
6 See generally K. Dopfer and J Potts, The General Theory of Economic Evolution (2008) Routledge 
UK. 
7 ABC Radio National, Background Briefing: Internet Piracy 
www.abc.net.au/rn/backgroundbriefing/stories/2009/2726710.htm . 
A second order issue will be what “use” is and should be remunerable? Cf. Review of the Intellectual 
Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement, AGPS, 2000 (Ergas Report) at 5: 
‘Balancing between incentives to invest in innovation on one hand, and for efficient diffusion of 
innovation on the other, is a central, and perhaps the crucial, element in the design of intellectual 
property laws.’; L Ray Patterson, ‘Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use’, Vanderbilt Law Review, Jan 
1987, Vol 40 No 1. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
The Hon Greg James, QC1 
 
 
The conference at which the papers which comprise this book were delivered was 
convened to mark the 40-year anniversary of the commencement of Australia’s 
Copyright Act in 1968.   As can be seen from the papers, it sought to place the issues in 
copyright law in both their historical and their contemporary contexts.  Those issues 
have increasingly attracted national and international scrutiny, as was pointed out to 
the attendees by Senator Lundy in her speech at the conference dinner. 
In his foreword, the Hon Michael Kirby surveys the current debates on copyright law 
and intellectual property from an international and human rights law perspective.  
Those debates informed not only the conference papers, but also the robust 
discussions.  The varied papers produced for the conference reflected those debates, as 
well as governmental and legislative views, and also the history of the legislation in 
Australia and internationally. The technological revolution has allowed the global 
public to access information through the internet, which, particularly recently, has 
dramatically changed the climate in relation to copyright and intellectual property law. 
Since the conference, the release by Wikileaks of documentation of a broad-ranging 
kind relating to the affairs of various governments has fuelled the existing global 
debate as to what material might be retained confidentially, for what purposes, and 
what material should be disseminated or published or generated, so as to serve a public 
interest in being informed, and in rewarding creativity and providing access to 
knowledge. Those considerations have to be weighed in intensely political 
“democracy/free-speech” dialectic.   
In that context, it is not surprising that the proceedings of the conference were 
vigorous.  The papers covered a broad diversity of topics.  The attendees plainly 
enjoyed, indeed even immersed themselves in, the more arcane history of copyright 
                                                             
1 The Hon Greg James, QC, was one of the youngest Queens Counsel appointed in NSW history, 
and a leading advocate in Australian and international courts. He was a judge of the NSW 
Supreme Court and a South Australian Royal Commissioner. He is President of the NSW Mental 
Health Review Tribunal, which conducts about 10,500 hearings annually, and one of the NSW 
Law Reform Commissioners.  The Hon Greg James QC is Adjunct Professor at the School of Law 
Southern Cross University, and Visiting Professor and Chair of the Curriculum Committee at the 
Law School University of Western Sydney. 
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law, in particular in Australia, and in the more far-reaching development of 
international and global approaches to copyright, including the examination of 
different philosophical viewpoints which might underlie modern copyright and 
informed access, as discussed by Professor Lessig and Professor Fitzgerald. 
It has become clear to those of us who have spent our lives, as Michael Kirby did, 
growing up without being almost symbiotically linked to computers, that our concepts 
both of the technology, and of the application of existing copyright law and 
philosophy to the dissemination of knowledge, are dramatically out of date.  Those 
who have grown up and lived with the freedom the internet has given bring an entirely 
different perspective to the concepts of copyright, and to the incentive that the public 
interest, by recognising property in works and protecting them by copyright laws, 
affords to creators.   The public domain and free access were matters of significance 
for all concerned with copyright legislation and enforcement, and hence the value of 
such concepts and how legislation might accommodate them were the focus of much 
attention.   
The conference attempted to accommodate both older conservatism and legalism and 
more modern liberal attitudes.  More modern developments as described in the paper 
made it plain to those of us not attuned to the freedom of dissemination now available, 
and not attuned to the degree of control over that freedom of dissemination that States 
and large corporations might wish to exercise, that we need, in the world’s interest, to 
be well aware of all the issues for debate and their fullest ramifications.   
The conference concluded with an examination of current issues raised by Professor 
Sterling relating to his experiences over 55 years of his work in international copyright 
law, and to his views for the future.  The remarks made in his paper foreshadow the 
necessity for the principles and values of copyright to be examined continuously 
globally, rather than nationally, more national recognition, and for the secure 
protection of those works which, in the global public interest, contribute to 
international knowledge rights in works.  
Professor Sterling set out a list of important current and future issues at Annexure 1 to 
his paper, and a proposal for global internet licensing in Annexure 2.  He had debated 
during the conference those issues with the conference attendees, and they had been 
the subject of vigorous examination.  They should be re-examined in the context of his 
proposals for reform to the Australian Copyright Act in respect of orphan works and 
other orphan material, for the formation of an Asian Pacific Copyright Association, 
and for the development eventually of a global association, which would meet the 
increasingly realised world needs to secure the original objects of copyright protection.  
When one examines the influences that Professor Fitzgerald, who had convened the 
conference, refers to in his concluding remarks, in the context of the vigorous public 
debate, private argument and conscientious enquiry that attended the conference, one 
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is left with a high degree of admiration for the contributions made by the authors and 
the attendees.  
I commend to all these papers, and particularly Professor Sterling’s proposals, in the 
hope that, after this conference, the debate will continue, with focus on issues which 
may enable, at a future conference, a further fruitful discussion of a possible and 
effective global copyright system.  
Greg James 
February 2011 
252 
INDEX 
 
Asian Pacific Copyright Association 
(APCA), 236, 237, 239, 250 
Atkinson, Benedict, 1, 20, 23, 47, 63, 
102, 103, 108 
Attorney General’s Department (Cth), 
15, 36, 37, 43, 46, 47, 54, 56, 57, 107, 
109, 152, 153, 172, 185 
Australasian Performing Right Society 
(APRA), 36, 41, 59, 61, 62, 131, 248 
Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement 2005, 11, 44, 101, 183, 
197, 242, 243 
Bannerman, Sara, 44, 102 
Barambah, Maroochy, 155, 156 
Berne Convention 1886, The, 34, 35, 
36, 39, 40, 41, 44, 48, 50, 52, 59, 63, 
69, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 88, 103, 
181, 203 
borderless regulation, 203, 204 
Bowen, The Hon Nigel, 15, 16, 56, 109 
Boyle, James, 136, 181, 187, 188, 197, 
247 
Canada, 37, 44, 58, 63, 79, 82, 83, 84, 
86, 88, 90, 92, 93, 95, 236 
Cohen, Julie, 181 
compulsory licence, 40, 57, 83, 120, 
183, 184, 233 
compulsory licensing, 83, 88, 182, 184 
Copyright Act 1905 (Cth), 21, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 48, 52, 102 
Copyright Act 1911 (UK), 35, 39, 40, 
41, 43, 49, 52, 54, 55, 75, 76, 102, 
166, 171 
Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 34, 35, 39, 
40, 49, 52, 54, 166, 171 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 1, 3, 15, 36, 
44, 52, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 97, 98, 99, 
100, 101, 102, 162, 163, 164, 166, 
168, 173, 176, 177, 178, 215, 232, 
234, 249 
copyright freedom, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
44, 73, 78, 114 
copyright future, 1, 20, 23, 24, 25, 122, 
206, 225 
copyright history, 21, 35, 38, 41, 44, 
47, 59, 73, 79, 86, 103, 205, 227, 249 
copyright policy, 17, 18, 32, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 66, 73, 76, 77, 91, 
147, 150, 153 
Copyright Wars, The, 114, 118, 120, 
121, 123, 135, 138 
Crown copyright, 162, 163, 167, 168, 
169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 
178, 182, 185 
Curtis, Lindsay, 56, 57, 107, 109 
Cutler, Terry, 147, 184 
domain, 186 
educational statutory licence, 3, 67, 68, 
69, 70, 100, 180, 184, 246 
exceptions, 6, 14, 18, 61, 95, 98, 99, 
101, 135, 136, 137, 144, 182, 183, 
253 
184, 204, 210, 212, 218, 219, 222, 
224, 227, 232, 246 
fair dealing, 40, 60, 67, 68, 70, 99, 180, 
182, 184, 210 
Fitzgerald, Brian, 20, 63, 109 
Frankel, Susy, 72, 102, 103 
Franki Committee, The, 65, 66, 67, 68, 
69, 70, 71, 102 
Franki Report (1975), 65, 102 
Gilchrist, John, 21, 102, 107 
Global Internet Licensing system 
(GILA), 224, 227, 230, 231, 250 
Google, 3, 6, 23, 24, 246 
Google Book Settlement, 23, 24, 246 
Gorell Report 1909 (UK), 36, 52, 54 
Greenleaf, Graham, 63 
Gregory Report 1952 (UK), 43, 44, 47, 
52, 55 
Gruen, Nicholas, 187 
human rights, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 249 
import controls, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42 
innovation policy, 147, 148, 149, 151 
International Federation of 
Phonographic Industries (IFPI), 51, 
53, 56 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 18, 
121, 131, 207, 208, 210, 223, 225, 
227, 229, 231, 237 
James, The Hon Greg, 249 
Keating, Senator John, 34, 38, 39, 40 
kinship systems, 157, 159, 160 
Kirby, The Hon Michael, 49, 249, 250 
Lessig, Lawrence, 4, 23, 109, 128, 181, 
183, 184, 211, 216, 224, 240, 250 
Litman, Jessica, 136 
locus of control, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 
41, 44 
Lundy, Senator Kate, 240, 249 
Magic Pudding, The, 185, 186 
middle powers (copyright), 44, 79, 80, 
92, 93, 103 
New Zealand, 32, 48, 64, 73, 75, 76, 77, 
102, 103, 121 
Old Parliament House, Canberra, 1, 2, 
21, 51, 57 
orphan works, 207, 208, 215, 218, 219, 
226, 228, 232, 233, 234, 250 
parallel imports, 18, 40, 77, 78, 101, 
103 
peer-to-peer, 118, 120, 121, 204, 208, 
217, 218, 220, 222, 229, 247 
piracy, 39, 54, 118, 123, 130, 184, 227, 
241 
public domain, 137, 138, 142, 181, 186, 
250 
public sector, 149, 151, 154, 244, 245 
public sector information, 151, 162, 
170, 173, 178, 179, 185, 241, 244, 
245 
radio ban, 36, 42 
remix, 4, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 128, 
129, 130, 137, 142, 151, 196, 211 
Rome Conference 1928 (revising the 
Berne Convention), 35, 36, 53, 56, 
58 
Royal Commission on Performing 
Rights Report 1933, 42, 43 
Smith, Adam, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 
193, 194, 196, 197, 198 
Spicer Committee, The, 44, 46, 48, 54, 
56, 102 
254 
Spicer Report (1959), 52, 54, 56 
Sterling, Adrian, 2, 4, 10, 21, 73, 102, 
109, 250 
Supreme Court of the United States, 
112, 118, 187 
three-strike proposal, 121 
totemic identity, 157, 160 
Turrbal traditional laws, 156, 157 
Web 2.0, 25, 188, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
197, 198, 199, 247 
Wikimedia, 127 
Wikipedia, 115, 127, 182, 185, 193, 
194, 196, 199 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, 2, 58, 
59, 201, 203, 209, 210, 223, 227 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 94 
World Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty 1996, 58, 59, 203 
World Trade Organization (WTO), 7, 
11, 12, 62, 237, 247 
Zines, Leslie, 20, 21, 46, 102, 108 
 
